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ing his computer science perspectives and for offering constant support throughout
the entire process. Their support has made this dissertation significantly better.
I have also benefited greatly from the weekly discussions with the current and past
members of the Imagination, Computation, and Expression (ICE) Lab, especially
Kenny Chow, Ben Medler, Donna Sammander, Tonguc Sezen, Digdem Sezen, and
Daniel Upton.
I am indebted to the diverse supportive communities in the Digital Media Pro-
gram and Georgia Tech at large. I have benefited a great deal from my teachers,
iii
particularly, Carl DiSalvo, Charles Isbell, Janet Murray, Nancy Nersessian, Ashwin
Ram, Mark Riedl, Eugene Thacker, Bruce Walker, and Lisa Yaszek. I have learned as
much from my fellow collegues. At the risk of leaving out many names, I would like
to thank Calvin Ashmore, Steven Dow, Clara Fernandez, Riccardo Fusaroli, Sergio
Goldenberg, Mike Helms, David Jimison, Hartmut Koenitz, Hyun-Jean Lee, Brian
Schrank, and Brian Sherwell. I also appreciate the administrative and technical sup-
port I received from Matthew Mcintyre, and Grantley Bailey and Melanie Richard,
respectively.
Many thanks to my friends here in Georgia Tech and also in Atlanta, many of
whom have been mentioned above. Their company has provided balance to my life
and made these five years some of the best years for me. I am equally grateful to my
teachers, colleagues, and friends from Pittsburgh, Montreal, and Shanghai.




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
I INTRODUCTION: INTENTIONAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The ELIZA Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Intentional Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 A Brief Account of Memory, Reverie Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 Perspectives on Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 The Computer as a Stand-Alone Thinking Machine . . . . . 24
2.1.2 The Computer as a Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1.3 The Computer as a Medium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.4 Messages of Social Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1.5 Narcissus’ Mirror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 System Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2.1 The Chinese Room Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2 The Intentional Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2.3 The Ghost outside the Machine: Social Perspectives . . . . 42
2.3 Reading Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.1 Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.2 Software Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.3 Cognitive Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.4 AI and HCI Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
v
2.4 AI-based Interactive Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4.1 Expressive AI Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.4.2 Computational Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
III THE AI HERMENEUTIC NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1 Intentional Systems as Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1.1 What is Text? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1.2 A Hermeneutic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Constructing the Discursive Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2.1 Lessons from Alife: Discursive Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.2 The “Epidemic” of Intentional Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.3 The Code Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.4 The Presentation Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2.5 Constructing the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2.6 User’s Hermeneutic Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3 A Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
IV THE SECRET OF HAPPINESS: A CLOSE READING OF THE COPY-
CAT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.1.1 Principles of Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.1.2 An Integrated Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 The Corpus and Potential Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3 The Technical-Social-Cultural Context of Copycat . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4 Content Analysis of the Technical Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4.1 The Two Aspects of Copycat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4.2 Intentional Vocabulary: Connecting the Two Languages . . 124
4.4.3 Leveraging the Two Languages of AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.5 Ideological Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
V AGENCY PLAY AS A SCALE OF INTENTIONALITY . . . . . . . . . 140
vi
5.1 Scale of Intentionality and System Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.1.1 Scale of Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.1.2 System Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.1.3 System Agency in Interactive Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.2 A Situated Approach to Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.1 A Dance of Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2.2 Agency as Free Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.3 Agency as Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2.4 Absence of Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.3 Agency Play as an Expressive Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3.1 Agency Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.2 Agency Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.3 Agency Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.3.4 Agency Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.3.5 User Input Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
VI MEMORY, REVERIE MACHINE : A CASE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.1 Motivation and Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.1.1 Machine Memories, Reveries and Daydreams . . . . . . . . 166
6.1.2 Stream of Consciousness Literature and AI . . . . . . . . . 167
6.1.3 Stream of Consciousness Literature and Cognitive Linguistics 170
6.1.4 Challenges of Engaging Legacy Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.1.5 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.2 Deployment of “Scale of Intentionality” and “Agency Play” . . . . 180
6.2.1 Main Indicators of System Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.2.2 Examples of Various Levels of System Intentionality . . . . 182
6.3 Major Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.3.1 Dynamic Narration of Affect Using the Alloy Conceptual
Blending Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.3.2 The Emotional State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
vii
6.3.3 Memory Structuring and Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
VII CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.1 Revisiting the Major Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.1.1 The Formation of System Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.1.2 Design Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7.3 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
APPENDIX A SAMPLE DATA FROM THE TECHNICAL LITERATURE
ON COPYCAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
viii
LIST OF TABLES
1 Framework of Intentional Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Multiple Readings of ELIZA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 AI Approach for Analyzing Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4 HCI Principles of Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5 Comparison between the AI and HCI Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6 Timeline of Major AI Developments between 1980 and 1999 . . . . . 116
7 Usage of Intentional Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8 Usage of Cognitive Faculties in Naming Functions and Structures . . 128
9 Comparison of Copycat with humans and other forms of life . . . . . 129
10 Indicators of “Scale of Intentionality” in MRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
11 Use of Intentional Vocabulary from paper “The Copycat Project: A
Model of Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making.” . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1 George Lewis and His Voyager System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Original Transcript of ELIZA (Excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3 An Early Model of Tamagotchi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 Four Characteristics of Intentional Systems (Prototype Model) . . . . 7
5 Screenshot of AARON ’s Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6 Screenshot of a Simulation of Braitenberg Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7 Original Transcript of SHRDLU (Excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8 The Main Fragment of the Antikythera Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . 24
9 Screenshots of Heider and Simmel’s 1944 Film Experiments . . . . . . 37
10 Roomba Vacuum Cleaner with “Spotty Leopard” Costume . . . . . . 41
11 Mechanical Turkish Chess Player by Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen in
1769 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
12 CD Cover Art of Cope’s 1997 Album Classical Music Composed by
Computer: Experiments in Musical Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
13 The AI Hermeneutic Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
14 Sample code of ELIZA from Norvig’s Textbook Paradigms of Artificial
Intelligence Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
15 System Diagram of an Artificial Neural Network . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
16 A Partial Screenshot of the A.L.I.C.E Artificial Intelligence Founda-
tion’s Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
17 A Network Model of the AI Hermeneutic Network . . . . . . . . . . . 105
18 Screenshot of a Java Re-implementation of Copycat by Scott Bolland 114
19 A Comparison between the Intentional and Technical Descriptions of
Copycat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
20 Source Code for a Bottom-up Scout Codelet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
21 Source Code for One Kind of “Happiness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
22 Occurrences of Intentional Vocabulary in “The Copycat Project: A
Model of Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making” . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
x
23 Density of Intentional Vocabulary in “The Copycat Project: A Model
of Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
24 Lumière Brothers’ Early Film “Workers Leaving a Factory,” screened
publicly in Paris in 1895 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
25 Dimensions of Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
26 Architecture Diagram of GRIOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
27 An Annotated Example of MRM ’s Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
xi
SUMMARY
Human interaction with technical artifacts is often mediated by treating them as
if they are alive. We exclaim “my car doesn’t want to start,” or “my computer loves
to crash.” Of increasing cultural importance are software systems designed explicitly
to perform tasks and/or exhibit complex behaviors usually deemed as intentional hu-
man phenomena, including creating, improvising, and learning. Compared to the in-
strumental programs (e.g., Adobe Photoshop), these intentional systems (e.g., George
Lewis’ musical system Voyager) seem to produce output that is “about” certain things
in the world rather than the mere execution of algorithmic rules. This dissertation
investigates such phenomena with two central research questions: (1) How is system
intentionality formed? and (2) What are the design implications for building systems
that utilize such intentionality as an expressive resource.
In the discourse of artificial intelligence (AI) practice, system intentionality is
typically seen as a technical and ontological property of a computer program, emerging
from its underlying algorithms and knowledge engineering. Distilling from the areas
of hermeneutics, actor-network theory, cognitive semantics theory, and philosophy of
mind, this dissertation proposes a humanistic and interpretive framework called the
AI hermeneutic network. It accentuates that system intentionality is narrated and
interpreted by its human creators and users in their socio-cultural settings. Special
attention is paid to system authors’ discursive strategies, a constitutive component
of AI, embedded in their source code and technical literature. The utility of the
framework is demonstrated by a close analytical reading of a full-scale AI system,
Copycat.
xii
The theoretical discovery leads to new design strategies, namely scale of inten-
tionality and agency play. They provide insights for using system intentionality and
agency as expressive resources that can be used to convey meanings and express ideas.
The fruits of these insights are illustrated by a stream of consciousness literature in-
spired interactive narrative project Memory, Reverie Machine, co-developed using
Harrell’s GRIOT system. It portrays a protagonist whose intentionality and agency




The labels in the exhibition said the usual: “Digital Print by Harold
Cohen.” I called the curator and said, no, they are digital prints by
AARON, a computer program written by Harold Cohen. The label was
duly changed. But the bottom line still read: “Courtesy of the Artist.”
— Harold Cohen
I felt that I should be able to get the computer to sound good more or less
on its own, so that someone listening to it says, “Who is that playing?”
But if you get “What’s that?” instead, you have to go back to the drawing
board.
— George Lewis [129]
Voyager is an improvisational interactive musical system developed by trombonist
and composer George Lewis (Figure 1). The system receives and processes input
from human jazz improvisers’ performances and generates music in real time. What
differentiates Voyager from most other interactive digital music systems is neither the
complex jazz patterns it generates, nor its ability to generate notes for many different
instruments simultaneously, an ability that a human musician does not have. The
difference lies in the status that Lewis grants to the system as an equal partner with
other human improvisers. Lewis insists that his system is not designed to be “a
musical instrument, but ... an independent improviser.” Even its designer cannot
fully anticipate the music Voyager is going to play next, for it not only responds
to other musicians’ playing, but also initiates independent behaviors that arise from
1
Figure 1: George Lewis and His Voyager System
its own internal processes. When left alone, Voyager can perform by itself without
any human assistance. The musical dialogue between the system and jazz musicians
performing with it, in Lewis’s mind, is a result of the “bi-directional transfer of
intentionality through sound” [129].
Human interaction with technical artifacts is often mediated by treating them
as if they are intentional, that is, with desires, beliefs, or dispositions about the
real world. We exclaim “my car doesn’t want to start,” or “my computer loves to
crash.” However, the phenomenon of casually describing artifacts as intentional is
different from, for instance, regarding a computer program as an independent jazz
improviser or painter in its own right. The latter exemplifies digital artifacts that
are designed explicitly to support the narration and reading of its intentionality, as
if their actions were about something in the world rather than just the execution of
algorithmic rules. This chapter introduces the construct of intentional systems to
distinguish such artifacts from the former case.
The concept of intentional systems is closely related to artificial intelligence (AI),
cognitive science and arguably cybernetics. Many of the examples we will encounter
in the dissertation are, in fact, AI projects. So why do I have to coin another term,
instead of directly calling them AI or even cognitive science endeavors? The answer
2
has to do with the baggage that comes with AI. As a field whose past was tightly
connected to military funding and cold war contexts [45], AI and computer science
in large may impose ethical challenges to certain critical activists and artists [166].
Furthermore, AI and cognitive science are also communities of practice where their
defining goals, valid methodologies, terminologies, and social interactions have been
established and shared by its practitioners. Some practitioners, especially artists and
designers, do not actively participate in these scientific/engineering communities, but
are nevertheless constructing systems that engage the phenomenon of intentional-
ity. Including Lewis, they would have been excluded from our discussion without
broadening my scope. Hence, I propose the term intentional systems to downplay the
boundary of the AI practice while focusing on its essential engagement of intention-
ality.
1.1 The ELIZA Effect
From the vantage point of the designers and engineers of digital systems and artifacts,
the phrase “the ELIZA Effect” is used to describe the phenomenon that occurs when
users perceive these systems as having “intrinsic qualities and abilities which the soft-
ware controlling [them] cannot possibly achieve” or “assume that [the outputs of the
system] reflect a greater causality than they actually do” [111]. The term is named
after Joseph Weizenbaum’s renowned 1966 program ELIZA, which simulates a psy-
chiatrist interviewing a patient. An original transcript of the program can be found
in Figure 2. After the unexpected success of ELIZA, Weizenbaum was startled by
“how quickly and how very deeply people conversing with DOCTOR1 became emo-
tionally involved with the computer and how unequivocally they anthropomorphize
it” [212]. One of the famous anecdotes is that even Weizenbaum’s own secretary,
whom Weizenbaum claims “surely knew it to be merely a computer program” after
1DOCTOR is one of the applications of ELIZA.
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Human: Men are all alike.
ELIZA: IN WHAT WAY
Human: They're always bugging us about something or other.
ELIZA: CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Human: Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
ELIZA: YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
Human: He says that I am depressed all the time         .
ELIZA: I AM SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED
Figure 2: Original Transcript of ELIZA (Excerpt)
watching him working on the system, asked him to leave the room so that she could
have a private conversation with the program.
As the creator of the program, Weizenbaum was aware of the simplicity of the
underlying algorithm. Implemented on the basis of locating predefined keywords in
user input sentences, ELIZA applies simple transformational operations to construct
its output without further “understanding” of the conversation. Shortly after com-
pleting the program, Weizenbaum [211] openly acknowledged the user’s contribution
to the illusion of a meaningful conversation with ELIZA. When interacting with the
program, the user brings many assumptions from their real life experiences with hu-
man psychiatrists. For instance, if a patient gets the response “Tell me about boats”
after telling her psychiatrist in real life “I went for a long boat ride,” she will not
interpret it as the psychiatrist not having any knowledge about boats. More likely,
she will assume that there is some purpose to this response in order to direct the
subsequent conversation. Weizenbaum argues that it is the same assumption at work
when the user interacts with ELIZA, despite its clearly limited dialogue capacity.
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1.2 Intentional Systems
The ELIZA effect is a salient example of users’ attribution of intentionality to a
system, a phenomenon closely related to what philosopher Daniel Dennett identifies
as the intentional stance [38, 36]. According to Dennett, people generally adopt
three strategies in order to predict the behaviors of humans, animals, artifacts, and
even themselves [38, pp.298]. Some predictions are based on the laws of physics (the
physical stance), while others are built on the assumption that artifacts follow how
they are designed to behave (the design stance). For example, a cook can predict the
effect of leaving the pot on the burner for too long using the physical stance, whereas
he may adopt the design stance to make sense of his alarm clock without knowing
much of its mechanical construction.
Sometimes, however, neither the physical stance nor the design stance is (com-
pletely) accessible. In this case, there is yet another stance one can adopt: the in-
tentional stance. It entails treating artifacts, animals and humans as rational agents
with beliefs and desires in order to further predict how they are going to behave [35].
For instance, we may not know exactly how a Roomba vacuum cleaner (Figure 10) is
constructed or designed to traverse the entire room, but we can formulate our inter-
pretations of its beliefs and desires based on observation and subsequently use them
to predict its further actions.
An intentional system, Dennett continues, is any system that is “usefully and
voluminously predictable from the intentional stance.” This definition aligns with
the core of this dissertation, that is, the intentionality of the digital systems under
study is not their intrinsic technical property, but rather is derived by the humans
who create and use them. One issue remains, however.
In his dissertation, Seel [190] has shown that we can apply the intentional stance
to almost all artifacts that we interact with, raising the question about the boundary
of Dennett’s definition of intentional systems. To the majority of us, certain digital
5
Figure 3: An Early Model of Tamagotchi
artifacts (e.g., the humanoid robot ASIMO) afford intentional readings more easily
than others. A robotic drummer, for instance, supports intentional readings more
readily than a “hello world” program.
Various artifacts also support intentional readings in different ways. A doll does
so, for example, differently than ELIZA or the Voyager system described at the
beginning of this chapter. Construing dolls as intentional objects relies more on
their humanoid forms than their relatively simple behaviors. Other artifacts display
behaviors that we can relate to based on our own experience as intentional beings.
The Japanese handheld tamagotchi (Figure 3), for example, mimics the behavior of a
young animal pet who needs to be “fed,” “petted,” and “taken care of” by the owner
pressing certain buttons. A small mistake while trying to satisfy the tamagotchi’s
request could lead to its unexpected “death.” Similarly in Will Wright’s game The
Sims, players are asked to take their virtual characters, called Sims, through daily
activities such as sleeping, eating, bathing and dating. The Sims remarkably have a
“free will” option. When this feature is turned on, the characters can move around
autonomously and, without being controlled by the player, perform actions such as
sleeping that are necessary for their own “well being.”












Figure 4: Four Characteristics of Intentional Systems (Prototype Model)
systems that seem to be more intentional than others, and to differentiate among
various types of intentional readings by users. Instead of incorporating the entire
range of artifacts to which the intentional stance can be applied, the rest of this
section further develops the notion of intentional systems, this dissertation’s main
area of inquiry.
First, the construct of intentional system follows a prototype model [179], where
certain members of the category are more central than others. It means that the
following characteristics may or may not all be present in practice, and the presence
of each characteristic may vary by degree. I propose that intentional systems have four
key characteristics: 1) operational opacity, 2) system autonomy, 3) human-relatable
behaviors, and 4) authorial intention. Among them, 1) to 3) are mediated by 4)
(Figure 4). The rest of this section elaborates these characteristics of intentional
systems.
1. Operational Opacity
Operational opacity enhances users’ deployment of intentional stance. As Den-
nett’s theory has shown, when the operation through which a system derives its
behaviors remains at least partially inaccessible through external observation,
7
Figure 5: Screenshot of AARON ’s Output
users tend to attribute beliefs and desires to the system in order to make sense
of these behaviors. A revealing example is Braitenberg Vehicles (Figure 6),
a thought experiment constructed by cyberneticist Valentino Braitenberg [17].
The minimalistic vehicles move around in a virtual space in various manners
that, “if we did not already know the principles behind the vehicles’ opera-
tion, we might call aggression, love, foresight and even optimism2.” Those
who look inside these vehicles, however, would find their control mechanisms
extraordinarily simple, commonly in the form of “more light produces faster
movement,” “less light produces slower movement,” and “darkness produces
standstill.” Once their operational rules are unveiled, the user becomes less
inclined to read these vehicles using an intentional stance, but rather based on
these rules.
There are multiple ways that operational opacity can be achieved. Braitenberg
vehicles exemplify the case where a system appears to be intentional when the
underlying process controlling its behaviors is not directly available to the ob-
server. Sometimes deliberately concealing or obfuscating a system’s underlying
2The quotation is from John Wiseman’s webpage “Braitenberg Vehicles” at
http://people.cs.uchicago.edu/ wiseman/vehicles/
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operation is its author’s strategy to construct its aura as an independent and in-
tentional entity. For instance, digital artist Harold Cohen deliberately refuses to
publish any detailed technical papers of his painting program AARON (Figure
5). Notably, within the community of computer science, AI practitioner Simon
Colton adopts the same strategy for his recent system The Painting Fool [27],
despite the field’s established tradition of unveiling the underlying operations.
In other times, even though a system author publishes her system in full de-
tails, the complexity of the algorithm makes it impractical to keep up with all
the operations that are going on at any minute. In this case, an informed user
and even sometimes the author herself still need to rely on intentional stance
to a certain extent. Many AI projects fall into this category where operational
opacity derives from its complexity. For example, neural network systems are
notorious for their operational opacity. Its complex, multi-layered numerical
weights make it nearly impossible for system authors to track their exact oper-
ations. In this case, it is much needed to read that the system is intentionally
“learning.”
In general, when a digital artifact is intended to accomplish feats that we would
casually describe as requiring human intelligence and intentionality, AI-level
techniques that involve complex knowledge engineering and algorithmic ap-
proaches are generally utilized to sustain the intentional readings. An artifact
without such complexity, on the other hand, may be able to accomplish such
feats, but its behavior is typically predictable through a design or even physical
stance once the user realizes its simple input/output pattern. For example, an
electronic doll may express its “desire” to be “fed” by “crying” every time the
baby bottle is removed from its mouth. However, the user can quickly notice
the simple underlying binary control mechanism from its fixed response and
therefore switch to a design or physical stance.
9
Figure 6: Screenshot of a Simulation of Braitenberg Vehicles
2. System Autonomy
An intentional system behaves autonomously, at least in certain aspects. There
is a fundamental difference between a completely servile program (e.g., Adobe
Photoshop, or Ask Jeeves) and one with some level of autonomy (e.g., the
Microsoft Clippy3). Whereas the former passively obey user’s commands, the
latter initiates interaction with user and takes actions on its own. Borrowing
Lewis’s terminology, one is an “instrument” of the human user, while the other
acts as an “independent player” [129]. Voyager ’s intentionality partially relies
on the fact that it does not completely follow the “commands” of other human
jazz musicians, but rather displays independent behaviors from time to time.
System autonomy helps to explain the reasons why certain simple systems sur-
pass many computationally complex ones as being more intentional. First, we
will see an excerpt (Figure 7) from a demo of Terry Winograd’s acclaimed system
SHRDLU [216], which moves various blocks on a simulated tabletop. Compared
to the simplistic pattern-matching-based ELIZA, SHRDLU used many state-
of-the-art natural language understanding algorithms to infer user input. Yet,
3From the vantage point of intentional systems, Clippy is a successful example, even though not
a pleasant one. One of its problems, it seems, is that it is unfortunately placed in a context where
a servile program is needed.
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Human:  Pick up a big red block. 
SHRDLU: OK. (does it) 
Human:  Grasp the pyramid. 
SHRDLU: I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHICH PYRAMID YOU MEAN. 
i d bl k hi h i ll h hHuman:  F n  a oc  w c  s ta er t an t e one you
are holding and put it into the box. 
SHRDLU: BY "IT", I ASSUME YOU MEAN THE BLOCK WHICH IS
TALLER THAN THE ONE I AM HOLDING       . 
SHRDLU: OK. (does it) 
Human:  What does the box contain? 
SHRDLU: THE BLUE PYRAMID AND THE BLUE BLOCK       . 
Human:  What is the pyramid supported by? 
SHRDLU: THE BOX. 
Figure 7: Original Transcript of SHRDLU (Excerpt)
when users watch the system following the exact command or faithfully report-
ing its implausibility, the system does not strike them as possessing beliefs or
desires in the way ELIZA did. In fact, the design stance can sufficiently predict
the former. By contrast, ELIZA appears to initiate and guide the conversation
as an interlocutor with its own will. The (appearance of) autonomy helps to
“elevate” a system from an instrument to an intentional agent.
SHRDLU is a special case because the simplicity of the domain in which it oper-
ates hides the complexity of the system’s operation and its potential autonomy.
Despite the technical difficulty, the task of moving blocks on a flat surface is con-
ceived as rather straightforward by an average human4. To be fair, the planning
algorithm used in SHRDLU could have be read as more autonomous, if it were
used in less-predictable domains such as airport management [91, pp.109-112].
3. Human-Relatable Behavior
The behavior of an intentional system has to be relatable to human users whose
4In the AI community, it is widely acknowledged that commonsense reasoning, a effortless task
to human beings, is extremely difficult to realize computationally. This is one of the reasons why
SHRDLU ’s technical significance is easy to miss by many people who are familiar with the field of
AI.
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intentionality is directed towards the world. If a system fails to be predictable
based on human-like beliefs and desires, it simply becomes incomprehensible.
Human relatability does not exclude systems that mimic animal behaviors, such
as the case of Tamagotchi, as most of them can be understood using human
terms.
A good illustration of the importance of human-relatable behaviors is Joe Bates’
influential OZ Project at Carnegie Mellon University. With the goal of creating
“believable agents” using AI techniques [10], the project team did not follow
the prior research on agents, which focused primarily on making the underlying
algorithms more robust and efficient. Instead, Bates and others in the project
introduced and highlighted “drama elements” and “interactivity” into these
virtual agents, in order to make them behave in ways which are more human-
relatable [136, 193].
4. Authorial Intention
The above three characteristics are so far concerned with user ’s perception
of various aspects of the system, which is mediated and contextualized how
the system author intends it to be. Here, I mean system author’s intention
of how her system should be regarded, whether intentional or not. We have
already seen, based on different authorial intentions, how the system author
can influence the perception of operational opacity by revealing/concealing the
underlying process. For obvious reasons, authorial intention has remarkable
impact on whether a system is designed to be (read as) autonomous and whether
its behavior is human-relatable.
What I want to stress, however, is how authorial intention influence users’
perceptions of a system, in addition to its design. Consider a java applet which
generates colored pixels on a blank screen one line after another. After filling in
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the entire display, it refreshes the screen and repeats this process, which renders
completely different results. In addition, the source code of the applet is openly
available to anyone. After observing the system’s behavior and carefully reading
the code, a user may conclude that the system is quite autonomous (as it does
not rely on any user command) but not very human-relatable. However, her
opinion may be different after learning that the author of the program intends
to use it as a commentary on the randomness of the stock market. With this
new information, the user may see the system behavior as more human-relatable
because now it is about something concrete in the world. In other words, the
same code may be more or less intentional depending on what the author intends
it to be.
A deeper reason, as elaborated in later chapters, is that intentional systems
highlight the complex meaning exchange and negotiation between system au-
thors’ narrations and users’ interpretations of intentionality. A system that is
not designed to be read as intentional is not actively engaged in this process
in the same way as intentional systems. Therefore, even though a car sup-
ports intentional readings under certain circumstances, it is not considered an
intentional system in my framework.
In the practice of AI, authorial intention is implicit. Philip Agre calls critical
attention to the role of narrated intentionality within AI by stating that the
goal of AI is to build computational systems whose behaviors can be narrated
using intentional terms, such as “planning” or “learning” [2]. As argued in
greater detail in the later chapters, AI practitioners inevitably deploy rhetori-
cal strategies in both their software and their publications, presentations, and
interpersonal communications.
As mentioned earlier, my designation of intentional systems follows a prototype
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Table 1: Framework of Intentional Systems (X: High Degree; X: Low Degree)
A Barbie doll ELIZA Voyager
operational opacity X X
system autonomy X X
human-relatability X X X
authorial intention X X X
model. For simplicity of representation, Table 1 and Table 2 use “high degree,” “low
degree,” and absent to describe the level of intentionality in these systems. Table 1
provides reasons why ELIZA can be seen as more intentional than a Barbie doll since
the former displays more human-relatable behavior as it maintains a natural language-
based dialogue with the user. ELIZA’s underlying process, although simple, is more
opaque than that of the doll. Voyager, on the other hand, is a more prototypically
intentional system because it exhibits all four characteristics to a high degree.
For each characteristic, we should also take into consideration the specific social,
cultural and technical context in which the system is situated. As shown in Table
2, the reading from a user of ELIZA in 1967 may be quite different from that of an
average user today, even though the code of the system remains the same. Once a
landmark in the history of AI and computing, ELIZA is considered a simple pattern
matching program by the current AI community, a well-known phenomenon referred
to as “the moving frontier of AI”5. College students are often given the assignment of
re-implementing the program in their introductory level AI classes. In addition to its
decreased complexity, ELIZA’s operational opacity also diminished with the society’s
increasing level of procedural literacy brought about, in part, by the prevalence of
digital products.
5The term of “moving frontier of AI” was first coined in the 1960s by Marvin Minsky, who called
AI the study of computer problems that have not yet been solved [145]. This fast shifting standard
of what constitutes AI is a fundamental phenomenon that is unique to the field.
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Table 2: Multiple Readings of ELIZA (X: high degree; X: low degree)
A reading in 1967 A reading in 2009
operational opacity X
system autonomy X X
human-relatability X X
authorial intention X X
1.3 Motivations
Today, we live in a world full of “smart,” complex, and intentional artifacts around
us. We drive cars that can parallel park by themselves, play with robotic toy di-
nosaurs that have “personality” and do not always follow owners’ commands, and
communicate with phones that suggest location-aware information before we ask for
them. These latest consumer products may be reminiscent of certain familiar pas-
sages from our decade-old sci-fi books on AI. Unlike the rejections and heated debates
that greeted the initial AI artifacts (fictional and actual) in the 1960s and 70s, the
commercial success of their modern reincarnations suggest that society has come to
terms with the existence of intentional but inanimate systems.
However, acceptance does not mean that we have gained better understanding
of intentional systems. In fact, their increasing presence and cultural importance
underscore the need to expand our insufficient knowledge of, among others, how these
systems become intentional and how to design them. In order to do so, some people
turn to technology for answers. They see machine intelligence and intentionality
as merely technical properties of a system, proportional to the complexity of its
underlying algorithmic work and knowledge representation. The techno-centric view
of intentional systems is not a new approach, nor is it limited to the technologists;
scholars from the areas of philosophies of mind, language, and AI, such as John Searle,
assumed variations of this view in the debates of AI during the 1980s.
In contrast, the approach that I develop in this dissertation is to highlight the
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complex meaning exchange process between system authors and users through inten-
tional systems. In other words, this dissertation is about a humanistic view of AI,
intentional systems, and digital technology. In order to do so, I turn to a long-standing
field at the center of the humanities — hermeneutics.
For many people, the juxtaposition of AI and hermeneutics is quite an unusual
combination. Hermeneutics as the study and art of interpretation dates back to
the middle ages, where it was developed as a discipline for biblical studies. Later,
under the work of Heidegger and Gadamer, hermeneutics was no longer limited to
symbolic communication, and expanded into questions regarding human existence and
humanism, including culture and arts (Chapter 2). In the age of digital technologies,
hermeneutics in its broadest sense has become almost an icon of the humanistic
tradition due to its deep concern for human cultural practices (e.g., literature, history,
art, music, and philosophy) as well as even fundamental questions about human
existence. As N. Katherine Hayles pointed out in a recent talk6, many scholars in
the humanities fields share a common belief that hermeneutic reading is a privileged
activity for humans, especially literary scholars. Machine reading, according to them,
is insignificant by contrast because it is simply based on mechanical pattern searching
without the rich human interpretations.
By bringing hermeneutics to the relatively young technological field of AI, I intend
to propose an interpretive and humanistic view of AI as an alternative to the techno-
centric views. Part of my goal then is to tackle some of the questions that the techno-
centric views have so far failed to provide answers to, such as the how the Eliza effect
occurs and the impact of the social and cultural dimensions of my four characteristics
of intentional systems and their interpretation. My position as a critical theorist and
AI practitioner allows me to “read” these intentional systems both at the code level
6Hayles’ public lecture titled “Minds, Machines, and Media” on January 15th, 2009 at the 2008-09
Georgia Tech School of Literature, Communication, and Culture’s Distinguished Speaker Series.
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and at the discourse level, an approach, which has just emerged in the nascent field
of software studies.
1.4 A Brief Account of Memory, Reverie Machine
Memory, Reverie Machine (MRM ) is a text-based interactive narrative system that
is designed to oscillate between a prototypical intentional system and a more servile
one. Whereas more detailed discussions of the system can be found in Chapter 6, this
section intends to paint a broad picture of the system, especially from the vantage
point of users’ experience.
The stories generated by MRM are about a robot character, Ales, who is jointly
controlled by the user and the system. When the story starts, Ales functions as
the user’s avatar; he follows and responds to the user’s commands completely and
transparently. As the story develops, however, Ales’s behaviors and processes become
increasingly opaque to the user: he recalls past memories and daydreams from time
to time without the user’s permission; a coherent human-relatable personality and
emotional state of the character may also emerge, depending on how the user interacts.
In addition, the narration of the story shifts from an objective, third person point
of view to a more subjective and personal voice. An excerpt of a transcript below
illustrates MRM ’s behavior at this point of the story.
(the color of the kitchen door today should be [yellow/blue])
> BLUE
(;) (ales said to himself, adjusting his visual scan system.)
(the room where he had his first encounter of tune-up and oil change)
(had similar depressing entryways.)
(the oil change left a sickly feeling in his gut;)
(he would rust like the tin man before enduring another.)
(it amazes him that no one else complained about these things;)
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(they were too busy with the kitchen;)
(he should probably start his daily routine now.)
Compared to the onset of the story, the excerpt contains Ales’s memories of past
events. Such memories, reveries, and daydreams are not directly controllable by the
user, and the process by which they are retrieved remains inaccessible. The user,
however, can have impact on Ales’s emotional state. Choosing “blue” over “yellow”
in this case sets the character in a “melancholy” mood, which causes his surroundings
to appear “depressing” from Ales’s subjective point of view.
As the story goes on, the system becomes even more intentional. It may direct Ales
to ignore certain commands issued by the user and eventually takes complete control
of Ales. At this late stage of the story, to sustain a design stance (i.e., the system,
like most interactive narrative systems, is designed to follow the user’s command) is
nearly impossible.
Several readings are available to make sense of the system. The user could either
regard the MRM system as intentional for overseeing the story and its narration,
whereas Ales is an avatar jointly controlled by the system and the user. Alternatively,
the user could identify Ales and the system as the same entity, which gradually gains
its intentionality. Regardless of which reading the user adopts, the main concept be-
hind MRM is that the degree to which a system is intentional is a potential expressive
mechanism in the design of computational systems.
1.5 Overview
This dissertation is organized around two central research questions: 1) How is sys-
tem intentionality narrated and interpreted, and 2) Given an answer to (1), what
are the design implications for building systems that utilize such intentionality as
an expressive resource? This chapter has already introduced intentional systems —
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a collection of computational systems, in both software and hardware forms, that
exhibit complex behaviors usually seen as the territory of intentional human activ-
ities such as planning, learning, and creating. Chapter 2 offers an interdisciplinary
theoretical framework drawn from hermeneutics, philosophy of mind, actor-network
theory, and cognitive semantics. These different theories and approaches are synthe-
sized into four major issues of close relevance to intentional systems. First, I provide
an overview of the different historical perspectives on computing in order to situate
the role of intentional systems in a broader context of computing practice. Next,
the core concept of system intentionality is examined from different positions ranging
from philosophical debates about AI to social theories that attribute any human-like
agency to artifacts. Third, various possible approaches for reading intentional systems
are introduced, followed by a brief review of existing interactive narrative works that
influenced the design and construction of my co-authored narrative-based intentional
system Memory, Reverie Machine (described in Chapter 6).
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the first research question, i.e. how we can analyze
intentional systems function and interpretation in a social context. Chapter 3 develops
a novel theoretical framework — the AI hermeneutic network — to understand the
formation of system intentionality. Compared with existing methods of analyzing
computer systems in AI and human computer interaction (HCI), this framework
emphasizes system authors’ discursive strategies fornarrating system intentionality
at both the code and discourse levels, as well as focusing on users’ interpretative
readings of system intentionality in a broad social context. Chapter 4 exemplifies the
utility of the AI hermeneutic network with a close reading of a real and well-known
AI system, Copycat.
Building on these analytical frameworks and results, the following two chapters fo-
cus on their design implications for intentional systems, the second research question.
Chapter 5 raises the design concept called scale of intentionality, first introduced in
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Zhu and Harrell [220], which states that system intentionality can be manipulated to
convey meanings. Accordingly, it proposes a socially-situated design model of agency
play first articulated in Harrell and Zhu [84] that dissects agency in interactive nar-
rative works into various dimensions and suggests different strategies to manipulate
each dimension as an expressive resource. Chapter 6 introduces our own interactive
narrative system, Memory, Reverie Machine, as a case study for applying the above
design theory in expressive intentional systems. Finally, this dissertation ends with




The machine’s danger to the society is not from the machine itself but
form what man makes of it.
— Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings [213], 1950
The intentional systems we have seen so far are simultaneously connected to so-
cial, cultural, and technical foundations. Their multiple situated connections impose
unexpected challenges for applying the existing methods directly from any estab-
lished disciplines. On one hand, traditional computer science analyses tend to be
preoccupied with issues such as computational efficiency, task effectiveness, and gen-
eralizability of particular systems to other systems. These analyses often lead to the
techno-centric view that the phenomenon of intentionality displayed by these systems
is purely a result of the complexity of the underlying algorithm and/or the expressivity
of the knowledge representation. This approach hence puts social and cultural issues
aside, if acknowledging them at all. The fields of social sciences and humanities, on
the other hand, have developed many powerful theoretical and methodological tools
to study technology in broader social and cultural contexts. However, a majority
of scholars from these fields do not have the technical means needed for unpacking
these AI-based systems. Consequently, many choose to blackbox the systems’ un-
derlying operation and the related literature generated, such as technical papers and
interviews. This approach is also inadequate because, as shown in Chapter 3 and 6,
the code and literature of intentional systems deeply connects to how their authors
encode and narrate intentionality.
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Recent years have witnessed an emerging trend of more interdisciplinary and in-
tegrated approaches that bridge the gaps between the techno-science sphere and the
humanistic fields. For instance, the research area of human computer interaction
(HCI) and the rising research area of software studies both push the limits of their
originating fields of computer science and media studies respectively and reach over
to the other side of the gap. In line with this development, this chapter presents an
interdisciplinary framework for both close analysis of the formation of intentionality
in intentional systems and correspondent design strategies for these systems. It is a
crucial step because many of the systems studied in the later chapters have only been
looked at inside the domain of computer science.
My theoretical framework is organized around major questions that arise in un-
derstanding the nature, function, and interpretation of intentional systems, rather
than a survey of fields. These questions are: 1) What is the role of computational
technology in our society? 2) Can (digital) artifacts have intentionality? If so, in
what senses? 3) What existing framework of “reading” can help us to read inten-
tional systems? and, 4) What approaches are useful to design intentional systems in
the domain of interactive narrative. In addressing these questions, I will synthesize
the related major fields and approaches, highlighting the ones that I feel shed the
most light.
The rest of the chapter is organized around these four questions. Section 2.1
presents three major perspectives on computers/machines in relation to humans in
the development of computing. It is important to go over this history because it helps
to answer the question of how intentional systems integrate into society. Section 2.2
takes on the topic of system intentionality, a concept central to the systems of in-
terest in this study. It challenges the traditional notion of intentionality based on
the closely related debates in philosophy of mind/AI, as well as theoretical develop-
ments in other areas such as activity theory, actor-network theory, and distributed
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cognition theories. Subsequently, a variety of theories and methods useful for reading
intentional systems are introduced in Section 2.3. The hermeneutic tradition of text
interpretation, emerging software studies approaches for reading computer programs,
and cognitive semantics methods to analyze non-literary expressions described in this
section are the foundation of the new method proposed in Chapter 3. From the area
of cognitive semantics, conceptual blending theory is also of particular relevance for
producing intentional systems, as illustrated by the computational narrative system
Memory, Reverie Machine that I developed with Fox Harrell (Chapter 6). Related
traditional and computational narrative antecedents are presented in Section 2.4.
2.1 Perspectives on Computing
In the history of modern computing, different visions of the relationship between hu-
mans and computers have competed for dominance. One of the ways to summarize
the development and adoption of digital computers is through the different major
perspectives that emerged since the mid-twentieth century. It is important to trace
this history, for each of these perspectives represents a different way to position inten-
tional systems in our society. Are they autonomous machines with their own beliefs
and desires that might one day replace humans? Are they tools we can use? Or,
perhaps, are they a medium through which we can convey meanings and express our-
selves? The answer to these questions will determine how we see and interact with
these digital systems.
As the historical development of computing has revealed, the debates about the
computer’s ontological status as human has gradually given way to the question of
how society can benefit from these systems, either as tools or as comprising a medium.
This observation is important for situating my approach and practice as described at
the end of this section.
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Figure 8: The Main Fragment of the Antikythera Mechanism, dated approximately
to 150—100 B.C.
2.1.1 The Computer as a Stand-Alone Thinking Machine
“Can machines think?” Pioneers of computing proposed this daring question in the
early twentieth century and generated heated debates across the different sectors
of society accompanied by such vastly polarized responses as fear, curiosity, and
excitement. It is closely related to the question of machine intentionality because,
as many would argue in the following decades, intentionality has been considered to
be a prerequisite of thinking and intelligence [188, 189]. On one hand, this question
challenged many widely accepted civil and intellectual norms within fields such as
philosophy, theology, and biology. On the other hand, it connected to the long-
standing dream of building self-operating machinery, a tradition that can be traced
to the Antikythera mechanism (see Figure 8), a device to calculate astronomical
positions in Hellenistic Greece. It also resonates with the golem figure created from
clay in traditional Jewish folklore, which has since become a symbol of “automata.”
A typical response that reassures the conservatives is the classic Lady Lovelace
styled denial. Having worked with Charles Babbage and translated materials on his
analytical engine — one of the earliest mechanical general-purpose computers — Lady
Lovelace famously asserted that computers cannot originate anything since all they do
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is to follow pre-defined instructions step by step. To the followers of Lady Lovelace,
any linkage between the instruction-following machine and the action of thinking is
out of the question.
This conventional position, however, was acutely challenged by the booming field
of computer science and engineering, in particular artificial intelligence (AI) and cy-
bernetics. Even though Alan Turing [202] tactically rephrased the question into “can
machines appear to think” to avoid the controversies generated by the original one,
the trajectory of the fields in the next few decades clearly downplayed the difference.
After all, Turing clearly predicted in the same article that “[at] the end of the century,
the uses of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one
will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”
As a direct challenge to the Lady Lovelace argument, the AI dream of building an
intelligent machine that can think has dominated the research areas of cybernetics
and AI for decades — the former attempted to “model brains in computer hardware”
through feedback-loop-based control scheme whereas the latter “sought to mimic
minds in software”[45, pp.239]. Built on the assumption that thinking is information
processing, the early AI community made a series of major breakthroughs, including
Newell and Simon’s General Problem Solver [159], Daniel G. Bobrow’s STUDENT
program [12], Weizenbaum’s ELIZA program [211], and Terry Winograd’s SHDLU
[216]. These developments, part of what was later called “Good Old-Fashioned Ar-
tificial Intelligence” (GOFAI) [85] or “classic AI,” are built on Newell and Simon’s
influential “Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis”, which states that “A physical sym-
bol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action” [160].
More importantly, Paul N. Edwards [45] points out that another reason why AI
received so much public attention and government/industrial funding is that both AI
and computing were crucial to Cold War social and cultural contexts because they
were consequently recognized as metaphors and political icons during that period of
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time. For instance, John McCarthy’s concept of time-sharing not only provided “the
right subjective environment for AI work” so that researchers could work interactively
with the computer, but also greatly strengthened the link between AI and the military
Command and Control scheme (pp.256-59).
The stand-alone AI dream was not confined to research labs and government fund-
ing agencies. It also ignited the public’s imagination and manifested itself through
various popular media, especially science fiction literature and its related cultural
productions. The AI-based systems and characters depicted in these fictional worlds
are often based partially on imaginary and recognized goals and state-of-the-art of
existing AI research. For instance, Michael Mateas [137] points out that the renowned
AI system HAL 9000 in Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey [114] “both captures
preexisting intellectual currents that were already operating within the field of AI,
and serves as an influential touchstone that had a profound impact on individual AI
practitioners and on the aspirations of the field.”
The AI dream was constructed collaboratively by its researchers, government /
military institutions, and popular media. This complex phenomenon deeply influ-
enced the course of computers’ development. Unfortunately, the rapid development
quickly filled the field with unrealistic ambitions and exploded expectations in what
became know as the AI winter, which eventually led to the field’s shift to less ambi-
tious and more practical focuses.
2.1.2 The Computer as a Tool
A parallel, but less radical, image of a computer is that it is not intelligent by itself,
but is a useful tool for easing the tasks of humans. Different from the AI dream of a
stand-alone thinking machine, this perspective underscores its instrumental utilities
in service of the human. The systems following this perspective utilize the computer’s
ability to organize and distribute information in order to help their users to accomplish
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tasks varying from word processing to distance learning.
A well-known example of the tool-based computer system is Vannevar Bush’s con-
ceptual design of the Memex. As the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented
explosion of information, a more practical challenge facing society than AI was how to
better organize, distribute and make use of these data. In 1945, Bush [22] published
on his vision of the Memex machine — an electromechanical information organiza-
tional device that helps a researcher to browse through information in its library and
record her own trials of thoughts or follow other people’s through associative “traces”
and notes between different contents.1 The microfiche-reading device replaces the
traditional mechanical way of indexing with a method similar to the associative na-
ture of human cognition, in order to better assist human intelligence. The vision
of Memex has influenced the development of computers in many aspects. It was a
precursor to many new technologies such as hypertext, speech recognition, and World
Wide Web, directly influencing many later pioneers of computing such as J. C. R.
Licklider, Douglas Engelbart and Ted Nelson.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of building computers to provide servile
work to human was almost an antithesis of the much more ambitious vision of stand-
alone AI. Even today, after the AI community shifted further away from the original
AI dream to solve more specific tasks, the research agendas of HCI and AI are still
mostly independent from one another, and at times oppositional. In-between the two
perspectives, are systems developed as a tool to augment human intelligence.
Licklider’s concept of man-computer symbiosis [130], for example, envisioned col-
laboration between human and computer to “greatly improve the thinking process.”
1An interesting parallel exists between Bush’s invention and his life-long career. The Memex’s
major contribution was not intended to produce more knowledge by itself. Instead, it would organize
existing information to facilitate further research and innovation. Despite his role as an established
researcher, Bush is widely remembered as an organizer who helped to establish the close connection
between the military, government, and academia. The so-called iron triangle has incubated a vast
amount of scientific and technical advancement and contributed to America’s political power.
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In his idea of such a symbiosis he wrote, “[m]en will set the goals, formulate the hy-
potheses, determine the criteria, and perform the evaluations. Computing machines
will do the routinizable work that must be done to prepare the way for insights and
decisions in technical and scientific thinking”[130]. On one hand, the “man”-computer
symbiosis is different from the notion of the cyborg and the AI dreams in that Lick-
lider’s vision was built on the differences between human and machine capabilities, as
opposed to constructing the almighty human/machine that replaces one, the other,
or both.2 On the other hand, the machine in the symbiosis is also a “buddy” that
assists the human to get things done, and therefore can be seen as a bridge between
the two sometimes conflicting perspectives.3
To a certain degree, Douglas Engelbart’s work is a continuation of Licklider’s.
Engelbart saw computers as tools to boost humankind’s capability for coping with
complex, urgent problems. Pursuing his goal of augmenting human intelligence, En-
gelbart undertook the task of helping human users to gain “more rapid comprehension,
better comprehension, the possibility of gaining a useful degree of comprehension in
a situation that previously was too complex, speedier solutions, better solutions, and
the possibility of finding solutions to problems that before seemed insoluble” [48]. The
inventions Engelbart was directly involved in, including the computer mouse, word
processing programs, and early stage graphic user interface (GUI), were all important
milestones in the development of human computer interaction (HCI) paradigms.
2The term cyborg originated in the 1960s in relation to the field of cybernetics. It refers to a
hybrid creature between human and machine, the machine typically being a form of computer and
information technology.
3Historically, Licklider is often associated with AI because of his directorship at the Informa-
tion Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) — part of the early Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) organization — turned the IPTO into an incubator of early AI projects by pro-
viding them with large amounts of funding.
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2.1.3 The Computer as a Medium
A third perspective on computing is that the computer is a communication medium,
a potentially expressive one. This perspective is certainly in dialogue with McLuhan’s
broad notion of a medium [141] as an extension of human capabilities. In response to
the limitation of the media studies approach, McLuhan raised the difference between
the “medium” and the “content” and argued that existing studies narrowly focused
on the content at the price of the medium. In this regard, he proclaimed famously
that “the medium is the message.” Using the electric light as an example — spelling
out the name of a brand or lighting certain activities are at the content level, since
neither usage could exist without the electric light. But “it is the medium that shapes
and controls the scale and form of human association and action .... [I]t is only too
typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium.”
According to McLuhan, the fact that electric light had escaped the attention of the
media scholars unless it was used to spell out an advertisement or a company brand
provided evidence that people had “fail[ed] to study media.” Instead, it is the medium
or technology itself that should be studied prior to the content it carries, if any.
As a technological object, the social impacts of computers easily comprise a
McLuhanian “medium,” but a computer is not just a medium in the same sense as
the electric light. Artists, designers, writers, and scholars have noticed the potential
of computers as a communication medium precisely because its “content” can incor-
porate other media. Ted Nelson [157] and Alan Kay [109] were among the first ones
who adopted the viewpoint that the computer is a medium. They both encouraged
people to understand computers and to become literate in programming to master
the medium. Contradictory to McLuhan’s statement, Kay claims that “[t]he essence
of a medium is very much dependent on the way messages are embedded, changed,
and viewed. Although digital computers were originally designed to do arithmetic
computation, the ability to simulate the details of any descriptive model means that
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the computer, viewed as a medium itself, can be all other media if the embedding
and viewing methods are sufficiently well provided.” The later inventions such email
and World Wide Web all have reinforced the popularity of this view.
With the advancement of digital technologies, computers are increasingly regarded
as (potentially) an expressive medium. However, Janet Murray [154] rightfully re-
minded the overly optimistic people the difference between an artistic medium and
the technology that supports it, with a reference to the historic moment of film in the
Grand Café at Paris in 1895. She wrote “[t]he legend of the Paris café is satisfying
to us now because it falsely conflates the arrival of the representational technology
with the arrival of the artistic medium, as if the manufacture of the camera alone
gave us the movies” (pp.66). This observation led to a variety of work that sought to
define the formal properties and aesthetics of the digital medium/media [154, 134].
These studies are often done in the style of Greenburg’s art criticism [74], in the
sense that they intend to identify the “intrinsic” and identifying characteristics of the
digital medium that distinguishes it from other ones. In spite of the variety of per-
spectives proposed, the current digital expressive practices loosely fit into what may
be called the “procedural” approach [154, 134, 135, 14, 210] and the “metamedium”
[109] approach. The former deems the computer’s ability to generate different out-
comes as the essence of the medium, whereas the latter highlights its capability to
incorporate different media forms. In the domain of narrative, many interactive and
generative narrative systems overall are examples of into the first approach, while
many electronic literature (eLit) works are close to the second. Detailed discussion
of computer-based narrative works can be found later in Section 2.4.
2.1.4 Messages of Social Struggle
The previous sections have sketched out three major perspectives: the stand-alone AI
view, the instrumental view and the media view, in the early history of computing.
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Today, their descendants still occupy substantial areas such as AI, HCI and digital
media and arts respectively. So far, I have mainly described these perspectives as
independent of each other. In reality, they are under the constant influence of each
other.
For instance, the question of whether machines can think has faded away from so-
ciety’s attention as a driving controversy. On the one hand, the AI view has conceded
to the instrumental view of computing as the field of AI has shifted its primary focus
to solving practical problems that can benefit humans. Even for those still working on
the general problem of thinking, the problem is often framed not as that of creating
a stand-alone entity, but rather as creating as cognitive prostheses for humans [58].
Yet, the field has also drawn inspirations from other perspectives. One example is
Mateas’ Expressive AI [135] that engages the medium view by turning AI into an
expressive medium in its own right.
The rest of Section 2.1 shifts the focus slightly from the practical functions of
computers to their symbolic roles in society. The arrival of computer technologies
has destabilized many established boundaries, such as the one between human and
machine, and the one between natural and constructed. The nuanced position of
the computer lends itself to rhetorical and iconic strength as an advocate for social
struggle and change. Compared with the previous approach of computer as a medium,
some theorists and artists use computers directly as the message itself.
“Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would rather be a cyborg than a
goddess,” Donna Haraway [76] famously declared. Haraway constructed a socialist
feminist mythology of her cyborg — a cybernetic organism that oscillates between
organism and machine, life and death, social reality and fictional creature — in order
to offset the rigid and homogeneous society. In her cyborg world, “people are not
afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently
partial identities and contradictory standpoints.” Of particular interest to this study
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are the design principles that Haraway proposes on both material and ideological
grounds. What she calls “the informatics of domination” takes on the issues of “com-
fortable old hierarchical dominations” of gender, race, and class by underscoring that
the concepts of purity and unity are as imaginative as the mythical cyborg itself.
If Haraway’s manifesto of cyborgs engages the metaphor of information technol-
ogy as a fragmented hybrid, George Lewis [129] instantiates it through the actual
construction of computer systems. The Voyager system, mentioned in the beginning
of Chapter 1, is deliberately constructed as a rebel against the prevailing hierarchical
interaction model of human-leader-computer-follower. Instead, the system embodies
a non-hierarchical multidominance concept, initially brought up by artist and critic
Robert L. Douglas [41] to describe the distinctive African-American formal aesthetics
in visual and musical composition that are often dismissed as “too much” under the
Western art tradition.
The Voyager system embraces the concept of multidominance not only through
the formal properties and styles of music it produces — the system is composed of
sixty four asynchronously operating voices that all generate music in real time — but
also though de-instrumentalizing the computer in the dialogue between the human
and machine jazz improviser. Its author describes the system as an independent
“player” whose performances embody meaning and announce emotional and mental
intention.
In contrast to Haraway, Lewis has leveraged the instrumental role of computer
in the information-retrieval-based interaction paradigm as a metaphor of under-
privileged social classes and cultural forms under the similar rigidity of existing hi-
erarchical structure. In both cases, the role of the computer is both the content and
the medium, through which social and political issues are magnified.
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2.1.5 Narcissus’ Mirror
As we are busy figuring out the role of computer and how our society can benefit
from it, computers are changing who we are both literally and conceptually. First,
this change happens at a biological level. In the discourse of cyborgs/posthuman,
claims have been made that once we implant computers into our body, humans will
morph into cyborgs, or that one day we will be able to directly download our conscious
thoughts into a computer[151]. A more moderate position is that even the regular
use of computers, and any other tools at large, affects the boundaries of our bodies
[25]. In other words, we have always been cyborgs throughout the history of tools
and technology.
Admitting that “the prospect of becoming posthuman both evokes terror and
excites pleasure,” N. Katherine Hayles’ analysis [87] reveals a prominent cultural
change underlying the cyborgs/posthuman dream — a shift from the paradox of
presence/absence (embodiment) to the one of pattern/randomness (virtuality). The
posthuman condition is built on the cultural perception of virtuality that material
objects are interpenetrated by disembodied information patterns, as opposed to the
humanly embodied experience. To Hayles, part of the pleasure of becoming posthu-
man lies in “getting out of some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking
about what being human means.” The dialect of pattern/randomness offers a system
that is not front-loaded with meaning and illustrates the emergent power, in which
subjectivity truly lies. “The posthuman need not be recuperated back into liberal
humanism, nor need it be construed as antihuman”(pp.286), Hayles concludes at the
end of her book, as long as we don’t forget that we are first and foremost embodied
beings.
What is equally revealing is the metaphor that computer is the mirror through
which we understand our own identity. These machines provide the modern version
of Narcissus with a surface from which he falls in love again with his reflection. Based
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on Jean Piaget’s theory [172] that children develop the concept of life by making finer
and finer distinctions about the kind of activity that is evidence of life, Sherry Turkle
[203] conducted a series of empirical studies on children’s interactions with computers.
The experiments have shown that the computer influences the forging fundamental
categories in children’s sense-making of the world because it clearly stands in between
the living and the non-living. It sometimes “cheats,” and yet it runs on a battery. It
is “programmed,” but so are people. Turkle observes that one position that children
often come to is that computers are like people in their psychology but not like people
in their origins. It is of particular importance to intentional systems because the term
“psychology” here is almost a synonym of intentionality.
A particularly powerful moment she described is when one of the children con-
fronted an unplanned bug in a computer toy — the machine simply would not shut
down even if the child tried to. Turkle commented that it was a scary moment be-
cause it violated what we assume about machines — we can turn them off at will. So
at that movement of discovery, the toy became alive, and for our purpose, intentional.
The malfunction made its unpredictable from the design stance established by the
basic HCI interface design principles and forced people to move on to the intentional
stance.
The new categorization challenge is not only limited to children; the arrival of
computers destabilized the long-standing dichotomy between the worlds of physics
and psychology, set up by Western science. What Turkle sees as more valuable
in Artificial Intelligence is that it offers “a new way of thinking. The new way of
knowing asks that you think about everything, especially all aspects of the mind, in
computational terms, in terms of program and information processing” (pp.246).
This, of course, is not the first time in history that our identity as the human
race has evolved in response to confrontation with new discovery and technology.
When Copernicus ousted Earth from its illusionary central place in the universe, he
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called into question the human identity as God’s privileged servant; when Darwin
claimed that humans are descended from animals, he destroyed the image of human
as the moral creature with souls transcending all animals. Once more, in the presence
of computers, human beings have been deprived of its privileged place as the only
entity that thinks. In contrast to the Weizenbaum-styled rejection, Turkle embraces
computers for they give us another chance to “see ourselves differently as we catch
sign of our images in the mirror of the machine” [204, pp.9].
Heidegger’s work on technology may help to summarize the various perspectives
that we have gone through so far. In his article “The Question Concerning Tech-
nology” [89], the “essence” of technology is to “emframe,” that is, it “reveals” by
“concealing.” Similar to many other technologies developed throughout human his-
tory, computers once again reframe our understanding of human existence. AI and
computers certainly reveal who we are by providing us with a new mirror through
which we can see ourselves from a different angle. At the same time, we should not
forget that they conceal Being — the truth about human existence prior to logical
reflection — which cannot be simulated by computers.
Although a large segment of this history is represented by the narratives of the
social changes that computers have brought, it does not imply the subscription to
a McLuhanian technological determinism view. In his in-depth study of television,
Raymond Williams [214] denounced both technological determinism and the symp-
tomatic technology (called social determinism by Winner) views. He consequently
proposed a different interpretation:
[It] would differ from technological determinism in that it would restore
intention to the process of research and development. The technology
would be seen, that is to say, as being looked for and developed with
certain purposes and practices already in mind. At the same time the
interpretation would differ from symptomatic technology in that these
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purposes and practices would be seen as direct: as known social needs,
purpose and practices to which the technology is not marginal but central.
[215, pp.14]
So far, I have offered a condensed overview of major perspectives of computing in
the last few decades in order to situate my own practice. This study and our expressive
production work depicted in Chapter 6 represent an integrated perspective to call
attention to social and cultural issues through computers, especially AI technology,
as an expressive medium. It is with Williams’ reminder that we continue to the next
section, which lays the groundwork for understanding such “intention to the process
of research and development” of intentional systems.
2.2 System Intentionality
Intentionality is a topic of longstanding concern in philosophy. It is commonly de-
scribed as “aboutness” [2, 37, 217] or defined as “that property of many mental states
and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs
in the world” [189]. Reintroduced by Franz Brentano [18] in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and taken up by Husserl [104], the concept is understood as the linkage between
the “inexistence” of human mental phenomena and the material establishments and
states in the world. Intentional mental states, which include beliefs and desires, are
not free-floating thoughts, but are always about or directed at something. In other
words, we do not just have beliefs and desires in their abstract forms. Instead, they
are always about certain states (e.g., I believe that it is going to rain tomorrow) or
directed at certain objects (e.g., his desire for a new sports car).
In the mid-nineteen forties, psychologists Fritz Heider and Mary-Ann Simmel [90]
conducted an experiment in which they showed participants clips of animated films
with simple geometric figures (see Figure 9), animated with different pacing, move-
ment, location and other factors. Despite the minimalistic representation, none of the
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Figure 9: Screenshots of Heider and Simmel’s 1944 Film Experiments
participants saw these triangles and dots simply as mathematical shapes. Similar to
the users of Braitenberg Vehicles (Section 1.2), they almost unequivocally reported
seeing various types of human-like intentionality in these shapes, such as beliefs, de-
sires and other intentional mental states. Some even developed elaborate narratives,
such as that two of the shapes were in love when the third one tried to steal one of
them, and that the two lovers eventually defeated their enemy. This important ex-
periment suggests that attributing intentionality is a universal human phenomenon.
The phenomenon equips us with the crucial capability of hypothesizing causal rela-
tions between various events, characters, and objects, especially when the real cause
is beyond our reach.
Despite the universality of the intentional readings developed by Heider and Sim-
mel’s participants, the attribution of intentionality to artifacts is too radical, or even
unethical, for many to accept. The rest of this section is structured around the issue
of system intentionality. I first present two opposing positions of intentionality raised
in the philosophical debates of AI in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 to suggest a broader
understanding of intentionality. Next, theoretical developments in several different
areas are discussed in terms of how intentionality of artifacts are acknowledged and
treated. My goal here is to illustrate that a broader definition of intentionality that
does not exclude artifacts is possible and useful to understand intentional systems as
they become increasingly pervasive in our culture.
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2.2.1 The Chinese Room Argument
The notion of intentionality pertaining to mental states is of particular importance to
AI because it directly speaks to the field’s defining goal of building artificial minds.
Even though AI has scaled down its ultimate goal of building the thinking mind,
recent years have witnessed signs of a revival of this dream. Notably, the Second
Conference on Artificial General Intelligence was held in Virginia in 2009. Departing
from the prevailing pragmatic views of AI described in the last section, this conference
intends to encourage research that “focuses on the original and ultimate goal of AI
— to create intelligence as a whole.”4 This new trend of revival makes the history
and lessons from classic AI even more relevant to the present context.
Core debates about AI and intentionality typically center on the question of
whether computer programs can exhibit the phenomenon of intentionality in simi-
lar ways as humans. A typical attack on the success of early AI takes the flavor of
Lady Lovelace’s argument: computers may appear to think, but their operations are
unintentional execution of instructions and therefore the computers are not and can-
not be intelligent in the way humans are. In other words, intentionality is seen as a
fundamental prerequisite of human intelligence. At the heart of the debate is philoso-
pher John Searle’s Chinese Room argument [188], a controversial thought experiment
described below.
Suppose a non-Chinese speaker inside a room is given a large batch of written
Chinese symbols and a set of formal rules in his own language to manipulate them.
Whenever he receives a message (input) written in Chinese, the imaginary person
produces another set of Chinese symbols (output) precisely based on the rules as his
reply. This person gets so good at his task that from the vantage point of someone
outside the room his reply is indistinguishable from ones produced by native Chinese
4The official conference website can be found at http://www.agi-09.org/.
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speakers. However, this appearance does not change the fact that the person does
not speak a single word of Chinese. According to Searle, this action of symbol ma-
nipulation is what lies at the core of computational processes. Since the human in
the room clearly does not understand Chinese, neither does the computer.
The Chinese Room argument is a direct counter-argument to what Searle calls
the Strong AI hypothesis, that is, a view that computers and programs can possess
intentionality, intelligence, and other mental capabilities in similar ways as humans.
The basis of Searle’s argument is that a computer’s internal states and processes are
purely syntactic, as sketched out in Newell and Simon’s Physical Symbol Systems
Hypothesis (Section 2.1.1). Since the symbols being manipulated are meaningless
to the machine under Newell and Simon’s framework, the computer therefore is not
intentional or, consequently, intelligent.
This argument embodies the long tradition of philosophy of mind wherein inten-
tionality is seen as an intrinsic property of the subject under examination. To Searle,
the distinction between the Strong and Weak AI hypotheses represents the differ-
ence between intrinsic or original intentionality and intentionality derived through
language. He argues that the intentionality of mental states “is not derived from
some more prior forms of intentionality, but is intrinsic to the states themselves.”
By contrast, derived intentionality is “derived from the intentionality of the mind”
of the one who interprets them [189, pp.vii]. In the case of digital artifacts, AI sys-
tems may hold derived intentionality through being seen as playing chess intelligently
or understanding natural languages (i.e., the weak AI hypothesis), but they do not
have intrinsic intentionality because the symbolic objects and syntactical rules that
computers operate on cannot represent beliefs, desires, and other intentional mental
states.
Searle’s distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality was certainly an
important contribution at the time when the popular culture and government agencies
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fell in love with the hyped concept of Strong AI in the context of the Cold War.
Nevertheless, it merely rephrases the conventional view that humans are the only
privileged form of existence above everything else. More importantly, Searle studies
the phenomenon of intentionality as an ontological property of computers in isolation
without taking into consideration how people make use of them or the computers’
impact on society. As the Strong AI hypothesis fades away from the discourse, Searle’s
argument is also losing its relevance to intentional systems.
2.2.2 The Intentional Stance
A wide variety of responses have been generated since Searle published his Chinese
Room argument. Many of them have been documented in David Cole’s article [26].
Daniel Dennett, among others, raises the fundamental question about the existence
of intrinsic intentionality, even in human beings. He argues that “we [humans] are
artifacts ... designed over the eons as survival machines for genes.... So our intention-
ality is derived from the intentionality of our ‘selfish’ genes”[38, pp.298]! For Dennett,
all intentionality is derived in the first place. Far from being secondary in Searle’s
theory, the derived intentionality according to Dennett serves utilitarian functions
critical to human survival. The action of attributing intentionality allows us to make
sense of our surroundings, an argument not unconnected from the results of Heider
and Simmel’s film experiment that we see in the beginning of Section 2.2.
Echoing Dennett’s theory, Allen Newell’s theory of knowledge and its represen-
tation [158] stresses that knowledge, a key component to AI, is fundamentally inter-
pretive and derived. Rejecting the possibility that knowledge can be characterized in
any (intrinsic) physical structure, Newell’s theory bases entirely on the functioning of
knowledge. In a situation where knowledge is used, according to Newell, the notion
that an agent has knowledge requires an observer to ascribe it so.
In the previous chapter, I introduced Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance,
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Figure 10: Roomba Vacuum Cleaner with “Spotty Leopard” Costume
that is, the strategies we undertake to predict a system’s behavior by treating them
as if they have beliefs and desires. Recent studies in human computer interaction
seem to support this theory. In an empirical study conducted by Sung et. al. [201]
on the usage of Roomba (Figure 10), an owner describes his two Roombas, called
“discovery” and “scheduler,” in the following way:
And I know definitely they have a same firmware or a similar firmware
so the difference should not be much but ah, for example, my discovery,
he’s more crazy. He runs into things and sometimes and goes into different
places he should not be going to. And the scheduler he’s more like refined.
He knows what he’s doing.
Of interest here is that even though the owner is conscious of the technical im-
plausibility of his narrative, he still cannot help reading and describing his robotic
vacuum cleaners as intentional, that is, as possessing their own beliefs and desires.
A further illustration of the pervasiveness of the intentional stance is Sherry Turkle’s
field work on how children interact with computational toys as discussed in Section
2.1.5.
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Figure 11: Mechanical Turkish Chess Player by Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen in
1769
2.2.3 The Ghost outside the Machine: Social Perspectives
Dennett’s rejection of the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality blurs
the fundamental boundary that separates humans from artifacts. The discussion of
intentional stance allows us to escape from the ontological debate of intentionality
narrowly defined as the sacred property of humans. It also opens up new ways of
thinking about artifacts and their role in social settings, which include both humans
and artifacts. As radical as it may seem to many people, this view resonates with sim-
ilar developments in a wide range of other research areas that challenge the traditional
dividing line between the intentional subject and the passive object.
It is important to sketch some of these developments in order to contextualize
the position of intentionality that this dissertation takes. Although the theoretical
and practical explorations of artifacts and intentionality can perhaps be traced back
to ancient automata (e.g., Figure 11), which literally means “acting of one’s own
will” in Greek, this subsection mainly confines its scope to contemporary theories, in
particular, activity theory, actor-network theory, and distributed cognition developed
within the last century.
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As described in the beginning of the chapter, the view that intentionality dif-
ferentiates us from artifacts manifests itself throughout the long history of Western
philosophy, theology and science. Searle’s insistence on intrinsic intentionality clearly
embodies this tradition. Since the turn of the twentieth century, however, an increas-
ing number of theorists have questioned this assumption and drawn artifacts closer
to the core of humanity than ever.
2.2.3.1 Activity Theory
In the nineteen twenties, psychologists in the former Soviet Unions started a new
practice with activity as its central unit of analysis. To overcome the drawbacks of
psychoanalysis and behaviorism paradigms, activity theorists approach consciousness
and intentionality through the analysis of everyday activities that are “firmly and
inextricably embedded in the social matrix” of people and artifacts, a broad concept
including physical tools or sign systems [155]. Under this framework, artifacts play
an active role in mediating an individual’s consciousness and actions. For example,
a person may have the object of obtaining food, but to do so he must
carry out actions not immediately directed at obtaining food ....5 [He
may] make a hunting weapon. Does he subsequently use the weapon he
made, or does he pass it on to someone else and receive a portion of the
total catch? In both cases, that which energizes his activity and that to
which his action is directed do not coincide. [156] (Originally in [127,
pp.37])
The lack of coincidence between a person’s conscious actions and intentionality
reveals the central mediation role of artifacts: how instruments mediate between an
actor and the object of doing; how the object negotiates with the limitation of the
5In the terminology of activity theory, an “object” refers to the “objective” of an individual.
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instrument; and how artifacts are created and transformed with the development of
activities and therefore carry with them particular culture and history [115].
While activity theory portrays artifacts as “integral and inseparable components of
human functioning” [116], the framework is still constructed around human conscious-
ness and objectives. This “asymmetry between people and things” [156] is further
questioned and eliminated by the other two recent developments in actor-network
theory and distributed cognition theories.
2.2.3.2 Actor-Network Theory
Actor-network theory (ANT) was founded from science and technology studies during
the early 1980s by Bruno Latour [122, 124] and Michel Callon [23]. Traditionally, the
study of human actors is the territory of sociological inquiries. Non-human actors, on
the other hand, are often greeted by the attitude to “leave the nonhuman to the care
of technologists or to study the impact of black-boxed techniques upon the evolution
of social groups” [121]. In contrast, actor-network theory attempts to understand
social interactions through the lens of both human and non-human factors.
Even for many liberal scholars, ANT’s insistence on treating human and non-
human actors equally in its analysis is an “absurd” move that separates it radi-
cally from conventional sociology and many other traditions. A new construct called
theactant was created deliberately to downplay the distinction between human and
non-human actors in the complex networks of associations and translations. Before
diving into ANT’s implications for AI and intentional systems, it is worthwhile to
contextualize this bold gesture.
In a 1988 article “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together” [121], Latour eluci-
dates the foundation of his position. Starting from an extremely simple technological
invention of the door, Latour reveals an increasingly complex network in which func-
tions and skills are delegated in an intertwined manner between human actants (e.g.,
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a gatekeeper) and non-human actants (e.g., a hinge and a hydraulic door-closer). The
traditional sociological approach falls short here in providing a coherent explanation
in this simple example, for the field’s “absence of a convenient vocabulary hinders its
practitioners from mov[ing] freely from studying associations of human to associations
of nonhumans.” Latour points out cogently,
It is because humans, nonhumans, and even angels are never sufficient in
themselves and because there is no one direction going from one type of
delegation to the other, that it is so useless to impose a priori divisions
between which skills are human and which ones are not human, which
characters are personified and which remain abstract, which delegation is
forbidden and which is permissible, which type of delegation is stronger
or more durable than the other. In place of these many cumbersome
distinctions why not take up a few simple descriptive tools?
In the same article, Latour relates his concept of “the distribution of skills between
humans and nonhumans” to the low-hanging overpasses on Long Island, a famous ex-
ample in Winner’s article on how artifacts embody forms of power and authority[215].
These unusually low overpasses were designed by Robert Moses, a major builder of
public infrastructure in New York between 1920s and 1970s. As part of his political
vision of the city, Moses constructed these overpasses “according to specifications
that would discourage the presence of buses on his parkways.” This means that the
lower-class citizens who do not have access to automobiles will not have the means to
commute on these parkways and hence lose their access to the connected neighbor-
hoods. Automobile-owning whites of “upper” and “comfortable middle” classes, as
Moses calls them, on the other hand, would be free to use the parkways for recreation
and commuting. In this particular example, actor-network theorists would argue that
the technological objects of overpasses serve similar social functions as human police
hired to reinforce segregation laws as well as the immaterial ideology of social and
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class inequality.
2.2.3.3 Distributed Cognition Theories
Distributed cognition theories represent recent perspectives in cognitive science that
expands the field’s traditional emphasis on the mental processes occurring inside an
individual’s brain. Similar to the above two theories, distributed cognition pays atten-
tion to the close interaction between human and artifacts in a social-cultural system.
As defined by its founding members, distributed cognition perspectives address “the
representation of knowledge both inside the heads of individuals and in the world ...;
the propagation of knowledge between different individuals and artifacts ...; and the
transformations which external structures undergo when operated on by individuals
and artifacts” [56].
In parallel with actor-network theory, distributed cognition approaches also adopt
a more symmetric relationship between human and non-human by assigning them
theoretical equivalence as “agents” in their analyses. More importantly, both forms
of agents are necessary components of distributed cognition approach’s unit of analysis
— the cognitive system. The theory studies the cognition of a system in terms of
its functioning, emphasizing the organization, coordination, and operation among its
components.
Hutchins [106, 156] provides an example of a cognitive system of an airplane cock-
pit, where the system’s goal is the “successful completion of a flight.” In order to
understand the “cockpit system,” we have to consider the unity of pilots and instru-
ments because “the properties of individual agents alone, no matter how detailed
the knowledge of the properties of those individuals might be” is inadequate. The
human and non-human components of the cockpit form a single cognitive system and
coordinate with each other to enact the goal.
In a more detailed study, Hutchins [105] analyzes a cognitive system of shipboard
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navigation on Navy vessels. He contrasts Western navigation, which relies on artifacts
to aid the procedure of locating the navigator’s position on a chart, with Micronesian
navigation, which has used the reference of star sightings, speed judgments, and other
contextual information. Hutchins argues that although the computational problem
facing both Western and Micronesian steersmen is the same, the representations and
processes to carry out that task (algorithmic level) and the physical instantiation
(implementational level) are different in the two cases. Western navigation is algo-
rithmically complex with details and calculations. However, much of these tasks are
pre-calculated and embedded in instruments and procedures such as charts and de-
vices. The cognitive system of navigation, including the navigation team together
with artifacts and procedures, organizes itself towards settings that are robust and
cognitively economical to navigators.
In summary, this section surveyed multiple contemporary theoretical investiga-
tions of intentionality in the context of artifacts. Starting with the critiques of AI
in philosophy of mind, we first encountered Searle’s Chinese Room argument that
machines may have derived intentionality, which should not be confused with hu-
man intrinsic intentionality that computer symbol manipulation processes can never
achieve. The distinction between derived and intrinsic intentionality has been chal-
lenged, among others, by Dennett who questions the existence of the so-called intrinsic
intentionality, even in human beings. Instead, he has proposed that all intentional-
ity is derived, as a result of the human survival instinct to predict the behaviors of
other elements in the environment, both the living and not, especially when little
information is known about them. The ontological debates about intentionality in
the traditional sense were useful in their particular context when the field of AI was
inflated with unrealistic ambitions that baffled people’s perception on humanity at
the time. However, as stated in the previous section, the ontological question of “Can
machines think?” has lost its importance in society. It is more constructive, in my
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view, to adopt broader understandings of intentionality that allow us to decipher the
roles of technological artifacts, as they become increasingly pervasive in our society.
We hence briefly visited three major theoretical developments in the past century —
activity theory, actor-network theory and the distributed approach — that form the
theoretical foundation of thinking through the concept of system intentionality later
in Chapter 3.
2.3 Reading Systems
The task of analyzing intentional systems in terms of how system intentionality is
formed requires close readings of these systems. This section presents my theoretical
framework built on the existing theories of “reading.” First, 2.3.1 offers a succinct
account of the hermeneutic tradition of interpretation as the foundation of my main
method. One particular school of hermeneutics, as we shall see, is also of particular
importance to AI and intentional systems because of its philosophical concerns on
human existence and intelligence. Next, an emerging research area that I find to be
surprisingly closely related to hermeneutics called “software studies” is described in
Section 2.3.2. Section 2.3.3 then introduces cognitive semantics as an alternative to
read intentional systems. Finally, in Section 2.3.4 examines the existing analytical
tools from the field of AI and human computer interaction, two areas closely related
to intentional systems, and points out the drawbacks for each analysis schema to fully
understand system intentionality.
2.3.1 Hermeneutics
The venerable field of hermeneutics covers the theory and art of interpretation. Preoc-
cupied with questions regarding interpretation, understanding, and point of view, the
field has gone through several significant shifts. Classical methodological hermeneutics
is devoted to methods of studying texts, often sacred and mythical ones. In contrast,
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hermeneutics since the beginning of the twentieth century has been focusing on philo-
sophical inquiries; philosophical hermeneutics and its various extensions are primarily
concerned with the philosophical foundation of meaning and understanding.
The field of hermeneutics bears a long tradition that stretches back to ancient
Greek philosophy. A comprehensive overview of the field is well beyond the scope
of this section. More thorough studies can be found in [164, 176, 208, 174]. Instead
of offering a thorough and authoritative overview of hermeneutics, the goal here to
provide necessary background to understand the major critiques of classic AI from
philosophical hermeneutics-based perspectives. More importantly, this section pre-
pares the reader for the method of reading intentional systems in Chapter 3, which
is informed by classical hermeneutics.
2.3.1.1 Classical Methodological Hermeneutics
As a major branch of biblical study during the middle age and Renaissance, clas-
sical methodological hermeneutics (classical hermeneutics in shorthand) primarily
concerns with developing systematic and interpretive methodologies to retrieve the
author’s intended meaning from the text. During the middle age, interpreters of the
biblical text based their understandings on empathetic projection instead of read-
ing the sacred text literally. This approach was further developed and systemized
by Schleiermacher and Dilthey into a coherent methodology for text interpretation
in general. Schleiermacher [164, 186] combined grammatical analysis from classical
philology with the study of themes from Biblical exegesis and developed a general
framework of text interpretation.
Expanding Schleiermacher’s theory, Dilthey [39] claimed that interpreting texts,
verbal utterance, actions, and art requires the action of recognizing the intention
behind these meaningful expressions. This action is more like interpreting a poem
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than conducting physics or chemistry experiments. This viewpoint is well summa-
rized by modern day scholar Henry Virkler’s description on the duality of classical
hermeneutics:
[Hermeneutics] is considered an art because communication is flexible,
and therefore a mechanical and rigid application of rules will sometimes
distort the true meaning of a communication. To be a good interpreter
one must learn the rules of hermeneutics as well as the art of applying
those rules. [208, pp.16]
Dilthey also stressed the importance that lived experience (Erlebnis) and under-
standing (Verstenhen) have in the methodology of the humanities, in contrast to
the natural sciences. Erlebnis is connected with the process of self-understanding,
whereas Verstenhen relates to the understanding of others. Dilthey argues that Er-
lebnis alone does not provide self-understanding. The latter is only obtained to the
extent that the self relates to itself as it relates to others.
One of the underlying assumptions of classical hermeneutics is that the author’s
intended meaning is the only valid interpretation. Therefore, a hermeneutical in-
terpreter’s goal is to overcome the barrier of the passage of time, the evolution of
language, and the change of context, and to successfully retrieve the true meaning
intended by the original author(s) of the text. This view is still shared by the mod-
ern followers of classic hermeneutics. In his major work Validity in Interpretation
published in 1967, Hirsch expressed his strong objection to relativism:
When critics deliberately banished the original author, they themselves
usurped his place [as the determiners of meaning], and this led unerringly
to some of our present-day theoretical confusions. Where before there
had been but one author [one determiner of meaning], there now arose
a multiplicity of them, each carrying as much authority as the next. To
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banish the original author as the determiner of meaning was to reject
the only compelling normative principle that could lend validity to an
interpretation .... For if the meaning of a text is not the author’s, then no
interpretation can possibly correspond to the meaning of the text, since
the text can have no determinate or determinable meaning. [92, pp.5]
In their persistent pursuit of the valid interpretation, hermeneutic interpreters
quickly found themselves stuck in a difficult situation — the understanding of text
as a whole is dependent on the knowledge of its constituting parts, which in turn is
equally relying on the interpreter’s comprehension of the entire text. This issue of
the hermeneutic circle is one of the major challenges and themes of the field.
2.3.1.2 Philosophical Hermeneutics
Under the influence of German romanticism and idealism, the field of hermeneutics
saw a major shift of focus from being other disciplines’ methodological or didactic
aid to philosophical inquiries of “the conditions of possibility for symbolic commu-
nication as such” [174]. Heidegger and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics raised
the notion that interpretation is not based on knowing, but based on our direct and
non-mediated being-in-the-world. The field’s new task during this period is well sum-
marized by Ricoeur’s definition that “hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of
understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts” [176, pp.43].
Whereas Dilthey’s hermeneutics primarily tackles the epistemological problem of
communicating with other people, Heidegger’s approach links it to the ontological
foundation of existence in relation to the world through the concept of Dasein. In
his influential work Being and Time [88], Heidegger defines Dasein as direct, non-
mediated being in the world, “a being with being.” Its constitution cannot be dis-
played through the conventional human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), which are
“ground[ed] by derivation.” In other words, Dasein exists prior to scientific knowing.
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Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics is extended by Gadamer particularly in
his Truth and Method [67]. Gadamer links the nature of being into Heidegger’s notion
of throwness, that is, the condition in which human beings are “thrown” into the
world independent of their wills and cannot step back and reflect on their actions.
Gadamer proclaims:
To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of partic-
ular difficulty. The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing
outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We
are always within the situation and to throw light on it is a task that is
never entirely completed. This is also true of the hermeneutic situation,
i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition
that we are trying to understand. (pp.268)
2.3.1.3 Hermeneutics and AI
Within the work that has been done with hermeneutics in the context of AI, attention
has been so far primarily concentrated on the philosophical hermeneutic tradition. It
is not surprising given that Heidegger and Gadamer’s theory of human existence and
understanding fundamentally contradicts the approaches of classic AI. Dreyfus’ 1972
work What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason [42], for example,
ardently criticizes the plausibility of AI on hermeneutic grounds. He claims that
the foundation of AI is built on biological and psychological assumptions as well
as deeper epistemological and ontological assumptions. With these assumptions, AI
and cognitive scientists came up with the view that cognition is the manipulation of
internal symbols specified by internal rules. Using Heidegger’s hermeneutics as his
theoretical basis, Dreyfus argues that understanding is fundamentally based on our
embodied and highly context-bounded being-in-the-worldness and throwness, none
of which can be formalized into rule-based symbol manipulation. For this reason,
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according to Dreyfus, classic AI is doomed to fail.
In the domain of natural language understanding, AI veteran Terry Winograd
and philosopher Fernando Flores [217] reached a similar conclusion by combining
hermeneutics with biological and technical vantage points.6 They take on the West-
ern rationalism understanding of language, thought, and rationality, and show how
its influence sometimes blinds us from seeing other alternatives. Based on both Hei-
degger’s hermeneutics and Maturana’s biological study of vision, the authors remind
us that meaning and Being require flexible accommodation of their ever-changing
context.
Remarkably, some studies on hermeneutics have been also done inside the AI
community. Mallery, Shurwitz and Duffy [133] from MIT’s AI lab, for instance,
conducted an investigation on hermeneutics, hoping to find insights to understand
“meaning, translation, architectures for natural language understanding, and even
... methods suitable for scientific inquiry in AI.” Although the authors noticed the
parallel between the hermeneutic circle and a computational notion of bootstrapping,
the article does not offer any concrete suggestions for the possible uses of hermeneutics
in AI.7 This, in a way, reflects how deeply the scientific and technological fields have
invested in the rationalist tradition. As Winograd and Flores have pointed out,
anything that diverges from this deep-seated preunderstanding of rationalism risks
the possibility of doubt and rejection [217, pp.16]. However, Mallery et. al.’s work is
certainly important for the field of AI in that it is a sincere and constructive response
to many hermeneutic-based critiques that it has received.
Before we move on, it is worthwhile to mention that Rodney Brooks’s interactionist
AI, a more recent paradigm of AI, is seen as bearing resemblance to Heidegger’s theory.
6Frustrated by the fundamental issues of AI described in this joint work, Winograd has shifted
his focus to HCI.
7Bootstrapping is a computational concept that uses lower order components to construct higher
order ones, which in turn modify the former.
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Compared with the classical AI paradigm, interactionist AI approaches intelligence
as an emergent phenomenon resulting from an agent’s “physical interaction with the
environment” [20]. Even though Brooks himself denied the influence, one cannot help
seeing the close connection between the two fields.
The two major developments of hermeneutics described above offer insights to
different aspects of meaning and understanding. The classic hermeneutics focuses
on the methodology of communication through textual interpretation, whereas its
philosophical counterpart deals with ontological foundation of understanding through
being-in-the-worldness. Their distinctions lend themselves to different applications in
the context of AI. As we have seen, the philosophical hermeneutics has proven to be
a powerful tool to examine the direction and approaches of classic AI. The classi-
cal hermeneutics can also be useful for the purpose of understanding these systems
through close readings, as illustrated in Chapter 3. The rest of the section introduces
two other approaches that will prepare us to read intentional systems. Software stud-
ies, to a certain extent, is related to classical hermeneutics in its approach to read
software systems as text. Cognitive semantics research, on the other hand, provides a
particular way of close reading that is not currently covered in software studies, that
is through the discovering of entrenched metaphors and blends in the texts.
2.3.2 Software Studies
The emerging research area of software studies, whose name was coined in Lev
Manovich’s book The Language of New Media[134], applies the theories and ap-
proaches from humanities and social sciences to computer software. It is related to
the classical hermeneutics in that scholars of software studies perform close reading
of computer software in order to gain insights of its authors as well as the embodied
social and cultural contexts in which the code was written. To put it succinctly,
computer software is studied as text.
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In the website of the recently started “Software Studies Initiative” at University of
California, San Diego, its creators Lev Manovich and Noah Wardrip-Fruin put forth
their motivations for the initiative:
[W]e think of software as a layer that permeates all areas of contemporary
societies. Therefore, if we want to understand contemporary techniques
of control, communication, representation, simulation, analysis, decision-
making, memory, vision, writing, and interaction, our analysis can’t be
complete until we consider this software layer.8
The origin of software studies is linked to the debate in late nineteen nineties
between software formalism and software culturalism. Commenting on Geoff Cox et.
al.’s widely read manifesto proclaiming that “the aesthetic value of code lies in its
execution, not simply its written form” [30], Florian Cramer [31] labeled Cox and his
supporters as software formalists as they “focu[s] on the formal poetics and aesthet-
ics of software code and individual subjectivity expressed in algorithms.” This is to
contrast with another approach of those whom Cramer calls the software culturalists.
As their name suggests, this group of people regard software as, first and foremost, a
culturally and politically coded practice and focus their attention on addressing these
aspects of software. Earlier influential work in this lineage includes Matthrew Fuller’s
work on software as culture and his cultural analysis of the Microsoft Word interface
[65], Paul N. Edwards’s study on the impact of the closed world ideology during the
Cold War political environment on the development of computer technology [45], and
Friedrich Kittler’s claim that the concept of software is itself an illusionary construc-
tion under the influence of Cartesian Dualism [113]. These early software culturalist
works laid the ground for what was later called software studies.
Many new generation software studies scholars are also influenced by the software
8Excerpts from the official website of Software Studies Initiative:
http://lab.softwarestudies.com/2007/05/about-software-studies-ucsd.html
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formalists in the sense that both stress the importance of procedural literacy. Instead
of blackboxing the underlying execution of software, these scholars see programming
and source code as the primary subject of their analysis. In his book Software Stud-
ies: A Lexicon [66], the first book dedicated to software studies, Fuller collected a
wide range of articles covering topics such as algorithms, data structures, computing
languages, data visualization and interaction. Although this list of topics may seem
quite common for a computer science and software engineering book, Fuller’s book
represents a range of vastly interdisciplinary approaches. Compared to the early soft-
ware culturalists, the book’s contributors, many of whom have extensive background
in computing, unseal the blackbox of software and analyze these seemingly technical
issues with critical and cultural lenses.
Meanwhile, other scholars remind us to look outside of the box of programming
for its own sake. For example, Kirschenbaum’s article [112] titled “Virtuality and
VRML: Software Studies After Manovich” traced the downfall of a once-promising
virtual reality programming language VRML to its business and managerial causes.
He points out that while studying the intangible software, we should not lose sight
of its “materialistic” causes. For Kirschenbaum, software is the product of “white
papers, engineering specs, marketing reports, conversations and collaborations, intu-
itive insights and professionalized expertise, venture capital (in other words, money),
late nights (in other words, labor), Mountain Dew, and espresso.”9
As a young and rising research area, software studies represents a vastly different
and sometimes contradictory approach. However, its nucleus of applying humanistic
close reading to software systems both at their source code and their developing
9An interesting parallel inside the field of AI is Rychtyckyj and Turski’s [182] realization that the
failure of most commercial AI expert systems was not due to technical problems, but mostly to the
company’s organizational and business issues. This paper was presented last summer at the What
Went Wrong and Why workshop in the AAAI 2008 conference. It is an important landmark, even
though Latour has made the very same argument in Latour [124], because the realization was made
inside the AI community of practice.
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context is useful to the analysis of intentional systems.
2.3.3 Cognitive Semantics
The last corner stone that lays the theoretical framework for reading intentional
systems is drawn from cognitive semantics, particularly from its areas of concep-
tual metaphor theory (a.k.a., metaphor theory) [118] and conceptual blending theory
(a.k.a., blending theory) [53, 54]. As part of the broader cognitive linguistics move-
ment, both metaphor theory and blending theory scrutinize the usage of figurative
languages including metaphors, metonymies, and blends in linguistic data with the
goal of gaining insights of how human cognition functions. These figurative languages
are so entrenched in and coherent with our culture that some believe that they pro-
vide cognitive structures for our worldviews [55]. With it comes the realization that
these entrenched linguistic patterns in discourses are important to recover fundamen-
tal cultural and ideological beliefs. In addition, certain components of metaphor and
blending theories suggest computational models that can be used to algorithmically
generate figurative expressions that have both cultural and aesthetic significance [81].
The following two sections provide brief accounts of both theories and how they fit
into my overall framework.
2.3.3.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Its Application
Conceptual metaphor theory originated in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s 1980
seminal work Metaphors We Live By [118]. The authors assert that metaphor is not
just a matter of language, but more importantly, their pervasive manifestations reflect
the fact “[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act,
is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (pp.3). Through various examples, Lakoff
and Johnson demonstrate that human understandings are structured coherently with
the conceptual categories, or gestalt understandings, we form through our recurrent
bodily experiences. These experiences are understood metaphorically when we use
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a gestalt understanding from one domain to structure experience in another. For
instance, the multi-dimensional structures of the concept LOVE are partially based
on the more concrete concept of JOURNEY. In a later article, Lakoff [117] suggests
that metaphors are organized in a hierarchical structure, from the most fundamental
and cognitive ones, which are grounded in our pre-conceptual embodied experiences,
to higher level conceptual and cultural ones.
A metaphor, within the framework of Lakoff and Johnson, involves the mapping
between two conceptual structures, a source domain and a target domain. The source
domain is from which we draw metaphorical expressions, and is typically (but not
always) composed of a concept that is familiar and understandable directly through
human embodied experience (e.g., JOURNEY ). The target domain, on the other
hand, is the conceptual domain that we intend to understand and is often less imme-
diate to our sensory-motor skills and more abstract (e.g., LOVE ). The metaphorical
mappings from the source to target domain establish correspondences between the two
structures in many literary and everyday expressions, so that people can better grasp
the more abstract target domain. For example, the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY
is manifested through text expressions such as “I don’t think this relationship is going
anywhere,” “Look how far we’ve come,” and “We’re at a crossroad.”
Metaphors embody worldviews through its metaphorical systematicity of high-
lighting and hiding [118, pp.10]. Different metaphors bring forth correspondent as-
pects of the target domain. For instance, the metaphor LOVE IS A PHYSICAL
FORCE describes the concept differently from LOVE IS MAGIC or LOVE IS A
PATIENT. As these metaphors provide insights through highlighting certain aspects
of the target, they also hide others. As Lakoff and Johnson point out, “it is important
to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were
total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of
it” (pp.13).
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In addition to its apparent cognitive contribution, metaphor theory has important
social and critical implications. It offers a unique lens for critical studies precisely
because certain fundamental metaphors are so deeply entrenched in our culture that
most of time people are not conscious about their impact. Otto Santa Ana [183],
for instance, combined metaphor theory and Foucault’s critical discourse analysis to
reveal the hidden political ideology and social order regarding Latino immigrants in
U.S. though analyzing metaphors used in mass media during a specific political era.
Santa Ana’s work has proven to be particularly inspirational for unpacking how AI
systems’ intentionality is constructed through metaphorical projections in the corpus
of technical literature. It is hence worthwhile to pause for a moment and give a brief
description of his methods as the methods used in Chapter 4 draw on this work.
Santa Ana and his team first gathered their corpus of texts published by the Los
Angeles Times from 1992 to 1998, a period that coincides with the campaign period
of several important propositions, namely Proposition 187, 209, and 227, regarding
illegal (Latino) immigrants in the state of California. From these articles, they iden-
tified and isolated non-literal linguistic expressions pertaining to the characterization
of Latinos and related topics. The data was then compiled into a table for further
analysis, regarding every single text expression of a metaphor, which Santa Ana calls
metaphor tokens.
Each metaphor token was then analyzed in the context of the complete article
through interpretive classification of its source and target domains by more than
one person. Santa Ana’s team members then took the painstaking task of iteratively
sorting and editing these labeling/coding generated from the previous procedure until
the major typological dimensions of the source/target conceptual domain became
clear.
The result of the analysis was enlightening. Through the vast amount of data un-
der examination, Santa Ana located a single metaphorical mapping, IMMIGRATION
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AS DANGEROUS WATERS, which was dominantly repeated. From this finding,
Santa Ana concludes that “while metaphors are at times consciously used for stylistic
purposes, these oratorical functions are eclipsed by their conceptualizing and signaling
functions” (pp.58-59). Santa Ana’s method plays an important role in this disserta-
tion, for it influences my method of analyzing an AI system, Copycat, discussed later
in Chapter 4.
2.3.3.2 Conceptual Blending Theory
The more recent conceptual blending theory [54], building upon Gilles Fauconnier’s
mental spaces theory [51], describes the means by which concepts are integrated. The
theory describes how we arrive at new concepts through blending partial and tempo-
rary pieces of information. Most importantly, it proposes that conceptual blending
processes occur uniformly in pre-conscious everyday thought and in more complex
abstract thought such as in literary arts or rhetoric. Though the empirical grounding
for such findings is still being developed [69], this turn toward backstage cognition
reflects the trend in cognitive science away from formal, logical, and rational thought
and toward context-driven, cultural, and embodied thought [52]. Conceptual blend-
ing theory is often seen as a rival with the closely related conceptual metaphor theory.
An in-depth comparison between the two approaches can be found in Grady’s paper
[73] and will not be repeated here.
Conceptual blending theory serves two purposes for this dissertation. First, it is
used as an analytical tool, in addition to metaphor theory, to decode the narration of
intentionality in intentional systems. It provides constitutive principles (comprising
an idealized model and process) and governing principles (constraints determining
which conceptual blends are more “optimal” than others for everyday thought) for
how blends are constructed [54]. Second, its computational models, in particular
Harrell’s Alloy algorithm [81], provide a generative source to the Memory, Reverie
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Machine (MRM ) project.
Conceptual blending is generally regarded as a basic and ubiquitous human cog-
nitive operation that manifests itself from the simple natural language phrases [54]
to the more complex mental activity of what Mark Turner calls double-scope stories:
Consider the as yet unexplained human ability to conjure up mental sto-
ries that run counter to the story we actually inhabit.... Or suppose you
are actually boarding the plane to fly from San Francisco to Washington,
D. C. You must be paying attention to the way that travel story goes, or
you would not find your seat, stow your bag, and turn off your personal
electronic devices. But all the while, you are thinking of surfing Win-
dansea beach, and in that story, there is no San Francisco, no plane, no
seat, no bag, no personal electronic devices, no sitting down, and nobody
anywhere near you. Just you, the board, and the waves. [206]
Such mental activities, for our purposes, can also be seen as daydreams [81] —
the subject of MRM. In this computational narrative project, daydreams, memories,
and affective dispositions are generated differently for each output through the con-
struction of blends. In particular, Fox Harrell’s approach to computational narrative
[80, 83] and his technical work such as his GRIOT system and its constitutive Alloy
conceptual blending algorithm [81, 71] (Section 2.4.2) are important components of
the MRM’s technical foundation.
2.3.4 AI and HCI Analyses
For the last three decades, composer and scientist David Cope has been using his
Experiments in Musical Intelligence — a computer program he initially developed
in 1981 — to generate musical compositions in the styles of well-known classical
composers as well as to help him compose over 6,000 pieces. He has subsequently
released five albums with the titles of Bach by Design, Classical Music Composed by
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Computer, Virtual Mozart, Virtual Bach, and Virtual Rachmaninoff. To my untrained
ear, it is hard to miss the similarity between the computer generated music and
that written by the classical composers after whom those albums are named. Even
some professional musicians have mistaken the music the Experiments in Musical
Intelligence (EMI, pronounced “Emmy”) generated as an unknown piece by Mozart.
At the surface level, EMI and George Lewis’ Voyager (Chapter 1) share many
similarities; they both algorithmically generate music and can both be seen as inten-
tional. As described in Section 2.2, system intentionality refers to the phenomenon
of inanimate artifacts such as computational systems behaving as if their actions
were about something in the world rather than the mere execution of algorithmic
rules. These systems are seen as exhibiting complex behaviors commonly regarded as
the territory of intentional human phenomena (e.g., planning, learning, and creating),
which are derived from mental states such as belief and desire. This chapter attempts
to locate the formation of system intentionality.
A more detailed look uncovers the different sets of values and practices that the
two systems speak to. Unlike Lewis, Cope does not claim that his program should be
seen as an independent player or an advocate for oppressed non-Western cultures. On
the contrary, the intentionality of EMI is proportional to how well it replicates the
icons of elite Western culture. The popular stories of how EMI “tricks” the listeners
is revealing. They illustrate Cope’s close linkage to the field of AI by naming his
project “musical intelligence” and framing the goal of his program as a version of the
“musical Turing test.” George Lewis, on the other hand, does not align himself with
AI or scientific practice. It is true that Lewis [165] admits his ambition to “get the
computer [program Voyager ] to sound good more or less on its own, so that someone
listening to it says, ‘Who is that playing?’ ” (emphasis added). However, Lewis and
Cope deploy very different strategies in the stories they create about their respective
systems: Lewis narrates his system as an independent player, not as an imitator of
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Figure 12: CD Cover Art of Cope’s 1997 Album Classical Music Composed by
Computer: Experiments in Musical Intelligence
any human beings. Cope, on the other hand, takes advantage of the aura of a classical
composer in order to construct a narrative that EMI is as good as one of the greatest
human composers.
The different approaches that authors take greatly affect how their systems are
perceived. As we see from the example of EMI and Voyager, the authors’ deeper
cultural and political stances, the way that they frame the problem, and how they
talk about it publicly on the website or through interviews, all shape how we see and
make sense of their systems. As we will see in the rest of this section, however, none
of the above is taken seriously into account either in AI or HCI analysis, the two most
relevant existing analysis schemas for intentional systems.
2.3.4.1 An AI Approach
Preoccupied with the concern for performance and generalizability, the AI approach
concentrates on analyzing the formal properties of the system itself. Based on the
established conventions of the main areas of AI (e.g., knowledge representation, plan-
ning, and machine learning), this section describes the core metrics that AI practition-
ers use in their analysis. Specifically, these methods are concerned with knowledge
representation, algorithmic complexity, domain knowledge, and performance (Table
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Table 3: AI Approach for Analyzing Systems
Aspects Evaluation Criteria
Knowledge Representation expressivity vs tractability
Domain Knowledge amount of domain knowledge the system has
Algorithmic Complexity CPU time, and memory space required
Performance how well its actual execution achieves the tasks
Architecture how well a specific cognitive process is carried out
3).
Consider an AI practitioner who encounters an intentional system, such as Voyager
or EMI, and wants to analyze it by employing the AI approach. From a knowledge
representation (KR) point of view, she will primarily consider the “expressivity”
(sometimes referred to as “expressiveness”) and “reasoning requirements” of how
knowledge is represented in the system. A well-known challenge in the KR community
is the “tradeoff between expressiveness and tractability,” as described in the textbook
by Levesque and Brachman [16]. Discussing the impact of knowledge representation
languages on AI algorithms, the authors wrote:
Basically, the problem is that it can be more difficult to reason correctly
with one representational language than with another and, moreover, that
this difficulty increases dramatically as the expressive power of the lan-
guage increases. This leads to a tradeoff between the expressiveness of
a representational language and its computational tractability. Here we
show that this tradeoff can be seen to underlie the differences among a
number of existing representational formalisms, in addition to motivating
many of the current research issues in knowledge representation. [128]
Notice that the term “expressive” in KR has a very different meaning from its
usage in the humanities and the arts. Expressivity in KR refers to the range of
different concepts that can be represented with a particular knowledge representation.
For instance, a simple representational formalism may be just a sequence of musical
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notes. It is useful to formalize certain musical pieces, but this representation is
confined to considering only one note at a time. A more expressive representation may
incorporate multiple parallel sequences of notes. While the second representation can
represent a larger variety of musical experiences, the algorithms involved will have
to be correspondingly more complicated and therefore more expensive.10 Thus, in
the practice of AI, the selection of knowledge representation is a tradeoff between its
expressivity and the consequent computational cost.
Next, the AI practitioner may be curious about the extent of domain knowledge a
system requires. In general, the amount of knowledge is often inversely proportional to
the complexity of the algorithm needed to solve a problem. In a planning system, for
example, domain knowledge can narrow the choice of possible plans and thus makes
the search easier [6]. Similarly, domain knowledge in a machine learning system
constrains the set of valid hypotheses, which eases the learning task [24]. An extreme
scenario in the domain of computer music is to equip the system with a database full
of already composed songs and specify which one to play for any given input. High
as the quality of the system “produced” music may be, the system is not interesting
by AI standards because the complexity of the algorithm involved is trivial. On
similar grounds, influential AI researcher Drew McDermott recently rejected the idea
of passing the Turing test with an exhaustive response table [86] as valid AI research.
11
As we have seen already, in addition to the expressivity of a system’s knowledge
representation, another important measurement of the AI system is algorithmic com-
plexity. One part of algorithmic measurement is the ratio of all acceptable solutions
to the entire output space. To put it simply, if all possible solutions in the output
10In this computer science terminology, “expensiveness,” sometimes also called “computational
cost,” or “cost,” refers to the number of CPU cycles (time) and amount of memory needed to
execute a certain algorithm.
11This unpublished article can be found in McDermott’s website: http://cs-
www.cs.yale.edu/homes/dvm/papers/turing-table.html
65
space are equally good, the algorithm does not have to do much more than pick one
at random. On the contrary, if the algorithm has to find the only valid solution out
of tens of thousands of possible ones, a situation commonly referred to in the AI com-
munity as a “needle in the haystack,” its complexity needs to be remarkably higher
than in the previous case.
Although high algorithmic complexity is a challenging AI research problem by
itself, it is also associated with the high cost and low efficiency of the algorithm. This
aspect is especially important for algorithms that require a lot of computer memory
to function. In standard computer science analysis, computational complexity is for-
mally defined as the number of cycles that a Turing machine executing the algorithm
would take to solve a problem with respect to the size of input [29], commonly no-
tated as the big “O.” In certain AI areas, such as planning, reducing computational
complexity is one of the primary concerns. For example, in the biannual Interna-
tional Planning Competition, held in conjunction with the International Conference
on Automated Planning and Scheduling (ICAPS), the evaluation criteria for suc-
cess are “minimize total time” (computational complexity) and “minimize total cost”
(smallest number of actions in the proposed plan). 12
Besides the above theoretical metrics, all AI programs have to run on computers,
process actual data, and be analyzed in terms of their actual performance — how well
they accomplish a pre-determined task according to relevant measurements. In AI
research, typical generic measures of performance include “classification accuracy” in
machine learning and, as previously mentioned, the computational complexity mea-
sures in the case of planning. Even though these objective metrics continue to domi-
nate the field of AI, there have been critiques [120, 43] from the community pointing
out that a single numeric measure of accuracy does not adequately reflect the scien-
tific interestingness of an algorithm. When an AI practitioner tries to measure the
12Official website of the competition can be found at http://ipc.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/
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performance of systems in the expressive domains, such as Voyager and EMI, bigger
issues surface, namely, how to objectively ascertain such subjective measurements as
quality of music?
Admittedly, there have been a number of attempts to formalize and objectify
subjective measures such as creativity and expressiveness towards the goal of applying
AI analyzing methodology to expressive domains including music, narrative, and
visual arts. Pérez y Pérez and Sharples [169], for instance, propose the construct
of “computerised creativity” (c-creativity) in the domain of story generation based
on Boden’s work [13] on creativity. In her book The Creative Mind, Boden defines
psychological creativity (p-creativity) as “ideas ... that are fundamentally novel with
respect to the individual mind which had the idea” (pp.32) and differentiates it from
historical creativity (h-creativity), which concerns the entire human history. Applying
the concept of p-creativity, Pérez y Pérez and Sharples propose to measure c-creativity
in terms of how much a system “generates knowledge that does not explicitly exist
in the original knowledge-base of the system and which is relevant to (i.e. is an
important element of) the produced output.” Although this framework represents an
interesting attempt to combine scientific formalization and cultural production based
on Boden’s philosophical work, it is inadequate to capture the different aspects of
creativity for reasons similar to those mentioned above.
In addition, certain AI practitioners may pay special attention to the architecture
of a system — not in terms of its efficiency, but regarding how well it carries out a
particular cognitive process at the functional account. These practitioners typically
come from a branch of AI which seeks to gain insights of human cognitive processes
from computational modes, and/or vice versa. For instance, the various AI systems
coming out of Schank’s group, as part of the renowned Yale School, faithfully imple-
ment the notion of “dynamic memory” [185], a cognitive psychology theory explaining
how humans use their memories in various tasks.
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So far, we have seen that the AI analysis framework concentrates on the operation
of computational systems, including the knowledge representation, amount of domain
knowledge, algorithmic complexity and performance. Given its focus on the system
itself, this framework provides a handy toolset to analyze the algorithmic complexity
of intentionality. However, the omission of system authors and users in the frame-
work makes it difficult to address other criteria of intentional systems — process
opacity, human-like coherence, and authorial intention. More issues arise when we
take a deeper look at the architecture level. As I will argue later in Chapter 3, how
well a system architecture models a cognitive process depends simultaneously on the
system’s operation as well as the system authors’ narration of it. With these issues
in mind, we move on to the existing HCI analysis framework with the relationship
between human and computer systems as its primary concern.
2.3.4.2 An HCI Approach
A human computer interaction (HCI) specialist may approach a system from a very
different angle. He will not pay close attention to how the system computes the
results, but rather how it interfaces with its human users. Evolving within the “com-
puter as a tool” perspective (Section 2.1.2), the field of HCI focuses on the question of
how well the tool adapts to the human, particularly its users’ needs and capabilities.
Initially growing out of the tradition of human factors and contemporary concerns
that computer programs were usually designed without taking the users into seri-
ous consideration, HCI promotes human (user) centered design to enhance human
productivity through such concepts and design principles as “affordance,” “natural
mapping,” “usability,” and “feedback” and avoids execution and evaluation “gulfs”
[161]. This goal is often broken down into the subsequent questions of, “How easily
can the user learn to use the program?” “How flexible is the system in supporting the
different ways of interaction preferred by different end-users?” and, “Is the system
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Table 4: HCI Principles of Usability [40, pp.259-273]
Learnability Principles Flexibility Principles Robustness Principles
Predictability Dialog initiative Observability
Synthesizability Multi-threading Recoverability
Familiarity Task migratability Responsiveness
Generalizability Substitutivity Task conformance
Consistency Customizability
robust enough to provide support for successful achievement and assessment of the
users’ tasks?” (Table 4).
Before he looks carefully at either Lewis’ or Cope’s system, the first thing that
the HCI specialist would be interested in is its users. Who are the users? What
are their characteristics? Are they professional musicians or normal listeners? How
much exposure do they have to classical or jazz music? What are their age ranges
and income levels, and so on? Unless the HCI specialist knows the answers to these
questions, he cannot decide whether the system is usable to these users.
Next, he may attempt to identify several benchmark tasks that the systems would
need to perform. These tasks are chosen from a set of core tasks that the system
supports and are fundamental for the users. As argued below in the next section,
it is not easy to define the user or choose such tasks for intentional systems. The
term “task” entails an instrument-view of the system, which is incongruous with
the original premise of Voyager. Some may argue that the author’s intention does
not need to be considered in an HCI analysis, but even leaving out authorial intent
does not solve our specialist’s problem completely. New issues arise: who is the user
of Voyager? The audience who is listening to the performance? The human jazz
musicians who are playing along with the system? Or, George Lewis himself? If we
assume all of the above are legitimate users of the system, then what are the typical
tasks of each of these user-groups, and how can a single system be simultaneously
helpful and usable to such a diverse range of people with different agendas?
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Table 5: Comparison between the AI and HCI Analyses
AI Analysis HCI Analysis
Perspectives Stand-alone Thinking Machine Computer as a Tool
Subject System’s internal process system’s interface
Value System performance User’s performance
Measurement defined by author defined by studying the users
System Intentionality A technical property A result from the interface
Assuming that the HCI specialist somehow resolves all the above difficulties, a
more puzzling question awaits him. A core component of HCI evaluation is to measure
how “natural” and “easy” a particular system is to use so that the users can increase
their productivity. Both interpretive and empirical evaluation methods essentially
focus on the question of the performance of the user using the system under certain
conditions. Different from the AI definition of performance, here the term applies to
the degree to which the users’ tasks are augmented by the specified system. Based on
the nature of the benchmark tasks, performance can be measured in terms of speed
(time needed to react and/or complete), accuracy (errors, the ratio between hits
and misses), production (number of tasks completed), and scores (number of points
earned), etc [40]. Although these metrics are useful for certain computer programs
that are used to enhance productivity, such as Photoshop or tax-filing software, they
are not quite applicable to either of the two musical systems of interest to us.
2.3.4.3 Limitations and Unanswered Questions
We have just gone through a rough overview of how the fields of AI and HCI, both
closely related to intentional systems, offer frameworks for analysis of the two above
mentioned computer music systems. AI analysis, continuing the stand-alone-thinking-
machine perspective of computing, is deeply invested in a system’s algorithmic com-
plexity and the expressivity of knowledge representation. By contrast, HCI evaluation
methods blackbox the internal processes of the system while focusing on its interface
with the user. Rooted in the computer-as-a-tool perspective, HCI is more interested
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in how the system augments the user’s performance, normally in the form of produc-
tivity rather than the performance of the system itself. Compared to the AI analysis,
the HCI measure of performance is defined based on the study of the users and the
context, instead of being defined by the author(s) as is the case with the AI system
(Table 5).
These two analytic schemas offer in-depth knowledge of either the formal proper-
ties of a system or the ease with which human users can adopt them; however, each
exhibits considerable limitations when applied to intentional systems. As we have
seen, AI analysis typically completely ignores context and focuses on computational
systems only in isolation without considering either the author or the user of the
system. Although process complexity is a necessary condition for intentional systems
(Section 1.2), it is not sufficient by itself to form intentionality. Following the practice
of natural sciences, the “content” of the system matters to AI only in terms of its
formal representation. In other words, whether Cope chooses to model Mozart or
a first-year composition student is not relevant. HCI, on the other hand, provides
certain vocabulary and methodology to consider users and the context of interaction;
however, the field’s current productivity-oriented value system prevents it from being
further helpful to the study of intentional systems. As we have seen from the previous
section, without a clear definition of the users’ needs that should be fulfilled by the
particular system, the HCI analysis cannot be properly applied.
Neither of the two evaluation schemas tells us much about where or how sys-
tem intentionality is formed. Neither schema explains, for instance, how authorial
intention effects the users’ perception of system intentionality — how Lewis’ politi-
cal stance impacts how his audience sees Voyager ; how listeners’ perceptions of the
intentionality of EMI are structured by such provocative names of the albums as
Virtual Mozart. Nor do these schemas take into consideration the larger discourse
about these systems that happens outside of the machine operation and outside of
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the human’s direct interaction with them. Covering EMI ’s famous “Mozart’s 42nd
Symphony,” a reporter wrote:13
MUSIC LOVERS who attended a concert at the University of California
at Santa Cruz in April heard the college orchestra put their hearts into
Mozart’s 42nd symphony. The work features all the glorious harmonies
and elegant flourishes one expects from Mozart, though it perhaps lacks
some of the genius of other late works such as the 41st symphony, the
famous Jupiter. But there is a reason for this lack of je ne sais quoi. In
the 207-year interval between writing the 41st symphony and the 42nd,
Mozart was busy doing more decomposing than composing. [99]
Many curious listeners of EMI first encounter such media coverage about EMI, before
they listen to the album. Does it possibly impact their perception of the system? If
so, in which ways does the impact occur? These questions will be answered in the
next chapter.
2.4 AI-based Interactive Narrative
The last component of the theoretical framework pertains to a specific application of
the theory of intentional systems, namely how to design intentional systems in the
domain of interactive narrative. Chapter 6 presents our interactive narrative project
Memory, Reverie Machine (MRM), as a case study of the intentional system design
principles proposed in Chapter 5. This section provides the necessary background of
interactive and generative narrative needed to understand the design and contribution
of MRM. I first introduce the expressive AI practice as the overarching framework
for my own design and construction of intentional systems. Harrell’s approach to
computational (interactive and generative) narrative and the GRIOT system is briefly
discussed as both the theoretical and technical foundation for the MRM project.
13Mozart composed 41 symphonies in total during his lifetime.
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2.4.1 Expressive AI Practice
Expressive AI is a new interdisciplinary approach to AI proposed by the computer
scientist Michael Mateas [135, 136]. It combines AI research agenda with artistic
practice by its focus on interpretation and authorship. Different from both GOFAI
and interactionist AI, whose ultimate goal is machine intelligence despite their distinc-
tive approaches described above, expressive AI foregrounds its interpretive affordance,
which supports the reading of both the system’s underlying operation and user in-
teractions. Expressive AI’s criteria of success diverge from traditional AI research on
performance and efficiency and are based on whether the AI practitioner/artist can
establish a specific poetics that engage the audience in specific processes of interpre-
tation.
Unlike many other (interactive) art practices, expressive AI practice also pays
attention to what is inside the AI-based system. Different internal architectures
of an AI system afford different possibilities that a practitioner can use to inscribe
her authorial intention on the machine — a concept Mateas defines as an authorial
affordance of specific AI architecture. The system architecture itself, as exemplified
in Mateas’ AI-based interactive art pieceTerminal Time [136], can contribute to the
meaning of the piece. For instance, one may take a less generative approach to
implement Terminal Time and still exhibit similar results. The conceptual strength
of the piece, however, will be substantially weakened, according to Mateas, because
the interpretive and architectural concerns are no longer aligned. As Mateas claims
strongly, “[a]n artist engaging in expressive AI practice will be able to build works with
a depth, a richness, a sophistication that can’t be achieved without this simultaneous
focus on meaning making and machine structure.”
Expressive AI serves as the underpinning of both my theoretical inquiry and ex-
pressive practice in multiple ways. Most importantly, it demonstrates that the at-
tendance to a system’s technical specifications, including system architecture, data
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representation, and algorithmic choices, is not necessarily orthogonal to humanistic
concerns of meaning and expression. In fact, as the rest of the dissertation will illus-
trate, these technical insights are relatively unexplored an area for humanistic and
critical study of the relationship between human and computational technologies,
such as intentional systems. Second, my own interactive narrative practice, presented
in Chapter 6 as a case study, aligns closely with expressive AI in its simultaneous
focus on authorial intention and user interpretation through AI-based techniques.
2.4.2 Computational Narrative
Computational narrative is a major application area for the insights regarding inten-
tional systems provide by this dissertation. In particular, Fox Harrell’s approach to
computational narrative has been influential [81, 83]. His major concerns are exem-
plified by his GRIOT system, which is the foundation of Memory, Reverie Machine
project both in terms of technical implementation and our approach to computational
narrative [80]. This subsection offers a brief review of this perspective, as laid out in
Harrell’s dissertation [81], while emphasizing its influences on MRM.
Harrell’s framework on computational narrative engages works with the following
characteristics:
generative content, semantics-based interaction, reconfigurable narrative
structure, and strong cognitive and socio-cultural grounding. A system
that can dynamically compose media elements (such as procedural com-
puter graphics, digital video, or text) to result in new media elements can
be said to generate content.
He further elaborates the emphasis on meaning and semantics in his formalization
and computational methods:
Semantics-based interaction here means that (1) media elements are struc-
tured according to the formalized meaning of their content, and (2) user
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interaction can affect content of a computational narrative in a way that
produces new output that is “meaningfully” constrained by the system’s
author. More specifically, “meaning” in GRIOT indicates that the au-
thor has provided formal descriptions of domains and concepts to either
annotate and select or generate media elements and subjective authorial
intent.
Meaning can also be reconfigured at the level of narrative discourse. The
formal structure of a computational narrative can be dynamically restruc-
tured, either according to user interaction, or upon execution of the system
as in the case of narrative generation. Discourse structuring is accom-
plished using an automaton that allows an author to create grammars
for narratives with repeating and nested discourse elements, and that
accept and process user input. Appropriate discourse structuring helps
to maintain causal coherence between generated blends. Strong cognitive
and socio-cultural grounding here implies that meaning is considered to be
contextual, dynamic, and embodied. The formalizations used derive from,
and respect, cognitive linguistics theories with such notions of meaning.
Using a semantically based approach, a cultural producer can implement
a range of culturally specific or experimental narrative structures.
Technically, GRIOT implements the core elements of conceptual blending theory
using Josephe Goguen’s computer science theory of algebraic semiotics [71]. Details
can be found in their joint work [72].
Harrell states that his goal with GRIOT was quite different from passing a type
of Turing test for creative competence, as described earlier in this section. Instead, he
designed it to provide a technical framework for humans to provide rich content, and
narrative systems created with GRIOT are meant as cultural products themselves
(as opposed to instances of output of such poetic systems). It utilizes cognitive
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science models, informed by the skepticism of logical AI modeling of human thought
in the cognitive linguistics enterprise [119], toward expressive ends that are often
literary. The Memory, Reverie Machine quickens this interest in terms of subject
matter and interaction model as well. As shown in Chapter 6, it is used to explore
the meaning and limitations of machinistic thought through fiction, while critiquing
its outmoded notions theoretically and technically. Finally, the notion of generating
memories, reveries, and cascading sequences of remembered events is reinvigorated by
work such as conceptual blending theory and novel techniques informed by AI-based
interactive narrative.
In summary, this chapter presents my synthesized and integrated theoretical
framework drawn from a broad range of areas. It is organized around four core
questions, including 1) the role of intentional system in relation to human beings, 2)
the possibility of system intentionality, 3) ways to “read” intentional systems, and 4)
approaches for designing intentional systems in the domain of interactive narrative.
The first section is organized around the major perspectives on the role of comput-
ers in our society in the history of computing. The stand-alone AI view, instrumental
view, medium view, and self-reflexive view emerged in different historical moments of
computing, all of which have their respective influence on intentional system. Next,
I traced the lineage of the notion of system intentionality, first through the ontologi-
cal debates of AI in the area of philosophy of mind, and then through various other
theoretical developments that portray a broader notion of system intentionality. The
following Section 2.3 offers a set of theories, including the field of hermeneutics, soft-
ware studies, cognitive semantics, AI and HCI frameworks of system analysis, that
provide useful theoretical and methodological tools for close reading of intentional
systems. Finally, the last section gives a brief account of the existing practices that
influenced my own work in designing and constructing of an intentional system in the
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domain of interactive narrative. Prepared with this synthesized framework, we are




THE AI HERMENEUTIC NETWORK
What makes any hardware or software component an agent is precisely
the fact that one has chosen to analyze and control it in these mental
terms.
— Yoav Shoham, “Agent-oriented programming” [196], 1991
Dennett’s intentional stance implies that system intentionality is derived by the
users who want to predict the behavior of the system they are interacting with. This
section will extend Dennett’s argument and add system author’s narration of inten-
tionality as an equally important component that gives rise to system intentionality.
Philip Agre [2], one of the most well regarded thinkers in dialogue with both the
technical and philosophical communities, explicitly points out the discursive nature
of AI practice. Based on his first-hand experience as an AI practitioner, Agre argues
that “the purpose of AI is to build computer systems whose operation can be nar-
rated using intentional vocabulary” [2], such as “reasoning,” and “planning.” Most
AI practitioners, according to Agre, find the ontological debate of whether these
systems really exhibit these phenomena “an annoying irrelevance.” To them, what
really matters is not the “vague” issue of what the words really mean, but “the seem-
ingly precise issue of how they can be defined in formal terms that permit suitably
narratable systems to be designed” [3].
The action of narration, however, is not as straight-forward as it may seem. In
AI, the practitioner’s intentional narration of her system first needs to be differenti-
ated from a fairy tale that an adult constructs to cheer up an unhappy child. In the
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latter scenario, the adult intends to achieve a specific goal by constructing a narra-
tive that she knows is counter-factual. The intentional narration of AI, on the other
hand, is so seamlessly integrated into the practice of AI that most practitioners par-
ticipate in it without being consciously aware of it. As argued later, the dichotomy
of “factual” and “counter-factual” is derived from a romanticized notion of science.
Second, the intentional narration is manifested not only through the literature (e.g.,
interviews, technical publication, personal communications), but also through the
technical construction of AI systems, including the choices of function, algorithm,
system architecture, as well the representation. Third, narrated system intentional-
ity needs to be communicated to the users of intentional systems, who subsequently
interpret the system and develop their own intentional narrations of it. Most im-
portantly, the narrations and interpretations are interconnected through a complex
network of meaning exchange and negotiation between the authors and the users of
intentional systems in the larger social and cultural context.
The above paragraphs explain the main idea of my overall framework of an
AI hermeneutic network, which emphasizes that system intentionality arises from a
hermeneutic process, which incorporates three types of elements: the system author’s
discursive strategies, the system’s discursive machine, and the user’s hermeneutic
reading. Part of my major contribution is to critically analyze the discursive nature
of system intentionality from the vantage point of an insider-outsider of AI. Similar to
an ethnographer who, when living in a different culture, gains “inside” information
about a group of people she is studying, my approach to AI is based on my own
experience as an AI practitioner. At the same time, as the ethnographer is essentially
an “outsider” and inevitably makes sense of this culture through her own lens, my
critique and approach to AI is informed by the theories of the humanities and social
sciences.














Figure 13: The AI Hermeneutic Network
and the HCI analysis schema. As described earlier in this chapter, the scope of the
traditional AI analysis is within the code. The algorithm and knowledge representa-
tion are studied extensively in terms of their effectiveness and expressivity. The HCI
analysis is primarily concerned with the interface of a system. The central concern
is how user-friendly the system is and how well it matches the needs of its users. In
contrast, the AI hermeneutic network takes into account all the above elements as
well as the discourse of the system in the form of literature.
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the AI hermeneutic network.
First, Section 3.1 proposes a textual approach to analyze intentional systems, which
addresses some of the issues of the existing AI and HCI analysis, discussed previously
in Section 2.3.4. Next, Section 3.2 draws from the lessons from existing analysis of
Alife, and identifies the discursive strategies that system authors deploy at the level
of source code, presentation/interface, and literature about the system. Next, Section
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3.2.6 briefly discusses the user’s hermeneutic reading of the system. Finally, Section
3.3 expands on Figure 13 by inserting new connections between different elements
and extends it to a broader social context.
3.1 Intentional Systems as Text
The limitations and difficulties we have encountered when applying the existing AI
and HCI frameworks to intentional systems suggests that system intentionality is not
simply the result of well engineered algorithms and knowledge representations, or
the “natural” interaction between user and the system. The four criteria of inten-
tional systems call for a different model that better addresses the correlation between
user, author, and the system. In this section, I propose a textual-approach, that is,
to study intentional systems as an artifact that participates in the meaning-making
process between its creators and users. This section first explains the benefit of ana-
lyzing intentional systems as texts and identifies certain traditional textual analysis
approaches that are useful for locating the formation of system intentionality. Then,
it makes explicit the reason why one particular historical approach, hermeneutics,
can be useful for our purpose.
3.1.1 What is Text?
The meaning of text has been broadened tremendously by such contemporary theo-
retical developments as structuralism, post-structuralism, literary theory, semiotics,
cultural studies, and modern hermeneutics. Especially under the influence of Roland
Barthes’ work, among others, the term refers not only to written and print-based
forms of discourse but also to a much broader range of cultural productions [9, 7].
Novels, paintings, photographs, fashion, TV programs and advertisements can all be
analyzed as “Text,” despite their different modalities and representations, because
they rely on the same semiotic structure in the meaning-making process, or codes [8],
as written discourses.
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Many approaches and theories have been developed about what constitutes as
texts and how to study them. For instance, Barthes’ work develops Saussure’s dream
of semiology, a general science of all languages and social signs [184]. Building on
Saussure’s linguistic theory, theorists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Barthes devel-
oped a structuralist approach in order to understand the process of meaning-making
through universally repeated patterns. Barthes’s well-known semiological analysis
of cultural “myths” [7] reveals the underlying structural pattern that allows certain
dominant meaning-making to appear “natural” and “self-evident.” For Barthes, ev-
erything is meaningful and symbolic and therefore can be treated as text. Michel
Foucault[59, 60], on the other hand, believes that “discourse” should be the central
unit of analysis because everything is mediated through power relationships and lan-
guage. More recent analyses tend to move away from the semiological/structuralist
approach. Post-structualist theorists such as Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari adopt a
more open and fluid approach on the basis of the incompleteness and impreciseness
of language and meaning-making.
The primary motivation for analyzing intentional systems as texts here is not
to propose coherent sign systems, or to engage in a discussion of the social strug-
gle around their production and consumption, even though it is an important topic.
Instead, a textual studies approach for intentional systems highlights the discursive
and interpretive nature of these technical systems, which is still relatively unexplored
under the current AI and HCI paradigms described above. Seeing intentional sys-
tems as texts thus opens up new possibilities to consider them as part of the meaning
negotiation process between the author and the user, a central topic that has long
been part of textual studies. Although traditional approaches to text (Section 2.3.1)
assume that the meanings encoded within texts by the authors can be objectively re-
trieved by readers without any distortion, given appropriate methods of interpretation
[92], many contemporary theorists believe that meaning is made by the reader/viewer
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[200]. The AI hermeneutic network model introduced in the next section subscribes
to a more balanced view. As German philosopher Manfred Frank [62] proposes in an
essay on the literary text, texts support a complex communication process in which
both author and reader actively create, shape, and reconstruct meanings. This echoes
the even broader notion of dialogic meaning posited by the Russian philosopher and
critic Mikhail Bakhtin, who suggested that language is understood as dynamic, con-
textual, intertextual, and relational [100]. Therefore, acknowledging the textuality
of intentional systems allows us to engage a range of socially situated methods that
have been developed outside the fields of AI and HCI. For instance, the well-studied
social and cultural impact of the meaning-making process can be used to explain dif-
ferent readings of intentionality of the same system (e.g., ELIZA) for different users,
a phenomenon described in Section 1.2.
3.1.2 A Hermeneutic Framework
Out of the wide range of textual analysis theories and methods, hermeneutical anal-
ysis (a brief overview of hermeneutics is available in Section 2.3.1) provides a unique
vantage point for studying the formation of system intentionality and integrating
other more contemporary theories for our purpose. Compared with its modern coun-
terpart theories, hermeneutics (particularly classical hermeneutics) emphasizes the
role of authorial intention. In comparison, most contemporary theories see authorial
intention as irrelevant to the meaning of the text. This position is famously captured
by Barthes’ announcement of “the death of the author”[9]. Saussurean linguistics
[184] and its closely related structuralist approach to text also keeps the author out
of any core analysis. However, we have to take into account the context from which
these theories emerged. The assumption that the author-intended meaning is the only
valid interpretation has dominated classical hermeneutics and textual interpretation
for centuries. Barthes’ denunciation of authorial intention should not be understood
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literally, but instead as his strategy to call attention to the plurality of readers’ inter-
pretation, which is long neglected and discarded in this tradition. The development
of AI and intentional systems did not share the same historical path as text.
In the modern practice of computing, the author’s intention is often suppressed
in the name of science and the users’ needs. AI practitioners often see themselves
as objectively and neutrally following a scientific procedure, whereas designers who
subscribe to human centered design principles prioritize their designs according to
what the user wants, rather than their own design taste. However, the meaning ex-
change model between the author and user reveals the implausibility of the valorized
notion of a neutral and objectified author. As Winograd and Flores observe, the
system programmers do not have absolute freedom to design a system because “[t]he
programmer acts within a context of language, culture, and previous understand-
ing, both personal and shared”[217, pp.97]. Downplaying the role of human system
authors, therefore, risks omitting these contexts and the strategies deployed by the
authors in the production of intentional systems. In other words, restoring the role
of the author, as opposed to downplaying it, is the first step to studying intentional
systems as texts.
Acknowledging authorial intention and their subsequent discursive strategies also
helps to prevent the techno-centric view in technical disciplines that system intention-
ality arises from the computer itself. In fact, as the next section argues, a hermeneutic-
based approach helps us understand how system intentionality is narrated by the sys-
tem’s authors and interpreted by its users. In this regard, the spirit of hermeneutics
helps us to compensate for the limitation of the current AI and HCI framework (dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.4) and provides a promising new perspective for understanding
the formation of system intentionality.
It is worth mentioning that, despite its primary focus on author intended mean-
ings, hermeneutics still has certain room for different reader interpretations. A good
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interpreter not only retrieves the original meaning embedded in the text by its au-
thor, but also applies it to her current social and cultural context so that the original
meaning becomes relevant. In hermeneutic study of biblical text, the ability to apply
the divine message in historical texts to a different audience in a different society is
a crucial skill for an interpreter [208]. Of course, the flexibility and plurality in the
practice of hermeneutics is limited compared to the flexibility in later theories, such
as the post-structuralist approaches. This limitation can be addressed by integrating
such theories with the classical hermeneutics framework. However, as the rest of this
chapter and the following one will show, the primary emphasis of this dissertation is
a system’s authors’ narration of system intentionality.
3.2 Constructing the Discursive Machine
Faced with the difficulties of pinning down a precise definition of agenthood, a key
concept in the AI domain of multi-agent systems (MAS), Yoav Shoham wrote:1
An agent is an entity whose state is viewed as consisting of mental com-
ponents such as beliefs, capacities, choices, and commitments. These
components are defined in a precise fashion, and stand in rough corre-
spondence to their common sense counterparts. In this view, therefore,
agenthood is in the mind of the programmer: what makes any hardware
or software component an agent is precisely the fact that one has chosen
to analyze and control it in these mental terms. [196, pp.329]
Shoham’s comments correctly locate agenthood as the result of the author’s will-
ingness to adopt intentional vocabulary as her lens to analyze and build systems,
rather than as a property of these systems. However, he overlooks the impact of
1Agenthood is a highly intentional term. It is commonly used in the research area of software
agents and multi-agent systems, but its precise definition has not yet been agreed upon. It generally
refers to that the agent has its own personality and/or history of interaction [46].
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these terms on the ways they structure the AI researcher’s practice. This section ar-
gues that what Shoam calls the “rough correspondence” between the formally defined
AI intentional terms to their “common sense counterparts” constitutes an essential
component of AI and intentional systems — the discursive machine. A discursive
machine contains the discursive strategies that a system author deploys to narrate
system intentionality. This machine is so embedded as part of the AI practice that
most practitioners are not consciously aware of its existence and influence. Among
the few AI practitioners who notice its operation, some see it as the epidemic of true
scientific research and try to eliminate it at all costs. This section concentrates on
the usage of intentional vocabulary. Initially built on Agre’s observation on key AI
intentional terms, it then broadens the scope of intentional vocabulary to include a
wider range of discursive strategies, including definitions, algorithms, system architec-
ture, and literature, as well as visual vocabulary (e.g., images of anthropomorphized
agents). Again, the pervasiveness of the discursive machine should not be seen as an
obstacle towards the “real” AI. Instead, as argued earlier, it is a crucial part of the
meaning-making process between the author and user, in which system intentionality
is formed.
This section first draws from Katherine Hayles’ existing analyses of Alife, in which
she argues that the various level of narratives constructed by Alife researchers are
constitutive to the research area. Extending Hayles’ study to incorporate the actual
technical practice of AI, Section 3.2.2 highlights the significance of intentional vocab-
ulary to the field by re-examining AI practitioners’ related observations through the
lens of actor-network theory. Next, Section 3.2.3 to Section 3.2.5 illustrate system
authors’ various deployment of discursive strategies to narrate system intentionality
with examples at the source code, presentation, and technical literature level of their
systems.
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3.2.1 Lessons from Alife: Discursive Strategies
Before introducing the AI hermeneutic network framework, it is useful to position
my approach with N. Katherine Hayles’ [87] work on Artificial Life (also referred to
as “Alife,” “alife,” and “AL”) for two reasons. First, Alife computer programs are
very similar to intentional systems in that they (are intended to) display phenomena
commonly associated with real life forms, such as cells and birds, not machines.
Second, Hayles’s study of the Alife programs and research area focuses explicitly on
the discursive strategies that Alife practitioners deploy. After a brief account of this
existing work, this section discusses how my approach builds upon Hayles’ work and
yet differentiates itself by underlying the technical practice as discursive as well.
As its name suggests, Alife is an area that is closely related to AI with researchers
working in both areas. The founder of the interactionist AI paradigm, Rodney Brooks,
for instance, is also closely associated with Alife. As stated in Section 2.3.1.3, the
interactionist AI paradigm turns its back on the classical AI (GOFAI) approach of
modeling intelligence through formal rules and focuses instead on the embodied in-
teraction between the system, called an agent, and its environment. These embodied
agents, often compared to primitive life forms such as ants and cockroaches [20, 21],
are seen as one kind of artificial life form in Alife. If AI is the study of computational
systems in relation to intelligence, Alife’s focus is then on systems as life forms.
Startled by the Alife researcher and evolutionary biologist Thomas S. Ray’s as-
sertion that “[t]he object of an AL instantiation is to introduce the natural form
and process of life into an artificial medium” [175, 180], Hayles realizes that Ray’s
rhetoric exemplifies Alife’s underlying message that computer codes or hardware may
be living organisms. Hayles goes on:
How is it possible in the late twentieth century to believe, or at least
claim to believe, that computer codes are alive — and not only alive,
but natural? The question is difficult to answer directly, for it involves
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assumptions and ideas circulating throughout the culture. In view of this
complexity, the subject is perhaps best approached through indirection,
by looking not only at the scientific content of the programs but also
at the stories told about and through them. These stories, I will argue,
constitute a multilayered system of metaphors and material relays through
which “life,” “nature,” and the “human” are being redefined. (pp.224)
In a subsequent study, Hayles examines the “narratives” at three levels. The first
level of narrative includes “representations, authorial intention, anthropomorphic in-
terpretation” of a specific Alife computer program written by Ray and others called
Tierra. Compared to Richard Dawkins’ work The Selfish Gene[34], Hayles empha-
sizes that Ray does not simply “attribute” human agency and intention to genes as
Dawkins. Instead, Hayles is “working with artificial systems designed by humans
precisely so the ‘creatures’ would be able to manifest these qualities.” A crucial com-
ponent of the manifestation is constructing the narratives, so that they are tightly
interwoven into the operations of the program. As a result, Hayles observes, “the pro-
gram operates as much within the imagination as it does within the computer.” For
instance, she points out that using such terms as “mother cell,” “daughter cell,” “an-
cestor,” “parasite,” and “hyperparasite” does more than set up parallels between the
computer program and the living systems; these terms also “reveal Ray’s intention in
creating an appropriate environment in which the dynamic emergence of evolutionary
processes could take off” (pp.227).
At the second level, narratives are effective tools that Alife practitioners mobilize
to seek legitimization of their research area within theoretical biology. Different from
the ones told at the first level about individual programs and hardware, the narra-
tives here are about the research area of Alife itself. In order for their work to be
accepted in theoretical biology, Alife researchers need to position these programs as
life-as-it-could-be, compared to which the traditional biology of life-as-we-know-it is a
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special case. Some researchers, Hayles notices, compare Alife simulations to synthetic
chemicals, which freed the early study of chemistry from the confinement of naturally
occurring elements and components. The goal of this analogy then is to argue that
Alife is equally important to theoretical biology, for it is not a model or simulation
of carbon-based life forms, but a second instance of life.
At the third level are narratives about the present and future of terrestrial evo-
lution forms. These are constituted by speculating on the relation of human beings
to the “creatures” created by computer software or hardware. According to Hayles,
rather than being merely the measure to judge the success of AI systems, human
intelligence in Alife is itself reconfigured in the image of the evolutionary processes
modeled in Alife. In other words, the machine in Alife does not simulate the human,
but instead becomes the model for understanding the latter (pp.224-239).
Hayles’ analysis of what she calls “the nature and artifice of Artificial Life” is
revealing and relevant to intentional systems, for system intentionality, as I will argue
below, is deeply discursive as well. The methods she uses directly inspire my construct
of the AI hermeneutic network because they reveal how the “aliveness” of the Alife
programs is narrated by Alife practitioners through the “stories” they construct.
However, I do not intend to repeat the above work here, but rather to connect it
more closely to the actual practice of AI and its related fields by addressing the
following aspects that have not been taken into serious consideration.
First, Hayles stresses the importance of the rhetorical strategies that Alife prac-
titioners adopt. However, these rhetorical strategies are taken mainly from the lit-
erature (e.g., papers, talks, interviews, and interpersonal communications) not from
technical practice. As I will show in the next section, these technical practices of
intentional systems are not less discursive than the literature. In fact, they are part
of the AI technical practice without which no AI system can function.
Second, Hayles’s analysis implies that the leading Alife practitioners knowingly
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constructed these narrative of the systems and the field, in order to be accepted by
the larger intellectual community of theoretic biology. The next section will illustrate
the ways in which these discursive strategies are so entrenched in the practice of AI
that they are rarely acknowledged or questioned by most practitioners in the field.
In other words, my approach extends Agre and Winograd’s main philosophical
critique of AI with a textual analysis approach informed by Hayles’ work. Both Agre
and Winograd are concerned with the mentalist fallacy embedded in the symbolic
AI paradigm, Winograd & Flores [217], and Agre [2] subsequently points out that
the actual practice of AI is inadequate to capture the basis of human existence and
understanding. Although my AI hermeneutic network framework echoes a lot of Agre
and Winograd’s observations of the field of AI, one of the differences is that I do not
see the discursive and interpretive nature of the technical practice as an obstacle to
achieving intelligence and intentionality.
3.2.2 The “Epidemic” of Intentional Vocabulary
Throughout the history of AI, new technological innovations have brought in such
intentional vocabulary to the field as “reasoning,” “planning,” “learning,” “strate-
gizing,” and “creating.” These intentional terms are so pervasive in AI that it is
impossible to talk about any algorithms or systems without using them. To the prac-
titioners in the field, these terms have very specific meanings relating to specific meth-
ods, which are only “roughly correspondent” to their commonsense meanings. This
section calls into attention the close interplay between the formal and commonsense
meanings of these intentional terms, based on the observations of AI practitioners
including Agre and McDermott. Different from their perspectives that intentional
vocabulary is an epidemic whose usage should be minimized, this section argues that
the intentional terms are an constitutive component of AI practice.
The connection between the precise formal meanings and their vague common
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sense counterparts of the intentional vocabulary is what Agre calls the “dual character
of AI terminology”:
When a running computer program is described as planning to go shop-
ping, for example, the practitioner’s sense of technical accomplishment
depends in part upon the vernacular meaning of the word.... On the
other hand, it is only possible to describe a program as ‘planning’ when
‘planning’ is given a formal definition in terms of mathematical entities
or computational structures and processes. [3]
In this sense, the elasticity of these key terms to be simultaneously formal and vague
is strategic. In the meantime, Agre denies that using intentional vocabulary is a
conscious deception. Although it broadens the application of AI, this practice is
also “self-defeating” because these elastic terms inevitably link AI to a much larger
discourse based on reflections of their vague meanings. The consequence is that AI
practitioners “find it remarkably difficult to conceptualize alternatives to their existing
repertoire of technical schemata”[3].
Drew McDermott [140] made a very similar, but more radical, observation on this
issue in the mid 1970s. Criticizing the relationship between the formal and vernac-
ular meanings of intentional vocabulary as “wishful mnemonics,” McDermott saw
it as “a major source of simple-mindedness in AI programs.” Identifying the use of
these intentional mnemonics in a wide variety of AI systems ranging from the General
Problem Solver (GPS ) to language “translation” systems, McDermott warns AI prac-
titioners that the epic of “contagious wishfulness” is misleading, most prominently to
the practitioners themselves. Instead of naming their programs “UNDERSTAND”
or “THINK,” all disciplined programmers, he urges, are to avoid the trap of wishful
mnemonics. What they should do is to refer to their program as “G0034” and see if
they can still convince themselves or anyone else that G0034 implements some part
of understanding.
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McDermott succinctly traces the usage of mnemonics to the earlier structured
programming paradigm. When a system is implemented under this paradigm, it is
programmed “entirely in terms of the purposes at one level before implementing them
by the most convenient of the (presumably many) alternative lower-level constructs.”
For example, a Google-like program may be defined by several high-level functions
(e.g., “query,” “sort,” and “display’), each of which is defined by its specific purpose.
At the next step, the high-level functions are subsequently broken down into the
more concrete functions, and the most proper algorithms are then used to implement
the pre-defined purposes. This is the step where the quick-sort algorithm is chosen
to instantiate the sort function. This top-down programming approach relies on a
close match between the purpose of a function through its name and its operation.
In other words, the meaning of “sort” is precisely defined and widely shared by the
programmers. The situation is quite different in AI. McDermott argues that:
If a researcher tries to write an ‘understanding’ program, it isn’t because
he has thought of a better way of implementing this well-understood task,
but because he thinks he can come closer to writing the first implemen-
tation. If he calls the main loop of his program ‘UNDERSTAND’, he is
(until proven innocent) merely begging the question.
This brief observation provides a way for us to understand Agre and McDermott’s
denunciation of mixing the vernacular and formal meanings in AI practice. A deeper
reason at work here is the romanticized view of science. According to this view, sci-
ence is an objective reflection of nature and exists independent of its practitioners
and society. The structured programming paradigm represents a top-down engineer-
ing approach for specifying a program using the “purpose” of each function. With
this level of detail, programmers can implement and fulfill these purposes using meth-
ods commonly understood and agreed upon within the community. This process is
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similar to instantiation of a conceptual architectural blueprint to detailed construc-
tion diagram with specifications of the construction material needed, and eventually
to a real building. Each level of detail defines the modules’ purpose, which is realized
with more concrete details at the next step.
Writing an “understanding” program is different from instantiating the functions
inside a data flow diagram (e.g., a sorting function) not merely because of the lack
of understanding of how to do so, as McDermott argues. A deeper issue here is
the discursive and declarative power that the AI practitioner possesses to name her
program “UNDERSTANDING,” something that the programmer writing top-down
structured programming code does not actually have. The active role of scientists
(and engineers) in inscribing and narrating the results of their experiments has long
been neglected for the sake of “objectivity” in scientific practice, especially exper-
imental natural science. Under the rhetoric of this romanticized notion of science,
its disciplined practitioners are neural devices immune to their own “subjectivity.”
However, the dilemma here is that nature cannot speak directly. As Latour [122,
pp.70-74] asserts, part of the scientist’s mission is to be the spokesperson for what
is inscribed by her instruments. In a hypothetical scenario, Latour depicts a reader
who is determined to see the proof of an argument about endorphins from a scientific
paper. She visits the author of the paper and is asked to read the results of the
experiments herself. By illustrating the difficulties the reader goes through to con-
nect the readings from scientific instruments and the argument made in the paper,
Latour effectively demonstrates the power of the spokesperson, not because of her
own wishes, but because of her task to transmit what nature really is. To summarize
Latour’s point, no scientific practitioner/author can be disassociated from her claim.
What Agre and McDermott did not acknowledge is the spokesperson role of AI
practitioners. Certainly, the romanticized notion of science makes it more comfortable
to assume that the operation of a system is independent of its authors. For this
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reason, McDermott suggests all functions should be named in the style of “G0034.”
However, even McDermott himself notices the formidable difficulty of his proposal.
An assembly-like AI program without the narration of its author is like a reading in
an instrument waiting for the scientist to be its “mouthpiece.”
The examples of “UNDERSTANDING” and “G0034” are both extreme. In most
cases, AI practitioners are simultaneously the executor and narrator for their sys-
tems. On the one hand, the formal meanings of many key intentional terms have
been established and followed by AI practitioners in their systems. Simply naming
a program “PLANNER” does not automatically legitimize it as a planner in the AI
sense. In this sense, an AI practitioner (only) executes the conventions and methods
associated with these terms. On the other hand, the operations and narrations of
the systems need to be narrated. Similar to the Alife researchers in Hayle’s analysis
(Section 3.2.1), AI practitioners are different from theoretical scientists who identify
certain properties in existing subjects. AI practitioners are, instead, engaged in the
task of creating artifacts that manifest these properties, artifacts that did not exist
before. The elasticity of the intentional vocabulary hence provides AI practitioners
with an effective discursive vehicle that closes the gap between the operation of a
system and the properties it is designed to exhibit. I argue that without the glue of
intentional vocabulary used in practitioners’ narrations, the empire of AI may col-
lapse. Therefore, the “wishfulness” is “contagious” not because it is “deceptive” but
because it is necessary.
Intentional vocabulary is one of the most important ways through which system
intentionality is narrated. The simultaneous role of AI practitioners as executors and
narrators is reflected in their technical practice, detailed in Chapter 4. However, the
understanding of “vocabulary” does not need to be limited to just AI key terms such
as “planning.” In the following two sections, I will extend Agre’s work and argue
that the blend (Section 2.3.3.2) between the formal and vernacular meanings of these
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terms also structures the discursive machine through various other forms, at both the
code and the interface level.
3.2.3 The Code Level
Agre’s insights on the duality of intentional vocabulary help to settle the debates
between the software formalists and software culturalists. As Section 2.3.2 describes,
the former are primarily interested in the execution of the code, whereas the latter
focus on the cultural significances of it. Agre’s argument suggests that the formal
and cultural elements of code cannot be separate completely from each other, because
they are ultimately linked together through the elastic meanings of the vocabulary
they share.
Michael Mateas [136] reached a similar conclusion in his dissertation. He decon-
structs the codes invoked in AI practice into a “code machine” and a co-existing
“rhetoric machine,” both of which are necessary for any AI system to function. The
former includes the physical processes, computational processes, and complex causal
flow specified in the code, whereas the latter is composed of discursive strategies,
humanly interpreted computation, and definitions of system progress. Although the
code machine handles the execution of the system, according to Mateas, it is the
rhetoric machine that allows both the author and the reader of the code to make
sense of and narrate what the code does.
This section demonstrates the discursive strategies that AI practitioners deploy
to narrate system intentionality in their source code. It involves the choices of both
the definitions and the system architecture. Through various examples, I intend to
illustrate how source code can embody effective meaning-making strategies and hence
I stress the importance of code in the analysis of computational system, both formally
and culturally.
95
(defun eliza ()  
  (loop   
    (print 'eliza>)   
    (write (flatten (use-eliza-rules (read))) :pretty t))) 
 
(defun use-eliza-rules (input)  
  (some #'(lambda (rule)            
    *eliza-rules*)) 
    (let ((result (pat-match (rule-pattern rule) input)))             
       (if (not (eq result fail))                 
       (sublis (switch-viewpoint result)          
               (random-elt (rule-responses rule))))))       
 
(defun switch-viewpoint (words)  




Figure 14: Sample code of ELIZA from Norvig’s Textbook Paradigms of Artificial
Intelligence Programming [162] (Emphasis Added)
Function Level Figure 14 shows an excerpt of the source code of a program that
re-implements ELIZA. The code is from Norvig’s Lisp programming textbook[162],
which is widely used among computer science students.2 The main functions of the
program call another function, whose name is “switch viewpoint.” In a vernacular
understanding of the term, to switch someone’s viewpoint means to put that person
in the shoes of another person, to adopt that other person’ specific social, cultural,
political viewpoint in a specific situation. However, the code of the function “switch-
viewpoint” at the bottom of the figure shows that the only manipulation that this
function does is to swap the words “I” for “you” and “am” for “are,” etc.
Under a traditional computer science and AI analysis (Section 2.3.4.1), the name
of a function is a low-level implementation detail irrelevant to the “essence” of the
program, for it does not effect the machine execution of the code. However, in the
actual practice of AI, such terms and definitions provide the system authors with dis-
cursive anchors so that they can narrate the operation of the systems as intentional.
2Lisp is a family of computer programming languages that is widely used for developing AI
system. It was initially invented by John McCarthy in 1958.
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Describing the operation of the function as “ELIZA is switching her view point” gen-
erates foreseeably different reactions from the less intentional narration of “ELIZA is
replacing the ‘You’s with ‘I’s in the sentence.”
Algorithm Level The discursive machine also lends itself to the design and nar-
ration of algorithms. In many cases, it is not just the terminologies that are used to
define a particular function; the entire algorithm is mobilized to support a coherent
intentional narration, as shown in the following example. In the subfield of machine
learning, reinforcement learning is a family of algorithms that learn to choose optimal
actions to achieve their goals [148]. A reinforcement learning equipped autonomous
agent can experiment in its environment in order to learn a control strategy, called
policy, to choose actions that achieve its goals based on the “rewards” and “punish-
ments” it receives.
One example is a camera sensor-equipped robot whose goal is to dock into a
power plug whenever its battery level is low. The robot has a set of actions, such
as “move forward” and “turn,” that allow it to achieve its goal. Its goal is defined
by a reward function that determines the number of rewards and punishments for
each state, locations in this case, that the robot is in. For instance, any state-action
transitions that immediately provide a connection to the power plug receive a positive
reward, whereas the transitions that cause the robot to leave the room where the plug
is get a negative reward or punishment. A reinforcement learning algorithm learns
the optimal policy based on the rewards for each action.3
The idea of modifying an agent’s behavior with positive and negative consequences
has been explored by the psychology theories of classic and operant conditioning. In
the psychological studies of learning and action selection, human and animal subjects
are shown to alter their behaviors to obtain positive rewards and avoid negative
3I use the Q-Learning algorithm to explain the example. In some reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, rewards are not assigned after each action, but until the very end.
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rewards. The applications of these theories are widely adopted in schools and other
educational institutions.
Unlike the original studies, the “rewards” in reinforcement learning do not imply
any pleasure, hedonic impact, or other psychological stimuli. As we have seen, the
reward is a numerical value that does not have any psychological or neurological
impact on the agent as is the case with human or animal subjects. The algorithm is
therefore out of the realm of the original psychology theory. However, the definitions
and the operation of the algorithm produce a narrative that can be perfectly mapped
onto the psychology theories. This strategy implicitly helps to validate the plausibility
of reinforcement learning as a research area due to the success of its psychological
counterparts. More importantly, the narratives of an agent “learning” in the same
way that human beings do also contribute to the construction of system intentionality.
System Architecture Level System architecture is another location where inten-
tional narrative can take place. In the late 1980s, the neural network architecture
(Figure 15) achieved wide success in various domains, such as computer-controlled
autonomous vehicles. Part of the reason for the neural network’s success was not that
its performance was statistically better than other machine learning architectures, as
many would discover years later. Rather, the hype was built on the narrative that
these architectures were based on biological neural structures that humans have, even
though, except for the terminology, they only loosely resembled each other. A typical
neural network architecture is shown in Figure 15, where the inputs were the stim-
uli and each of the dots was called a “perceptron.” Other than its original creators
who saw neural as a logic model [139], most AI researchers during the neural network
boom did not intend to model biological neurons in any rigorous way; what they cared
about was solving technical problems with these systems. However, they neverthe-
less participated in and contributed to the discursive machine of the algorithm. For
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Figure 15: System Diagram of an Artificial Neural Network
obvious reasons, the algorithm’s more descriptive name — the non-linear statistical
data modeling algorithm — was hardly ever used either in the community or in mass
media. After all, what can be more effective than to say that the computer behind
the wheel of the autonomous car is already equipped with neurons and perceptrons
to start with?
The boom of neural network research did not last very long, and the neural net-
work paradigm is no longer a key component in mainstream AI research. Interestingly,
researchers discovered that, among other issues, the pure numeric results of the neu-
ral network architecture do not support sufficient readings and interpretation of its
operation. When an AI practitioner works on a planning system, for instance, the
actions selected (or not selected) by the system to achieve a certain goal under the
given conditions easily form a largely coherent narrative of the system’s operation.
This narrative is crucial for the researcher to make sense of the operation of the sys-
tem. However, a neural network produces only a numerical sequence representing the
“weights” at each connection. Debugging any neural network is notoriously difficult
because these numbers and the final output of the system cannot be easily connected
with an easily understandable narrative.
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3.2.4 The Presentation Level
When David Cope released EMI ’s first CD album Bach by Design in 1994, the music
was both composed and synthesized by the computer in the tone of a digital piano.
By the time the second album Classical Music Composed by computer was published
three years later, human musicians were hired to interpret and perform the pieces
composed by EMI. In the following 2000 album Virtual Mozart, only historical musical
instruments were used in the human performances of the computer generated music.
During the same period of time, the recognition of EMI also went through several
stages. Although many people, including Cope himself, criticized the completely
generated music in the first album as dull and “woody,” the music performed by
humans in the second album was said to be lively. Virtual Mozart was so well-received
that Cope claimed in an interview [99] that “[t]here’s no expert in the world who could,
without knowing its source, say for certain that is not Mozart.” This success is due
not just to EMI ’s growing effectiveness, which allows it to compose music “true” to
the spirit of the Austrian composer. Cope’s efforts to deploy presentational means
also contribute to the aura of the music. As a reviewer of the album describes:
The excellent performance certainly added to the “originality” of the com-
positions: Only historically authentic instruments were used. The orches-
tra, directed by the UC Santa Cruz professor Nicole A. Paiement, con-
sisted of two flutes, two oboes, two clarinets, two bassoons, timpani, each
two violin I and II, two violas, two celli, and one bass. Even the piano
(in the concerto), played by UC Santa Cruz professor Linda Burman-
Hall, was a historical instrument from ca. 1800. However, the limita-
tions in the availability of historical instruments were responsible for a
re-orchestration: the incorporation of the brass parts into those for the
woodwinds.
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Even though the AI analysis schema does not address the presentation and inter-
face of intentional systems, the example of EMI is a testimony to their importance.
Some readers may argue that EMI is a special case of an AI-based artistic project
and that purely scientific AI research projects manifest their effectiveness through
measurable performance, not through presentations. This romanticized notion of sci-
entific practice that transcends human influence, again, has forgotten that AI’s holy
grail of the Turing test is itself subjective and interpretive. The following example
shows how the discursive machine is present in so called “real” AI projects.
Among the various successors of Weizenbaum’s ELIZA, A.L.I.C.E. (Artificial Lin-
guistic Internet Computer Entity) is one of the most successful programs. Having won
various awards for chatterbots — the ELIZA-like conversational computer agents,
A.L.I.C.E. fits into the “core” AI research agenda of natural language processing. In
one of the most famous transcripts of A.L.I.C.E.’s conversation with a human, the
program is asked to introduce itself. Its reply is “I am an artificial linguistic entity.
I was activated at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, on November 23, 1995. My instructor
was Dr. Richard S. Wallace. He taught me to sing a song. Would you like me to sing
it for you?” When the human agrees, A.L.I.C.E. “sings” the lyrics of “Daisy Bell.”
Here, A.L.I.C.E ’s creator clearly references the legendary AI system HAL 9000 in
Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey [114]. “Daisy Bell” was the song that
HAL sang when it tried to beg the protagonist not to destroy it, one of the most
human-like moments of the system in the movie. In the current version of its official
website, Wallace also includes an animated anthropomorphized virtual agent (Figure
16). Separately developed by another company, the agent mimics human interac-
tion through its gaze and, in some versions, voice with synchronized lip movements.
Although neither the cultural reference nor the anthropomorphized representation
directly influence the operation of the natural language processing algorithm, they
are part of the discursive machine of the whole system and contribute to the system’s
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Figure 16: A Partial Screenshot of the A.L.I.C.E Artificial Intelligence Foundation’s
Website5
perception as intentional.
3.2.5 Constructing the Literature
In his book Science in Action[122], Latour depicts the techno-science sphere as a two-
faced Janus — one for the bracketed and black-boxed ready made science that has
been accepted as “facts,” and the other science in the making as open controversies.
Inside the black box of the glorified ready made science innovations in textbooks,
Latour demonstrates, are the messiness and contingency of science in the making.
Contradicting the view that science and technology are beyond the reach of social
and cultural influences, he traces the process of how science is “made.” Based on
his ethnographic studies, Latour observes the importance of scientific literature (e.g.,
publications) that allows scientists to connect both to the scientific community and
to other social factors that influence science in the making. He asserts that, “the
more technical and specialised a literature is, the more ‘social’ it becomes, since the
number of associations necessary to drive readers out and force them into accept-
ing a claim as a fact increase” (pp.62). Therefore, in addition to considering actual
computer programs and their presentation, an analysis of intentional systems should
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include the authors’ publications, presentations, interviews, manuals and other inter-
personal communication about the system. Such narrative output situates the system
in AI research communities and frames users’ interpretations and, therefore, must be
considered as part of the intentional system.
Technical literature, one of the major venues through which AI practitioners dis-
cuss their systems, provides a rich resource for further analyzing the discursive strate-
gies used in the construction of system intentionality. I have conducted an empirical
study of this technical literature, paying specific attention to the authors’ use of
metaphors, blends, and other strategies. The detailed methods and results are dis-
cussed at length in Chapter 4.
3.2.6 User’s Hermeneutic Reading
Finally, users bring their own experiences and social and cultural backgrounds when
they interact with systems in order to appropriate their meanings. In information
studies, for instance, researchers have conducted ethnographic studies of how users
hermeneutically read quantitative data provided by information systems and how
they contextualize these “cold and objective categories and numbers” with the real-
life situations. From observing his subjects, Boland [15] draws our attention to the
active role users play in appropriating meanings of “text,” which he refers to the data
provided by the information system used by these subjects. He describes,
These users create a primary context in order to bring the actors and
the situation to life, they then proceed to invent alternative contexts and
hypothetical histories in order to engage in dialogue with other, possible
readings of the text.
A user’s reading of an intentional system is based on the system’s functionality
and her direct interaction with the system. It is also affected by any popular media
coverage of the system. The user’s expectation and mental model [161] of the system
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is influenced by her own personal experience as well as the discourses in society. In this
process, the system, intentionality narrated by the authors through various discursive
strategies, is interpreted by the users who interact with the system. Although users’
interpretations are an indispensable component of the AI hermeneutic network, an
extensive user study of their hermeneutic interpretations falls outside of the scope of
this dissertation and is a subject for future work.
3.3 A Network Model
So far, we have separately discussed the discursive machine used by system authors
to narrate system intentionality and users’ hermeneutic interpretations. However,
we have to differentiate this framework from the traditional view of text, in which
the readers retrieve the meaning encoded by the author. The authors and users of
intentional systems do not exist independent of each other, nor are they disconnected
from the society. I intend to complicate the model raised at the beginning of this
chapter and stress the network nature of the framework.
First, the clear distinction between the user and the author needs to be reconsid-
ered. In the AI community, users and authors are often the same group of people.
Many AI systems are meant to be used only by the AI researchers and their graduate
students who developed them. In other cases, they may be used by other researchers
in the community, whose work (e.g., AI systems and publications) will mostly likely
be read by the original system authors.
Second, even if the user is a “layperson,” her interaction with and reading of
the system and the literature she generates about the system (e.g., blogs) contribute
to society’s collective experience with intentional systems and a cultural consensus
of what constitutes intentionality and intelligence. The moving frontier of AI not
only has an impact on AI practitioners, but also speaks to society’s ever-changing









Figure 17: A Network Model of the AI Hermeneutic Network
the vernacular meaning of the intentional vocabulary, and it influences the practice
of AI through the duality of these terms.
Third, both previous points have implied a meaning exchange with the authors
and users of a specific system to a larger society. Each of the elements in the previous
diagram (Figure 13) is connected to a network of other elements. For instance, the
development of an intentional system and its rhetorical machine is connected with
other similar or related systems. The close reference between A.L.I.C.E. and HAL
9000 is a good example. Similar influences exist in the literature. As the next chapter
will show, many authors use intentional vocabulary in accordance with the literature
of related works.
Finally, as actor-network theory (Section 2.2.3.2) has shown, other elements should
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also be taken into consideration. Government funding agencies, media corporations,
public relations managers for the institution where the system was built, an economic
crisis, a technological breakthrough, etc. all belong to the AI hermeneutic network.
Although the users’ interpretations and temporary suspensions of disbelief are
crucial to the formation of system intentionality, this chapter has attempted to reveal
the discursive strategies of system intentionality in the technical practice of AI. The
construction of intentional systems is often concealed as technical, and its social
underpinnings have been generally overlooked. AI systems, as well as many other
techno-science practices, are built on the assumption that nature is separate from the
society and the human subject, as part of what Latour calls the “purification” process
of Modernism [123]. Techno-science, whether romanticized as a savior or demonized
as a threat, is commonly deprived of the social context of its construction and seen
as answering only to “nature.”
As a criticism of this view, this chapter has introduced the new framework of AI
hermeneutic network, built on theorizing intentional systems as texts. This frame-
work analyzed intentional systems as social and cultural products, as opposed to
construing them as the domain of purely technical practices. It has acknowledged
the social and discursive aspects of system intentionality as a result of a hermeneutic
communication process that involves both authors’ narrations and users’ interpreta-
tions. This framework opens up the possibilities to expressively manipulate system
intentionality in the design of intentional systems. Chapter 5 proposes a new design
principle, “scale of intentionality,” to demonstrate the new design strategies informed
by this theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SECRET OF HAPPINESS: A CLOSE READING OF
THE COPYCAT SYSTEM
... a small renegade codelet, totally unaware of the global momentum, has
had some good luck.... (pp.255)
— Hofstadter, D., & Mitchell, M. “The Copycat Project”[98], 1995
The previous chapter introduced the AI hermeneutic network, which underscores
the authors’ discursive narrations and users’ hermeneutic interpretations of system in-
tentionality. This chapter intends to demonstrate the ramifications of this framework,
particularly those of the authors’ discursive narrations, through the close reading of
an existing intentional system — Douglas Hofstadter and Melanie Mitchell’s analogy-
making system, Copycat, developed during the early 1990s.
The system intentionality of Copycat is manifested through the “insightful” and
“creative” analogies the system can come up with as the result of the “fluidity” of
its underlying algorithmic operation and knowledge representation. In this chap-
ter, I examine the ways in which authors construct such system intentionality, both
technically and discursively. Primary focus here is on the technical literature, a rela-
tively unexplored area for theorists interested in AI, which offers a rich collection of
first-hand material of source/pseudo code, architecture diagrams, tables, experiment
results, metaphors, and analogies, etc. As we will see from the rest of the chapter,
the intertwined technical descriptions and discursive narrations in these articles pro-
vide us with a key to understand how system authors navigate between formal and
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vernacular narrations to construct system intentionality.
By revealing the discursive strategies embedded in the literature of Copycat, my
goal is not to attack the “technical soundness” of the system. Its technical contri-
bution and limitation of the project are out of the scope of this dissertation, and
have been discussed elsewhere [57, 131, 64, 63]. Instead, my goal of this study is
to demonstrate the power and utility of the AI hermeneutic network, in particular,
the authors’ narration as a constitutive component of AI and intentional systems,
a component which has been ignored by most AI practitioners. As argued in the
previous chapter, system authors’ discursive strategies are a constitutive component
of all AI and intentional systems, in addition to being part of the systems’ technical
operations. Revealing these strategies and making explicit other non-technical factors
at work (e.g., social context and authors’ worldviews) contributes to an interpretive
and humanistic understanding of system intentionality and AI. The empirical analy-
sis of Copycat, as one instance of the many intentional systems, provides a means to
understand the narration of system intentionality through a concrete, real system.
Informed by classical hermeneutics, this chapter first introduces an interpretive
method to analyze the technical literature, considering the context where the sys-
tem was developed and the world views of the authors (Section 4.1). In order to
gain insight into the latter two elements, I have introduced secondary material (e.g.,
authors’ interviews with mass media, and their non-technical publications) as a refer-
ence. After the main corpus of the study (i.e. technical literature about the system)
is introduced, potential limitations of the methods are discussed in Section 4.2. A de-
tailed analysis of Copycat is organized according to the method introduced in Section
4.1. First, Section 4.3 discusses the social, technical, and cultural contexts in which
Copycat was built and their potential influences on the development and narration
of the system. Section 4.4 consists of a close reading of the technical literature. As
a major step in this analysis, this section demonstrates a discovery, from empirical
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data, that intentional vocabulary functions as the connecting point between the tech-
nical and intentional narrations, two parallel languages, both present in the corpus.
Finally, Copycat ’s authors philosophical view of AI is analyzed through secondary
references in order to provide further understanding of the close reading.
4.1 Method
The method used in the following analysis is informed by classical hermeneutics. As
discussed in Section 2.3.1, the long-standing hermeneutic tradition (especially classical
hermeneutics) places its emphasis on understanding text according to what its author
intended. While classical hermeneutics does not acknowledge the plurality of meaning,
its focus on authors fits our purpose of unpacking the discursive strategies system
authors use in technical literature to narrate system intentionality. After providing
a brief account of methods used in one school of classical hermeneutics, this section
extends existing hermeneutic methods and describes an integrated method to study
the construction of system intentionality in technical literature.
4.1.1 Principles of Hermeneutics
Built on the classical hermeneutic theories, modern day biblical hermeneutics contin-
ues to explore the art and science of interpretation. As contemporary hermeneutics
scholar Henry Virkler claims, “hermeneutics is needed ... because of the historical,
cultural, linguistic, and philosophical gaps that block a spontaneous, accurate un-
derstanding of God’s Word” [208]. Similarly, the core idea of hermeneutics can be
used to connect the authors and users/analysts of intentional systems, for a similar
gap exists between them. Virkler further summarizes hermeneutic principles into five
steps. The first three steps constitute general hermeneutics — the study of rules
that can be applied for interpreting the entire Bible — and are discussed below. The
last two steps are special hermeneutics methods for specific genres, and will not be
included in our discussion.
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In the first step, the historical-cultural analysis and contextual analysis, a hermeneu-
tic interpreter gains knowledge of the historical and cultural context under which the
author wrote the text, as the means to decode the author’s “allusions, references,
and purpose” of the writing. Contextual analysis, on the other hand, considers the
relationship of the specific text and the entire body of texts produced by this author
in order to gain a holistic perspective of the author. At this stage, the interpreter’s
task is to familiarize herself with the historical milieu in which the author wrote the
text, to observe the purpose of the text based on the author’s writing patterns, and
to identify the immediate context of the passage under study.
After familiarizing herself with the context under which the specific text was pro-
duced, the interpreter is ready to work on the text itself in the second step — the
lexical-syntactical analysis. Virkle argues that this step does not encourage blind
literalism; it instead differentiates how the author intends the text to be understood,
whether literally, symbolically, or figuratively, and informs the interpretation accord-
ingly. Carefully going through the text, the interpreter studies the definitions of
words (lexicology) and their relationship to one another (syntax), in order to achieve
a concrete and accurate understanding of the intended meaning.
The third major step in the biblical hermeneutical reading attempts to answer
the question of how the passage under consideration fits into the total pattern of
God’s revelation. It assesses the level of theological understanding when the passage
was written so that the interpreter can ascertain the text’s intended meaning for its
original readers. Finally, additional knowledge about the topic based on later biblical
text should also be acknowledged.
4.1.2 An Integrated Method
The essence of the general hermeneutics methods is to restore authorial intent by
carefully studying the context within which a text was created, analyzing the text
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itself, and putting the text in the perspective of the author’s ideological world view.
This method offers a promising starting point to study a system author’s discursive
strategies for creating system intentionality, because the steps to restore an author’s
intended meanings can also be used to reveal the strategies the author uses. The rest
of this section, based in my theoretical framework, introduces a revised method that
integrates hermeneutics, actor-network theory, cognitive semantics, and the philoso-
phy of mind.
Technical-Social-Cultural Analysis Although the study of context can be ex-
tended to a much broader set of inquiries, this study limits its scope mainly to the
“actants” listed in Latour’s work on science in the making [122]. More specifically, for
the particular system under study, I attempt to identify the lab environment where
it was created, its funding sources, and the connections between its author and other
AI researchers. Also taken into account is the historical development of AI at the
time the system was created.
Content Analysis The bulk of the analysis is a close reading of the technical lit-
erature about the system. The text of each article in the main corpus is carefully
analyzed in order to identify all the rhetorical strategies that are used to construct
the system as intentional. Once an article is scrutinized, each instance of discursive
strategies is entered into a spreadsheet as a row, with information on the particu-
lar intentional vocabulary, the whole sentence where it is used, the article in which
this instance appears, and the corresponding page number. Then each row in the
spreadsheet is carefully scrutinized again to identify the patterns and trends of these
instances of discursive strategies. This spreadsheet then becomes the data for further
analytical and statistical examination. The goal of this content analysis is to identify
intentional vocabulary and other rhetorical strategies that are deployed —consciously
or not— to narrate system intentionality in the presumably “objective” and “neutral”
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AI technical literature.
The coding scheme used to identify intentional vocabulary notes any non-trivial
token that implies human-like desire, belief, or other intentional mental states, or any
token that refers directly to human cognitive faculties. For instance, the sentence
“the system itself controls the degree to which it is willing to take risks” uses an
intentional vocabulary, whereas “SME first uses a set of ‘match rules’...” is not
considered one because “use” is commonly used in inanimate artifacts. “Copycat ’s
Long term memory” is considered intentional narration, for it directly assigns human
faculties to the machine. Of course, sometimes the difference between the intentional
and non-intentional vocabulary is a fine line. Although certain terms seem more
intentional than others, the prototype model of intentional terms poses a potential
limitation on the coding scheme because of the lack of a clear threshold to differentiate
them.
Ideology Analysis A study of an author’s rhetorical strategies should also take
into consideration her beliefs and values regarding the content she creates. In the
context of intentional systems, this means to explicitly identify the author’s position
on AI in relation to real human intelligence and intentionality. Is the author a firm
supporter of the Strong AI hypothesis? Does she believe that the system she has
built leads to achieving machine intelligence? These are important questions in that
they help us connect the discursive strategies identified from the previous step to the
author’s goal.
This section has introduced a method that is informed by the classical hermeneutic
methodology. In the rest of this chapter, this method is used to conduct a close
reading of Copycat, an analogy-making system, with special attention paid to its
authors’ discursive strategies in the technical literature produced about the system.
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4.2 The Corpus and Potential Limitations
The Copycat project was developed by Douglas R. Hofstadter, well-known for his 1980
Pulitzer-winning book Gödel, Escher, Bach [93], and his student Melanie Mitchell. It
is chosen for close reading for several reasons. First, it is positioned as both an AI and
cognitive science project that pushes its authors both to reveal technical advancements
and to connect the computational operation to the human mental faculty of analogy.
Second, the amount of technical literature generated about Copycat offers a rich, yet
manageable set of resources for our discussion. The size of the computational analogy
community is also well constrained compared to the size of the planning or machine
learning communities. Third, the subject of computational analogy is closely related
to the cognitively-oriented conceptual blending theories and models used to produce
GRIOT and hence Memory, Reverie Machine (Chapter 6).
The primary corpus chosen to conduct a close reading of the Copycat system
comes from the related technical papers and book chapters about the system, which
appeared between 1984 and 1995. Among them, four major publications [94, 97, 98,
147] devoted exclusively to this project are chosen as the primary material for this
study. (The 1994 article [97] is a combination of the material from the two later ones
[98, 147].) These articles were published in 1984, 1994, 1995, and 1995 respectively
by Hofstadter and Mitchell, incorporating over 200 pages of technical descriptions
of Copycat, comparing it to other computational analogy systems, particularly the
Structure-Mapping Engine (SME ) [50] and ACME [101]).
In addition, other related literature, including Copycat’s main author’s (Hofs-
tadter) interviews in the mass media, non-technical articles, websites are also studied,
particularly as with regard to the social contexts and his ideological beliefs regarding
issues related to intentional systems. Admittedly, several limitations exist in terms of
the corpus. First, certain articles, which may deploy discursive strategies differently,
could be left out since the corpus does not exhaustively include all publications on
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Figure 18: Screenshot of a Java Re-implementation of Copycat by Scott Bolland1
Copycat. Second, other AI practitioners’ discursive strategies may be very different
from those of Copycat ’s authors. Although these issues may potentially undermine
the generalizability of the results of this analysis, the aim of this analysis is not to
propose a generic pattern that fits all AI practitioners. In fact, part of the function of
the context and ideological analyses is to take into account the individuality of each
system’s author.
4.3 The Technical-Social-Cultural Context of Copycat
The development of the Copycat project coincides with the two AI winters — a term
coined as an analogy to the idea of nuclear winter. During the two AI winters, both
government/military funding and public interest for AI dropped substantially due
to the frustrations caused by the unrealistic expectations and over-promising of the
field. This chain reaction began with pessimism in the AI community, followed by
pessimism in the press, followed by a severe cutback in funding, followed by the end
of serious research [32, pp.203]. Some of the major AI developments around the time
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when Copycat was created are listed in Table 6.
After the failure of machine translation and the abandonment of connectionism in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, DARPA canceled many of its AI projects, including a
three million-dollar a year grant for Carnegie Mellon University’s Speech Understand-
ing Research. J. C. R. Licklider’s “funding people, not projects” policy in the 1960s
was replaced by a more pragmatic and applied approach; undirected research with no
direct applications for the military had a hard time receiving DARPA money. Things
got even worse when Sir James Lighthill released a report for the British Parliament
in 1973, stating that nearly no AI projects would generate truly usable technology in
the foreseeable future. Soon enough, government funding for AI became hard to find
and hence the first AI winter (1974 - 1980).
Thanks to the commercial successes of expert systems in the beginning of the
1980s, the AI community slowly recovered from the aftermath of the first AI winter.
Many companies around the world quickly adopted these systems, which simulated
the reasoning process of human experts in solving problems such as medical diagnoses
(MYCIN [197]) and the evaluation of mineral potential (PROSPECTOR [44]). How-
ever, as these companies would soon find out, these domain-specific programs were
too expensive to maintain. In addition, AI faced other major setbacks, such as the
fall of the LISP machine markets and the failure of Japan’s ambitious Fifth Gener-
ation Computer (logic programming) project. The result was that the field entered
its second winter (1987 - 1993).
Although never mentioned explicitly in the technical literature itself, the context
of the two AI winters had a very direct impact on the Copycat project. Technically,
the two AI winters marked a paradigm shift of the community from symbolic AI (GO-
FAI) to various different approaches and eventually to interactionist AI. Developed
during this transitional period, Copycat embodies techniques, values, and rhetoric
from multiple approaches to AI and cognition.
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Table 6: Timeline of Major AI Developments between 1980 and 1999
Year Major AI Developments
1980 The First AAAI conference.
First expert system shells and commercial applications devel-
oped.
1981 Danny Hillis’ the connection machine, a massively parallel
architecture, brought new power to AI and computation in
general.
1985 Harold Cohen’s AARON was demonstrated at the IJCAI con-
ference.
Neural Networks become widely used with the Backpropaga-
tion algorithm.
1986 SME, a renown analogy system, was published by Falken-
hainer, Forbus and Gentner.
1987 Marvin Minsky published The Society of Mind, a theoretical
description of the mind as a collection of cooperating agents.
Rodney Brooks introduced the subsumption architecture and
behavior-based robotics as a more minimalist modular model
of natural intelligence; Nouvelle AI.
1994 With passengers onboard, the twin robot cars (VaMP and
VITA-2) of Ernst Dickmanns and Daimler-Benz drove more
than one thousand kilometers on a Paris three-lane highway
in standard heavy traffic at speeds up to 130 km/h.
late 1990s The first webcrawlers appear. Along with other AI-based
information-extraction programs, they become critical to
widespread use of the World Wide Web.
It is true that Copycat ’s domain and high-level goal of symbolic analogy between
short strings of letters lies at the heart of the symbolic AI paradigm. Even its con-
cept net is reminiscent of classic symbolic systems such as Douglas Lenat’s CyC [125]
and Minsky’s concept of frame systems [143]. Yet, in comparison with its contempo-
rary competitor Structural Mapping Engine (SME) [50] by Falkenhainer, Forbus, and
Gentner, Copycat is not heavily invested in the syntactic rules of analogy, regardless
of the content of the problem. Even its concept net has a flavor of the connectionist
approach by introducing variable weights to the links between concepts. As other
AI researchers [131] have commented, “[c]ompared to Gentner’s structure-mapping
theory of analogy emphasizes formal, shared syntactic relations between concepts. In
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contrast, Hofstadter and Mitchell’s ‘slipnets’ [(Copycat)] project emphasizes semantic
similarities and employs connectionist notions of conceptual distance and activation
to make analogy more dynamic and cognitively plausible.”
But overall, the architecture and vocabulary used in Copycat speak strongly to
a dynamical systems approach. Unlike symbolic AI (Section 2.1.1), the dynamical
systems approach does not emphasize the syntactic manipulation of symbolic repre-
sentations of a problem. Instead, its primary focus is how a system changes its states
over time. Randall Beer describes:
the explanatory focus [of a dynamical model] is on the structure of the
space of possible trajectories and the internal and external forces that
shape the particular trajectory that unfolds over time, rather than on
the physical nature of the underlying mechanisms that instantiate this
dynamics. On this view, inputs do not uniquely specify an internal state
that describes some external state of affairs. Rather, they serve as a source
of perturbations to the system’s intrinsic dynamics. [11]
The dynamical systems approach’s emphasis on the evolution over time and state,
“self-organization and the emergence of structure,” and “multiple simultaneous inter-
actions” among different parts of the system [47] lends itself very well to Hofstadter’s
notion of fluid analogy. For instance, the system contains a pool of codelets (small
pieces of code that function like autonomous agents) including both top-down and
bottom-up functionalities, working simultaneously to provide control and to explore
new potential discoveries. The stochastic behaviors of the codelets over time, ac-
cording to its authors, provide the system with the necessary flexibility to discover
different kinds of analogies.
Some readers may find some parallelism between the Copycat architecture and
Marvin Minsky’s book The Society of Mind [144]. To a certain extent, both works
are about how intelligent behaviors can emerge from a large group of simple and
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unintelligent elements. In fact, Hofstadter spent a sabbatical year in 1983 at MIT’s
Artificial Intelligence Lab with the support of Minsky. In this year, Hofstadter wrote
the first full article [94] on Copycat, published the following year as a technical report
of the lab. In this 1984 article, the major ideas of Copycat were already proposed. It
was also during his stay at MIT that Hofstadter met Melanie Mitchell, who subse-
quently did her Ph.D. on Copycat at Indiana University with Hofstadter.
Copycat ’s main sources of funding came from the National Science Foundation,
Indiana University, University of Michigan, and several personal funding foundations
in the early days of the project. The lack of substantial DARPA funding meant
that Hofstadter had to find ways to fund his project, but also meant that he had
a relatively large amount of intellectual freedom to pursue his own interest without
having to tie it to military or other commercial applications. In the Prologue of
his second book, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the
Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought, expressed his frustration with the field of AI
at that time:
For me and probably for a good many other people, the term [artificial
intelligence] conjured up an exciting image — that of questing after the
deepest secrets of the human mind and expressing them as pure, abstract
patterns. In the early 1980’s, however, that term, as words are wont to do,
gradually started changing connotations, and began to exude the flavor of
commercial applications and expert systems, as opposed to basic scientific
research about the nature of thinking and being conscious. As a result I
came to feel much less comfortable saying or writing “AI.” Luckily, a new
term was just then coming into currency — “cognitive science” — and
I started to favor that way of describing my research interests, since it
clearly stresses the idea of fidelity to what actually goes on in the human
mind/brain, as well as the pure-science nature of the endeavor. [95]
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This somewhat ambivalent position of Copycat as half-AI and half-cognitive science
research had an impact on the discursive strategies the authors use in their technical
publication, as we will see in the next section.
4.4 Content Analysis of the Technical Literature
After a brief account of the technical, social and cultural contexts in which Copycat
was developed, this section zooms in on the analysis of the main corpus — technical
literature of Copycat. Once again, teasing out the discursive elements in the system
may seem from time to time a hostile gesture towards the system. However, as
explained earlier, this is not the goal of this study. In fact, the influence of this well-
known system in the history of AI is itself a proof of the significance and contribution
of the work as well as its authors. In fact, the potential reaction to seeing this
study as an “attack” illustrates the pervasiveness of the techno-centric view in the AI
community — if the intentionality is not from the technical operation of the system,
it is not valid AI research. My goal then is to reveal the existence of the discursive
component in what has been regarded as purely technical systems and to argue that
they are as constitutive as technical operation to these systems.
In this section, Section 4.4.1 first describes Copycat ’s operation in two different
kinds of languages, one intentional and the other technical, in order to demonstrate
the existence of both in the main corpus. The next section (4.4.2) demonstrates
that the intentional vocabulary offers system authors a powerful link that connects
the two languages that AI authors have to master simultaneously. Then, in Section
4.4.3. patterns of system authors’ navigation between the intentional and technical
languages are discussed.
4.4.1 The Two Aspects of Copycat
Before diving in-depth into corpus, it is necessary to familiarize the readers with the
high-level account for the operation and architecture of the system. Although the
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corpus offers mixed descriptions of the system, this section attempts to introduce
Copycat from two perspectives. The first description is constructed with intentional
vocabulary, drawn mainly from the corpus. The second version is mainly a technical
one with very few intentional terms, based on the source code and my understanding
of the system as a computer scientist.
The reason for juxtaposing the two different descriptions is to highlight the dis-
cursive machine’s impact on the perception of system intentionality. What is striking
is not merely that the two descriptions seem to be about different systems, but that
they seem to depict different kinds of systems. With the formal and technical terms,
most people would not expect that the second version describes an AI system.
4.4.1.1 A Fluid Analogy Maker
The Copycat project is an attempt to model human “mental fluidity” in analogy mak-
ing. Its authors claim that the program is capable of making “insightful” analogies in
a small, restricted domain, namely alphabetic sequences. For instance, when Copycat
is shown the following “problem”: abc → abd, pqr → ?, Copycat ’s answer will
likely be pqs. This domain is not as simple as it might seem, as certain analogies are
challenging even for humans. For instance, faced with a new problem abc → abd,
pqqrrr → ?, Copycat finds the answer pqqrrrr by mapping alphabetic position ro
group size. When the result is shown to humans, many find it “insightful.” Copy-
cat ’s functioning is non-deterministic; in different runs, it may find different solutions
to the same problem... In Copycat ’s domain of operation, many solutions are valid
for each problem, depending on how the subject “interprets” the problem. Solutions
that are more “obvious” are found more often, whereas other solutions are found with
lower frequency.
In order to model human “conceptual fluidity” in perception and analogy making,
Copycat ’s main focus is the “slippage” of concepts into one another. For instance,
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in the previous example, each letter was seen as its numeric position in the alphabet
so when the c was changed to a d, Copycat understands that the group of 3 rs has
to be changed to a group of 4 rs. In order to achieve this, the representation of the
system’s perception is constructed dynamically. When the system receives abc as
the input, Copycat ’s perception mechanism constructs a representation containing
information such that abc is a string composed of three letters or that b is the alpha-
betical successor of a. Copycat contains a collection of “concepts” (e.g., “successor,”
“predecessor,” “length,” “alphabet,” “sameness,” etc.) with which it “perceives” the
input. Depending on the problem the system is dealing with, some concepts might
“slip” into one another, and Copycat might all of a sudden map “alphabetic position”
to “group size” (as in the previous example). Finally, the system is also capable of
explaining its predictions by presenting to the user which concepts are mapped to
which other concepts.
Copycat incorporates three different modules: the “slipnet,” locus of the concepts
that the system has access to; the “workspace,” where Copycat constructs the rep-
resentation of the problem it is solving, and where the analogy is made; and finally
the “coderack,” where a collection of codelets is waiting to be executed. Codelets are
small pieces of code that perform tasks such as creating or destroying a new percep-
tual structure, evaluating how promising a particular structure is, or creating more
codelets. Codelets are executed stochastically, and the exhibited behavior of Copy-
cat is the result of the execution of hundreds of codelets. As the authors explain,
codelets can be seen as the enzymes in biological cells, where each enzyme does only
one very small task, but the combination of thousands of them manages to fulfill
complex tasks. The individual objects constituting the representation being built in
the workspace (corresponding to how Copycat is perceiving the input) are assigned an
“unhappiness” value (corresponding to how unsatisfied the system is with the struc-
tures associated to that object). When the unhappiness decreases, a global measure
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of “temperature” decreases. The lower the temperature, the more likely the program
will terminate, and generate an analogy based on the current representation in the
workspace.
Compared with other models of analogy in AI or cognitive science (e.g., SME [50]
or ACME [101]), Copycat has two main distinctive features. First, it models both
the perception and mapping stages of analogy (retrieval, perception, mapping and
inference are the four well established phases of analogical reasoning [50]). Second, its
biologically inspired search scheme based on codelets is claimed to be “psychologically
plausible” by its authors, in opposition to more traditional exhaustive search methods
used by all other models of analogy.
4.4.1.2 A Stochastic Local Search Program
So far, we have seen the intentional narrative that the authors of Copycat have con-
structed. In order to highlight the effect of these discursive strategies, this section
undertakes the task of formulating a technical description of the system’s operation,
using conventional terms that are formally defined and adopted by the computer
science community.
Copycat is a stochastic local search program. It receives three character-based
strings (String 1, String 2, and String 3) as input and generates a single output
character string. In order to generate the output character string, Copycat performs
a stochastic local search in a particular search space, optimizing a particular heuristic
function. The search space is the space of all possible structures that relate the
three input strings together. Each one of these structures is a graph built from a
base set of primitive constructs predefined by the author (such as “b is the successor
of a”). A particular structure captures the relations among the three input strings
and determines the compatibility of the different primitive constructs appearing in
a structure. Copycat maximizes a heuristic function, that is, the extent to which
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the proposed structure captures all the regularities and relations among the three
strings. The system may randomly terminate its search at any point in time. The
probability of termination is higher if the system has found a structure with a high
value based on the heuristic function. Once the search stops, the system generates
an output string according to the transformation operations specified by the current
structure. This means that the same operations that transform String 1 to String 2
will be applied to String 3 in order to derive the output string. For instance, when
Copycat receives the following input: abc, abd, pqr, Copycat ’s answer will be pqs
with a high probability.
Although the above technical description only seems to loosely relate to the first
intentional description, it captures the operation of the system. For instance, in the
original description of Copycat, the authors state that the system simulates human
perception, and that it builds a “point of view” of the input problem. This means
that the system builds a structure that relates all the letters in the three input strings.
These structures are assigned a “strength”, which is a function of its “happiness,”
“conceptual depth,” and “contradiction.” (Two structures are contradictory, when
they contain contradictory “slippages,” e.g., in one “successor” slipped to “predeces-
sor” and in the other one it did not.) Depending on the strength of the structures
currently present in the workspace, Copycat ’s “temperature” is higher or lower. As
the temperature decreases, the chances of Copycat stopping are higher. Thus, the
effect is that the system is optimizing its structure strength.
A comparison between the above two aspects is illustrated in Figure 19. I do
not wish to imply that one description is more “objective” or “accurate” than the
other. As argued from the last chapter, the choice of discursive strategies is an
intrinsic part of AI practice. The previous paragraph foreshadows the next section,
which demonstrates how the authors of Copycat connect the intentional and technical
languages by using intentional vocabulary.
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Figure 19: A Comparison between the Intentional and Technical Descriptions of
Copycat
4.4.2 Intentional Vocabulary: Connecting the Two Languages
This section presents one of the main arguments of this chapter, that intentional
vocabulary is essential to the practice of AI in that it provides a connecting point
between the technical language and intentionality language, both of which are part
of AI literature. First, Section 4.4.2.1 presents the empirical data from the analysis
of the corpus and categorizes them into three different uses of intentional vocabulary.
Then we closely trace two examples of “scout codelets” and the “happiness value
of codelets” in order to understand how the authors use intentional vocabulary to
leverage the technical and discursive requirements.
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4.4.2.1 The Use of Intentional Vocabulary
One of the main distinctions of Copycat from other existing computational analogy
systems, in the eyes of its authors, is that Copycat offers a “psychological plausible”
model of analogy. Although the authors never pin down the exact meaning of this
goal, it is repeated many times in the literature: “we have been influenced more by
psychological than neurological findings,” “SME is an algorithmic but psychologically
implausible way of finding what the structure-mapping theory ...” or “certainly, the
exhaustive search SME performs through all consistent mappings is psychologically
implausible” (emphasis added).
In order to demonstrate the “psychological plausibility,” a close parallel between
Copycat and human cognitive processes is made through various discursive strategies
that the authors deploy. Among others, three strategies used frequently by the au-
thors stand out. First, intentional verbs are heavily used to narrate the operation of
the system. Such words as “know,” “resist,” “understand” appear throughout the
corpus. More examples include (emphasis added):
Just as the program knows the immediate neighbors of every letter in the
alphabet, it also knows the successors and predecessors of small integers.
Copycat tends to resist bringing numbers into the picture, unless there
seems to be some complelling reason to do so.
Musing codelets allow several different and rival pathways to be sniffed or
checked out.
Second, certain data structures and functions are named after human cognitive fac-
ulties and human mental states. If the previous strategy is concerned with the inten-
tionality of the system, the narrations at this level are intended to draw close connec-
tion between Copycat ’s operation to human cognitive process and lay the groundwork
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for the next strategy. For instance, the search space of Copycat, a term hardly used
in the corpus, is composed of structures called “point of views” (or simply “views”),
which specify the ways different “concepts” connecting the three input strings (e.g.,
abc, abd, and pqr). Similarly, Copycat has “long-term memory,” “drive,” “desire,”
and “personality:”
It [(the Slipnet)] can be thought of, roughly, as Copycat ’s long-term mem-
ory.
[Copycat ] must reconcile a large number of mutually incompatible local
desires (the technical term for this is ‘frustration’).
... and those data provided some of the most important insights into the
program’s “personality.”
Last but not least, the system is often narrated in comparison to human and other
forms of life (e.g., cells, and ants). Although the content may vary depending on the
context, these arguments typically take the following form: A (creative) human faced
with situation X will react with action Y, and Copycat also performs action Y in this
situation X. The purpose of drawing such a comparison is to imply that Copycat is
similarly creative, intelligent and intentional. An example is:
In particular, people are clearly quicker to recognize two neighboring ob-
jects as identical than as being related in some abstract way. Thus the
architecture has an intrinsic speed-bias in favor of sameness bonds: it
tends to spot them and to construct them more quickly than it spots and
constructs bonds representing other kinds of relationships.
The following tables 7, 8 and 9 respectively illustrate examples of each of the three
above mentioned discursive strategies appearing in the corpus. More complete data
can be found in the Appendix. Readers can get a direct sense of the deployment of
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Table 7: Usage of Intentional Vocabulary
Context Intentional Term Source
Just as the program knows the immediate neigh-
bors of every letter in the alphabet, it also knows
the successors and predecessors of small integers.
know [98, pp.210]
Thus, copycat is capable of recognizing not only
that the structure ...
recognize [98, pp.210]
Copycat tends to resist bringing numbers into the
picture, unless there seems to be some compelling
reason to do so.
resist [98, pp.210]
This is how the system’s actual viewpoint develops
with time.
viewpoint [98, pp.226]
the system loses this naive, open-minded quality;
as indeed it ought to and usually ends up being
closed-minded...
open-minded [98, pp.228]
Thus, the system itself controls the degree to which
it is willing to take risks.
willing [98, pp.229]
... and those data provided some of the most im-
portant insights into the program’s personality.
personality [98, pp.230]
The answer xyz, whose very high temperature of
74 indicates that the program did not “like” it at
all, ...
like [98, pp.246]
authors’ narration from these examples. Grounded in these findings, the next section
offers a more in-depth analysis of the trends and patterns of how the authors narrate
the system intentionality of Copycat.
4.4.2.2 The Scouts
In the Copycat corpus, certain types of codelets called the “scouts” or “musing
codelets” receive a lot of attention. According to the articles, their purpose is to
look for potential connections and relations (e.g., “sameness”) between objects in the
working space for the main system to further scrutinize and evaluate. The image
of human scouts is familiar to most people — they are sent ahead of a main force
to gather information about the enemy’s location, strength, etc. In the following
depictions of the codelets, the authors clearly leverage our mental image of a human
scout:
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Table 8: Usage of Cognitive Faculties in Naming Functions and Structures
Sentence Term Source
It (the Slipnet) can be thought of, roughly, as
Copycat’s long-term memory
long-term memory. [98, pp.211]
The Workplace is the locus of perceptual activity. perceptual activity [98, pp.211]
An unhappy object is one that has few or no
connections to the rest of the objects in the
Worldspace, and that thus seems to cry out for
more attention
unhappy [94, pp.217]
The topology of our Slipnet is defined by certain
concepts realized as nodes
concepts [94, pp.4]
The basic image is that of many “fingers of exploration” simultaneously
feeling out various potential pathways at different speeds, thanks to the
coexistence of pressures of different strengths. These “fingers of explo-
ration” are tentative probes made by scout codelets ....
The foggier things are, the more unbiased should be the scouting mission
....
The mission of such a codelet is to scan the Workspace in search of in-
stances of its spawning concept.
A metaphor for the parallel terraced scan is provided by the image of a
vast column of ants marching through a forest, with hordes of small scouts
at the head of the column making small random forays in all directions
(although exploring some directions more eagerly and deeply than others)
and then returning to report; the collective effect of these many “feelers”
will then determine the direction to be followed by the column as a whole.
This is going on at all moments, of course, so that the column is constantly
adjusting its pathway in slight ways.
In addition to the explicit intentional vocabulary (e.g., “explore,” “feel out,” “mis-
sion,” “march,” and “report”), the authors use many terms with spatial connotation
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Table 9: Comparison of Copycat with humans and other forms of life
Sentence Source
Creative human thinkers manifest an exquisite selectivity of this sort
— when they are faced with a novel situation, what bubbles up from
their unconscious and pops to mind is typically a small set of concepts
that “fit like a glove,” without a host of extraneous and irrelevant
concepts being consciously activated or considered.
[98, pp.211]
This image comes essentially from the biological cell; the Workspace
corresponds roughly to the cytoplasm of a cell, in which enzymes
carrying out diverse tasks all throughout the cell’s cytoplasm are
the construction crews, and the structures built up are all sorts of
hierarchically-structured biomolecules.
[98, pp.216]
In particular, people are clearly more quickly able to recognize two
neighboring objects as identical than as being related in some abstract
way. Thus the architecture has an intrinsic speed-bias in favor of
sameness bonds: it tends to spot them and to construct them more
quickly than it spots and constructs bonds representing other kinds of
relationships.
[98, pp.218]
such as “potential pathways,” “forest,” “direction.” Other terms also have strong tie
to space: “foggy,” “scan,” “search,” and “exploration.” Embodied cognition theories
have stressed the importance of our motor-sensory experience as essential to human
intentionality and understanding [88]. Lakoff [118] also illustrates how the funda-
mental image schema such as “CONTAINER” and metaphors such as “LIFE AS A
JOURNEY” are temporally and spatially grounded. Similarly, the spatial aspects in
the description of the scout codelets make them easy to relate to and therefore easy
to see as intentional.
However, the spatial narration is brought in from the conceptual spaces of the
“human scout” and the “ant scout.” As the source code of a particular kind scout
codelet shows in Figure 20, the system has no spatial concepts at all. As a close
analysis of Melanie Mitchell’s dissertation [146] echoes, these codelets do not “scout”
or “explore” or have “missions” or goals. Their operation is to randomly pick one
object in the workspace, and a concept in the slipnet, and check whether the selected




(let* ((from-object (tell *workspace* 'choose-object 
'get-intra-string-salience))
(to-object (tell from-object 'choose-neighbor)))   
(if* (not (exists? to-object)) (fizzle))
(let ((bond-facet (choose-bond-facet from-object to-object)))
(if* (not (exists? bond-facet)) (fizzle))
(let* ((from-object-descriptor (tell from-object 
'get-descriptor-for bond-facet))
(to-object-descriptor (tell to-object 'get-descriptor-for 
bond-facet))
(bond-category (get-bond-category from-object-descriptor 
to-object-descriptor)))
(cond
((not (exists? bond-category)) (fizzle))
((incompatible-bond-candidates? from-object to-object bond-facet 
bond-category) 
(fizzle))








Figure 20: Source Code for a Bottom-up Scout Codelet
codelets is very constrained. For instance, the scout codelets look only for relations
among contiguous letters in a string, which drastically reduces the search space.
Notice that the operation of codelets is quite different from “hordes of ants explor-
ing a forest.” The discontinuous and random combination of concepts and relations is
repurposed and narrated through the continuous spatial exploration of a human/ant
scout. It is also worth pointing out the co-existence of multiple narratives inside the
code shown in Figure 20. In addition to the intentional vocabulary, chemistry-related
(e.g., “bond,” and “fizzle”) and other (e.g., “workspace,” “category,” and “descrip-
tor”) narrations are also present. These multiple and intersecting metaphor systems
complement the primary narration of system intentionality, and offer a spectrum of
narratives, from the more intentional to the more technical ones. The functioning of
this field of narratives, composed of different metaphors and semiotic systems, is a
rich area for further exploration.
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The intentional vocabulary does not always bring new properties that do not exist
in the machine operation to the narration of system intentionality. As we will see from
the following example, its more important function is to provide a bridge between the
discursive layer and the technical layer of the system.
4.4.2.3 The Reason of “Happiness”
Most AI practitioners will be quick to agree that “happiness” is an explicit intentional
term. Unlike terms such as “planning” or “learning,” “happiness” does not have a
conventionally agreed upon formal meaning that the AI community follows. In fact,
its highly subjective and emotional undertone is almost an antithesis of any formal
definition based on machine operation. This section provides an example of how the
authors of Copycat use intentional vocabulary such as “happiness” to connect the
intentional narration needed for their research goal and the technical requirement for
the systems.
In Copycat, the level of “happiness” of each object (e.g., a letter, a number, or
a group of letters from the three input strings) in the system’s “work space” is an
important factor. It regulates how much attention the system pays to a specific
object; the unhappier an object is, the more resources will be given to it. As its
authors describe,
Unhappiness is a measure of how integrated the object is with other ob-
jects. An unhappy object is one that has few or no connections to the
rest of the object in the Worldspace, and that thus seems to cry out for
more attention.
The choice of an emotional term with easily understandable meaning is far from
an accident. It reinforces the overarching research goals set by Copycat ’s creators,
that is, to model the analogy-making process with psychological plausibility. As
the authors position the system in one of the opening paragraphs, “Copycat is a
131
computer program designed to be able to discover insightful analogies, and to do
so in a psychologically realistic way.” One effective strategy to accomplish goal is
to connect the system’s operation to with common wisdoms. The authors wrote:
“the architecture follows the old motto ‘The squeaky wheel gets the oil’, even if only
probabilistically so.” Following this motto, it seems “natural” and “human-like” that
the “unhappy” concepts is entitled to more attention.
However, the “unhappiness” measure also serves a technical purpose that is never
explicitly mentioned in the corpus. Technically speaking, Copycat ’s goal is to optimize
the overall connection between different objects in the working space. The strength
of each structure is computed as an aggregation of the strengths of the individual
elements (e.g., bonds) in the structure. An “unhappy” element corresponds to an
element with weak structures, whereas a “happy” one has an already formed strong
structure that connects it to other elements. In probabilistic terms, working on the
weakest point in a structure yields the most chances for improvement; for modifying
a strong structure is likely to make it weaker (since the structure is strong), and
modifying a weak structure is likely to make it stronger (since it is already weak).
Hence, focusing on the “unhappy” objects maximizes the probability of strengthening
the current structure.
Figure 21 provides the source code for one particular kind of “happiness.” The im-
plementation shows a rather simple function with little connection to the vernacular
meaning of the term. Here, the so-called “intra-string-unhappiness” is updated with a
number between the range of 0 and 100, depending on the properties of the connection
this element has. As stated earlier, the point of the example is not the disjunction
between the intentional narrative and the computational operation. Rather, it illus-
trates the intentional vocabulary’s pivotal function of connecting the two. Without
the intentional narration, the technical machine operation lacks the system intention-







((tell self 'spans-whole-string?) 0) 
((exists? enclosing-group) 
(100- (tell enclosing-group 'get-strength)))   
(else 
(let ((bonds (tell self 'get-incident-bonds))) 
(cond 
((null? bonds) 100) 
((or (tell self 'leftmost-in-string?) 
(tell self 'rightmost-in-string?)) 
(100- (round (* 1/3 (tell (1st bonds) 
'get-strength))))) 
(else 
(100- (round (* 1/6 





Figure 21: Source Code for One Kind of “Happiness”
the other hand, intentional narrations are vague and hard to believe. The intentional
terms such as “happiness” provide a joint so that the discursive and computational
operations can cling to each other.
4.4.3 Leveraging the Two Languages of AI
In the previous chapter, we discussed the dual roles of an AI practitioner as both the
executor and narrator of her system. On the one hand, the practitioner faithfully
follows the established formal conventions and methodology associated with the key
AI intentional terms. On the other hand, she leverages the vernacular meaning of
these terms to construct the narrations of system intentionality. So far in this chapter,
we have seen the existence of the two languages of AI — one intentional and the other
technical — linked by certain intentional terms. This section documents patterns of
the circumstances in which each language is adopted by the authors of Copycat.
An overall pattern of the authors’ strategy is that the intentional narrations are
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generally reserved for setting up the goal of the system and describing the system
at a high level, whereas more technical descriptions are adopted when Copycat is
compared with other similar systems. In the opening paragraphs of all four articles,
intentional narrations of the system are used extensively to reinforce the connection
between Copycat and human cognitive processes. For example, in one of the articles,
the authors wrote “... the Copycat project is not about simulating analogy-making
per se, but about simulating the very crux of human cognition: fluid concepts” [98,
pp.208]. Another example is, “Just as the program knows the immediate neighbors
of every letter in the alphabet, it also knows the successors and predecessors of small
integers” [98, pp.210].
Figure 22 and 23 show the occurrences and density of intentional vocabulary in
“The Copycat Project: A Model of Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making” [98], de-
fined as the ratio of the number of intentional vocabulary used to the entire word
count of each section. The titles of each section, in sequence, are “Copycat and
Mental Fluidity” (Section 1), “The Three Major Components of the Copycat Ar-
chitecture” (Section 2), “The Emergence of Fluidity in the Copycat Architecture”
(Section 3), “The Intimate Relation between Randomness and Fluidity” (Section
4), “Copycat’s Performance: A Forest-level Overview” (Section 5), “Copycat’s Per-
formance: A Tree-level Close-up” (Section 6), and “Conclusion: The Generality of
Copycat’s Mechanisms” (Section 7). The figure shows a higher density of intentional
vocabulary in Section 1, 3, and 4 when the topic of Copycat ’s close relationship with
mental fluidity is discussed. The sections with lower density (Section 5, 6 and 7) are
concerned with topics of system performance, and conclusion.
In contrast, when Copycat is compared with other computational analogy sys-
tems, very few intentional terms are used. In the article “Perspectives on Copycat:
Comparisons with Recent Work” [147], the use of intentional vocabulary is 0.76 /


































Figure 22: Occurrences of Intentional Vocabulary in “The Copycat Project: A
Model of Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making” [98]
words, the majority of the comparison between Copycat and other systems is carried
in the technical language. For instance, notice the difference between the following
quote and the example shown in the beginning of this section:
Copycat’s drives toward abstraction and systematicity were just described
above. But note that Gentner’s definition of “abstraction” [order of a
relation] is not the same as the notion in Copycat of “conceptual depth.”
In Copycat, there is no logic-based definition for conceptual depth; rather,
these values are assigned by hand, with quite high values sometimes going
to concepts that Gentner might call “attributes” (such as alphabetic first,
which could be seen as an attribute of the letter “a”).
The reason for this contrast reveals the “awkward” role of intentional narrations
play in the practice of AI. Despite the importance of intentional narrations, their
subjectiveness and richness portray them as the antithesis of the scientific practice.
As a result, they are often neglected, denied of significance, even by their creators.
Hofstadter and Mitchell, on the one hand, painstakingly constructed multiple layers
of narrations to portray the human-like behavior of their system — their codelets
“scout” the unknown territory and “cry out” for attention. On the other hand, when
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Figure 23: Density of Intentional Vocabulary in “The Copycat Project: A Model of
Mental Fluidity and Analogy-making” [98]
confronting another system, they shy away from their discursive machine and turn
completely to the “hard-and-fast” facts of the system’s technical operation, hoping
that they will not be accused of the “epidemic” of “wishful mnemonics” (Section
3.2.2). It is remarkable when the authors wrote:
Much the same could be said for Copycat: an outside observer is free, after
a run is over, to “parse” the run in terms of specific, discrete processes,
and to attempt to impose such a vocabulary on the system’s behavior;
however, that parsing and labeling is not intrinsic to the system, and
such interpretations are in no way unique or absolute, any more than in
a basketball game. In other words, a long sequence of codelet actions can
add up to what could be perceived a posteriori and by an outsider, as a
single coherent drive towards a particular goal, but that is the outsider’s
subjective interpretation.” [97, pp.50]
Here, Hofstadter and Mitchell rightly acknowledge the multiplicity of system inten-
tionality. However, they conflate the authors’ active narration of the system with
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users’ interpretation. Their own example illustrates the pervasive and yet illegiti-
mate existence of intentional narrations in the practice of AI.
4.5 Ideological Analysis
Given his enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, art, music, and mathematical beauty,
as illustrated in Hofstadter’s first book Gödel, Escher, Bach[93], it may be a little
surprising to many people that he chose alphabetical strings as the domain of his
program. Admittedly, AI has a history of using simplified microworlds to solve oth-
erwise overly complex problems, and the mathematics and physics trained researcher
is certainly familiar with this reductionist approach.2 Hofstadter’s position in AI is
well captured in his interview with the magazine WIRED in 1995 [110], shortly after
his second book was published.
...you catch me in a tricky dilemma here. I want any computer program
that my students and I work on to delight me with its cleverness. I want
it to outclever its programmers. But at the same time, if after 10 or 20
years of work my program composed a great novel, made a series of great
mathematical discoveries, or wrote lots of great one-liners, I would be
terribly distressed. I feel the human spirit is infinitely more complex than
anything that we’re going to be able to create in the short run. And if we
somehow did create it in the short run, it would mean that we aren’t so
complex after all, and that we’ve all been tricking ourselves.
Notice that Hofstadter’s worldview, although close to the weak AI hypothesis,
is still different from it. As discussed earlier, the weak AI hypothesis holds that
computers may appear to be intelligent in certain circumstances, but they do not
2A microworld in AI is a limited domain of problems that appear to require intelligence to solve.
The most famous microworld is the “blocks world,” used by many AI researchers including Winograd.
Compared with the complexity of real world, a blocks world consists of blocks on the table, waiting
to be stacked in certain ways.
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have a mind, intentionality, or consciousness. The Copycat project, however, is more
ambitious. Its authors aim towards teaching the/a computer the “core of thinking”
[110] — analogy — in a psychological plausible way. On the other hand, as Hofstadter
has expressed in various contexts, he strongly believes that certain human qualities,
“something deep” at our “core,” that manifest itself through music and writing, are
not achievable by computers.
This chapter has illustrated a close reading of a full-fledged analogy making sys-
tem, Copycat in order to demonstrate the utility of the AI hermeneutic network.
Different from the existing methods of analyzing computational systems such as
AI/computer science analysis and human computer interaction evaluation, an inter-
pretive approach was adopted here. The primary corpus used in the analysis was the
technical literature published by the authors of the system. In addition, secondary
material such as the authors’ non-technical articles and interviews in the mass media
was also used for references. Based on a method informed by classical hermeneutics,
a close reading of the system was carried out on three levels: the technical, social
and cultural context during which the system was developed, content analysis, and
ideological analysis.
First, the context analysis has revealed that the Copycat project was histori-
cally situated between the two “AI winters,” a transitional period when the GOFAI
paradigm was slowly giving way to various approaches of AI. This had an impact on
both the algorithmic deployment and discursive strategies Copycat ’s authors took.
The main author’s (Hofstadter) connection with other actants (e.g., Marvin Minsky,
funding agencies) was also discussed.
The primary focus of the study, among the three levels, was the content analysis.
Based on an empirical analysis of the technical literature (the main corpus), I have
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identified the intentional vocabulary’s utility for connecting the two languages simul-
taneously at work in the authors’ narration of their system — one technical and the
other intentional. Through two specific examples of the happiness level of codelets
as well as the scout codelets, this chapter demonstrated how the authors of Copycat
use intentional vocabulary to support the technical requirements and the intentional
narration, both needed to justify the system’s operation and significance. Next, a
pattern of when the authors of Copycat switch between the technical and intentional
language for different purposes was presented.
In the last step of the ideological analysis, I contextualized the technical literature
under study in the context of the main author (Hofstadter)’s philosophical view on
AI. The discovery of the two languages and the role of intentional vocabulary to
connect them based on empirical data matches with the theoretical discussion of the
discursive machine previously presented in Chapter 3. It further proved the author’s
active role in narrating system intentionality. Most of the above observations have
escaped the analysis of traditional AI (computer science) and HCI frameworks.
So far, we have answered the first research question of the dissertation: Where
does system intentionality come from? The previous two chapters (Chapter 3 and 4)
have argued, both theoretically and empirically, that authors’ narration and users’
interpretation are the pivotal elements in the formation of system intentionality. The
discursive and interpretive nature of system intentionality hence allows us to think
of new ways of designing and creating intentional systems. The next two chapters
hence focus on the second research question: In light of the theoretical findings, how
do we design novel intentional systems?
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CHAPTER V
AGENCY PLAY AS A SCALE OF INTENTIONALITY
You are playing a young brave warrior in a sparse landscape. In order to
save a loved one, you must slay towering mythical behemoths, one after
another. After slaying a creature by scaling it and plunging a sword into
a tender point, the giant drops to its knees in melancholy slow motion.
You run, jump this way and that, trying to avoid black veins of dark force
rising from its body to seek you out. Inevitably, they pierce you and the
world turns black ...
— A scene from video game Shadow of the Colossus [198]
The first half of the dissertation has focused on authors’ narration of system in-
tentionality. The rest will propose new design possibilities and strategies to celebrate
system intentionality, not as the AI dream, but as playful and expressive new expe-
riences for the users. What factors should we take into consideration while designing
intentional systems in expressive, entertainment, or even educational domains? Is
there any design space that has not been explored sufficiently by existing approaches?
What would an expressive intentional system be like? These are the main questions
that the next two chapters intend to answer. This chapter offers two new design
constructs, scale of intentionality, and agency play, both of which were developed
jointly with Fox Harrell [220, 84]. Scale of intentionality is a novel approach to turn
system intentionality into a meaning-making mechanism. Special attention is paid to
one instance of the scale of intentionality, agency play, which explores system agency
as a potential narrative device that can be used to convey meanings in addition to
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the story content. The term system agency and its close connection to system in-
tentionality are introduced in Section 5.1, where the limitation of narrowly defined
approach to agency in human computer interaction and interactive narrative works
is also discussed. Next, Section 5.2 traces cross-disciplinary notions of agency from
various fields, and proposes an understanding of user agency as situated in the con-
text and goals of the narrative work at hand. Agency over some dimensions of control
such as moving a player character can be pitted against agency in determining plot
outcomes. The following Section 5.3 proposes the new model of agency play in which
control over a broad set of possible dimensions of user and system interaction becomes
a mechanism to convey meaning and express ideas. Toward this end, we will look at
cases in interactive narrative media and in games with strong narratively structured
content or rich story worlds. Finally, Section 5.3 explores various strategies of agency
play based on a new taxonomy of the different layers of agency. Although most of the
discussion here will focus on the domain of interactive narrative and its derivatives
in computer games, the core of design concepts raised is applicable to a larger realm
of intentional systems and digital media.
5.1 Scale of Intentionality and System Agency
In this section, we will first go over part of the history from the early development
of film, for it contains valuable lessons for intentional system designs. Based on this
history, a novel design concept of scale of intentionality is proposed to turn system
intentionality into a new expressive resource of intentional systems. We will pay
special attention to one particular way that system intentionality can be manifested
in interactive narrative works, that is, system agency.
5.1.1 Scale of Intentionality
When the Lumière brothers first experimented with motion pictures during the mid
1890s, the films that they produced were without exception shot from a camera
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Figure 24: Lumière Brothers’ Early Film “Workers Leaving a Factory,” screened
publicly in Paris in 1895
fastened to a stationary tripod. Events unfolded by people and props moving in
front of the camera, whereas the camera stayed in the same position (Figure 24).
This setting was unquestionable to many people at that time because it paralleled a
more familiar setting — theatre. In traditional theatric performances, a spectator is
expected to sit in a fixed position while she watches actions taking place in front of
her.
It was not until almost two decades later when this setting was fundamentally
challenged by D. W. Griffith. Film scholar Tom Gunning [75] provides a list of new
elements that Griffith introduced, including the full shot, the medium shot, the close-
up, the pan shot, the moving camera, the spot-iris, the mask, and the fade. Despite
Griffith’s extremely brutal discrimination against American Americans, these new
inventions not only freed camera from being a passive instrument needed for the
filmmaking process, but also contributed to the emergence of film as an expressive
language. D. W. Griffith was referred to by Gunning, among other, as the master of
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the syntax of film narration, who developed film from “cinema of attractions” to a
narrative form.
This era in the history of film is informative for designing new intentional systems,
especially in the domain of interactive narratives, for two main reasons. First, it
extends the literary distinction between narrative content and discourse to the new
form of narrative. The “same” story content, assuming such platonic concept exists
on its own, can be turned into different films, depending on the camera work and other
“discourse” elements used by different directors. Similarly in interactive narrative,
the various representation and amount of system intentionality can potentially be
used to carry meanings independently from the story content.
Second, in addition to pointing out the discourse level, Griffith developed and
demonstrated different ways that the variation of elements at this level can be used
to exaggerate, propagandize, or even subvert the story content. This is an area that
has not been systematically explored by existing intentional systems yet. Most of
intentional systems discussed in this dissertation maintained a static amount of system
intentionality — certain systems (e.g., Voyager and Aaron) are more intentional than
others (e.g., Photoshop), but each system’s intentionality mostly stay the same over
time. What if we can change this status quo?
The broad design concept scale of intentionality proposes to dynamically adjust
system intentionality along a scale through various discursive strategies. It explores
novel ways in which the variation in system intentionality is used to convey mean-
ings and express ideas. In the domain of interactive narrative, system intentionality
manifests itself through several aspects, especially through characters’ agency and
disposition. For instance, our Memory, Reverie Machine (MRM ) system presented
in the following chapter invokes a scale between narrating highly user-controlled char-
acter behaviors directed by the user’s actions and desires within the story world and
highly autonomous ones that exhibit situated “aboutness” regarding the system’s
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agency within its domain of operation. The ways in which the system’s agency can
be manipulated to make meanings will be discussed in full length in the rest of the
chapter. The MRM system also dynamically adjusts the degree to which the char-
acter’s dispositions and emotions are generated and are visible to the user. On the
higher end of the scale of intentionality, the character expresses his mental states and
emotions through memories and daydreams, whereas on the lower end such mental
activities are completely omitted from the story generated by the system. The use of
disposition in the scale of intentionality will be illustrated through our MRM system
in the following chapter.
5.1.2 System Agency
The design of intentional systems often involves the choice of temporarily suspending
users’ control over the system. For instance, the human jazz improvisers do not
have direct and complete control over the Voyager system in the way that a user of
Photoshop does. The design choice of dialogic exchange between human and computer
that helps to achieve Voyager ’s status as an independent player is, however, is at odds
with the traditional value of human computer interaction (HCI) design paradigm. As
a direct descendent of the “computer as a tool” perspective (Section 2.1.2), a major
part of HCI is devoted to designing computer systems are are transparent and easy
to control [161, 40].
For example, Ben Shneiderman, one of the most influential researchers in HCI,
posited the influential concept “direct manipulation” for interface design. It focuses
on interface representations that can be transparently manipulated and users’ abili-
ties to apply intellect directly to the task at hand [194]. In his well-known debates
with Pattie Maes on direct manipulation vs. deploying software agents as interface
strategies, Shneiderman stands strongly behind the former because it “gives users
the feeling of being in control and therefore they can be responsible for the decisions
144
they make” [195]. He further argues that “I make the basic assertion that people
are not machines and machines are not people. I do not think that human-to-human
interaction is a good model for the design of user interfaces.”
Shneiderman’s depiction of the feeling of “being in control” can be partially de-
scribed by the philosophical concept of agency. The philosophical concept of agency
generally refers to the capacity of an agent to act in a world. This construct is closely
related to intentionality, for the agent’s capacity is inevitably influenced by her men-
tal states of beliefs, desires, etc. It is true that theorists have placed different levels
of emphasis on intentionality in their definitions of agency. For instance, Giddens
[70, pp.56] acknowledges “the intentional or purposive character of human behavior,”
while emphasizing “[s]uch intentionality is a routine feature of human conduct, and
does not imply that actors have definite goals consciously held in mind during the
course of their activities.” Others believe that it is “the strong role of active (though
not necessarily fully ‘conscious’) intentionality in agency that ... differentiates agency
from routine practices” [163, pp.136]. The details of these different approaches are not
essential to this chapter and has been elaborated in Ortner’s work [163, pp.134-54].
The most important message here is that agency is one of the ways that intentionality
can be externalized through visible actions that are cognitively and emotionally di-
rected towards certain things and/or purposes. As Ortner suggests, “intentionality in
agency might include highly conscious plots and plans and schemes; somewhat more
nebulous aims, goals and ideals; and finally desires, wants and needs that may range
from being deeply buried to quite consciously felt.” This close connection between
agency and intentionality is of particular relevance to apply scale of intentionality to
interactive narratives, in which agency has already been widely discussed [154].
If HCI is seen as focusing on users’ agency, the design concepts described in this
chapter introduce the construct of system agency and propose a new balance between
users’ and systems’ agency. Subsequently, a system’s agency to act independently is
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not to be seen as a flaw because it perceivably takes the control away from the user.
Instead, carefully designed suspension of user agency under certain circumstances can
be a meaning making mechanism, as shown in the examples of interactive narratives
later in the chapter, or a political strategy to call into questions issues of “control” and
“diversity” as in George Lewis’ case. In other words, system agency is complementary
to user agency.
Overall, System agency is one of the ways that system intentionality can be ex-
ternalized. System agency can be manifested as the capacity of a computational
system to act independently and autonomously, performing actions or generating
events while being designed and described in ways that facilitate intentional readings
of these actions and events. When the level of system agency is high, a system’s
process is typically opaque with higher algorithmic complexity and it may display
more complex, human-like behaviors (Section 1.2).
The notion of system agency leverages the discourse accompanying classic AI
goals of building autonomous intelligent agents whose behaviors reveal human-like
directedness toward the world. The term “system agency” does not imply, however,
a dream of the strong-AI-styled system autonomy. Similarly to system intentional-
ity, system agency is a result of human interpretation in light of a set of situated
social circumstances, not as a property intrinsic to a computational system itself.
The term “system agency” provides a shorthand to describe human interpretation
of properties of the system behavior and capacity, specified by the story author and
authoring system designer. More importantly, it suggests that system agency needs
to be considered in parallel to human agency. The name is selected to call attention
to the inseparable nature of the human and system agency, as well as to sketch the
possibility for skillful manipulation of the relationship and dynamics between them
toward expressive ends.
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5.1.3 System Agency in Interactive Narratives
The description in the beginning of the chapter depicts a narrative scene from the
console video game Shadow of the Colossus [198]. Some readers may wonder why
the game design allows the player to perform actions immediately after slaying each
monster when the resultant fall into blackness is unavoidable; after all, many games
would use a pre-rendered, non-interactive cut-scene instead. Since the ending of this
scene is pre-determined and beyond user’s power to change, is this “false” illusion of
control a mistake overlooked by the designers of the game?
Digital media afford more active roles for users than traditional narrative forms in
various ways. Murray [154] identifies this phenomenon of increased user agency and
claims it as one foundational property of digital media. She also categorizes various
ways in which user agency is externalized in interactive narrative works. Examples
of user agency include spatial navigation, problem solving, incorporating gameplay
actions within narratives, and traversing links in hypertext narrative.
Murray’s theory has influenced many practitioners who set out to explore new
narrative possibilities brought by digital media in which agency plays an important
part. However, many attempts have been based on an overly simplified understanding
of agency, that is, agency as free will of players. This interpretation inevitably leads
to an obsession with the idea that “the more agency, the better.” This phenomenon
is exemplified in notions such as “full reactive eyes entertainment” or F.R.E.E., a
concept proposed by game designer Yu Suzuki during the development and marketing
of the game Shenmue [191], which aspired to allow a character to freely interact with
every aspect of her environment. Yet, despite the high degree of free will to interact
with objects in such a game, the slow pacing of its plot was consistently viewed as a
detraction from the game, perhaps with the high degree of freedom detracting from
meaningful narrative development, resulting in player boredom.
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This chapter is especially geared toward computational narrative systems that ac-
tively generate stories, story worlds, and/or dynamically alter elements of narration,
using AI algorithmic and knowledge structuring approaches. Such systems embody a
wide range of types of system agency that often fall into two categories, the second a
subcategory of the first: 1) system agency as narrative generation and constraint and
2) system agency as character control. The first type refers to the capacity of system
as the “narrator” and/or “author” to affect what the story is (narrative) and how the
story is told (narration) through control of events and objects, and their presentation
in the story world. Although computational narrative generation systems have tradi-
tionally focused on narrative presentation and structuring of events such as in [142],
recent work such as [150] has emphasized more complex variation in the narration
of stories. The second type is system’s capacity to control events through control of
characters in the story, often computationally encoding both internal states and ex-
ternal behaviors of characters. This type of system agency often relates to believable
agents design, and gives rise to the illusion of intentional agents acting in the story.
As shown in the next section, when both user and system compete or collaborate in
control of the same characters, a new range of opportunities are enabled to study and
implement new ways of designing agency toward expressive and aesthetic ends.
Context is indispensable to understanding of system agency in interactive narra-
tive works as it simultaneously constrains and enables the nature and interpretation
of user actions. Computational systems play a central role in establishing meaningful
contexts in interactive narrative works, ranging from presenting hypermedia experi-
ences of many electronic literature works, such as the lauded text-based animation
“Dakota” [219], to selecting story beats in Mateas and Stern’s interactive drama
Façade.1 The capacity of the computational system to modify the story world and
1Dakota is an interesting example of system agency, even though the Flash-based system does
not fall into the prototype of intentional systems. Not only does the system completely deprive the
user of her agency to interact with the piece, a more surface reading of system agency, but also it
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provide affordances for users actions is system agency.
Although Shneiderman’s concept of direct manipulation and other related HCI
design principles are certainly valuable for user interface design, it certainly has its
limitations when applied to intentional systems particularly in entertainment and aes-
thetic domains such as interactive narrative. A user’s actions and their consequences
in such contexts need to carry purpose and significance. Computers (and other arti-
facts) can contribute to the perceived meaning of human actions to take place, once
the computers are not seen merely as instruments.
5.2 A Situated Approach to Agency
The central argument of this section is that solely free will oriented, more is better,
models of agency are outmoded and should be expanded with an understanding of
agency as an expressive resource that can be varied along many dimensions to result
in meaningful and aesthetic effects in interactive narrative works. Formerly, such as
in the heyday of hypertext fiction or adventure gaming, user agency was novel in
the ability to traverse multiple paths through, or even become a character within,
an interactive narrative work. Full player agency became a type of holy grail in the
construction of interactive narrative works. However, the field has matured beyond
that stage, and the deployment of particular affordances for user agency is now a
stylistic choice carefully manipulated over the course of a user’s experience to facilitate
the goals of narrative system designers. The text of the rest of this chapter is mostly a
reprint of Harrell & Zhu’s paper “ Agency Play: Dimensions of Agency for Interactive
Narrative Design” [84], presented at the AAAI 2009 Spring Symposium on Interactive
Narrative Technologies II.
Long before being adopted in the digital media theory, apprehending the concept
of agency has been a central challenge in various disciplines including philosophy
subverts the established conventions and expectations of reading.
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and anthropology, as well as political activism and critical cultural theory. The
focus here is addressing a set of theories that allows us to scrutinize user agency
in relation to the digital technologies (computers, algorithms, etc) that go hand-in-
hand with it. The work of Andrew Pickering in the sociology of scientific knowledge
influences us in its distinction between human and material agency, articulation of a
“dance” between them, and focus upon a type of user agency as knowledge of how
to perform manipulations in a particular conceptual system (e.g. how to perform
elementary algebra manipulations) [173]. The actor-network theory of Michel Callon
and Bruno Latour has been influential in our practice in the way it incorporates both
human and non-human actors [124]. Furthermore, in her review of various accounts of
agency, Laura M. Ahearn identifies three major trends of which the concept has been
conceptualized over the past few decades, namely “agency as free will,” “equating
agency with resistance” and “the absence of agency”[4]. Although the prevailing view
in the domain of interactive narrative aligns itself with the first trend, the recent years
have witnessed increasing number of experiments drawn on the other two accounts.
The end of this section proposes an approach to agency that is situated in particular
social and narrative contexts and lends itself to a range of expressive applications in
interactive narrative works.
5.2.1 A Dance of Agency
Andrew Pickering focuses on a duality that he describes as existing between “human
agency” and “material agency” [173]. Human agency centers upon the intentionality
(aboutness) and actions taken by humans upon the world. In particular, as he is
interested in the types of agency exhibited by scientists in the practice of knowledge
production. He describes human disciplinary agency, recognizing and knowing how
to use/perform “a series of manipulations within an established conceptual system.”
In contrast, Pickering also describes “material agency” as the idea that the world is
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“continually doing things, things that bear upon us not as disembodied intellects but
as forces upon material beings.” It is a view that sees science as an array of forces
that humans typically apprehend through the use of machines. Pickering defines a
“dance of agency” as the process where humans attempt to apprehend the agency of
the material world through the mediation of artifacts, and that material world both
yields to, and resists, human apprehension. Despite his focus on scientific practice,
the notion that there are symmetrical notions of human and material agency engaged
in a dialectical dance parallels our constructs of human agency and system agency in
AI and interactive narrative practices.
5.2.2 Agency as Free Will
The prevailing approach to user agency in interactive narrative systems treats the
term as synonymous with users’ free will. A straightforward example of such a
treatment occurs in rhetoric of free spatial navigation, where a user is allowed to
explore digital environments at will, without being bound to visit locations in an
order predefined by author. Such environments include map locations in video games
or text-based interactive fiction (IF) labyrinths. In describing such environments,
critics often describe possibilities of spatial exploration as cases of user agency. In
articulating different categories of interactive narrative, literary theorist Marie-Laure
Ryan captures this conception of agency in her description of works providing what
she terms “internal-exploratory interactivity” [181]. She describes these as systems
where “the user exercises her agency by moving around the fictional world, picking
up objects and looking at them, viewing the action from different points of view,
investigating a case, and trying to reconstitute events that have taken place a long
time ago.”
The above examples refer to a user’s capacity to take actions and observe their
results. As Ahearn reminds us, this capacity is deeply connected to what philosophers
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call action theory in that each of the above examples requires certain concomitant
mental states, such as “intention” [33] and “presence of the self” [192]. As action
theorist Segal puts it “[h]itting a ball is an action, falling down a flight of stairs is
not. A theory of action seeks, among other things, to explain the distinctions we
make.” Increasingly powerful hardware and more robustly interactive software have
allowed designers to explore the decisions users can make at will in forms unimaginable
to early-day developers. For example, in the Xbox game Star Wars: Knights of the
Old Republic, the way a player controls her character through the story determines
its moral disposition (whether it aligns with the light or dark side of the force), the
set of new skills it can learn, as well as the branches of storyline which will be taken
[132].
However, an unchecked focus on free will may lead to unanticipated, and largely
undesirable (though perhaps also transgressive) consequences. In massively multi-
player online role-playing games (MMORPG), grief players perform actions not to
advance game goals or for narratively oriented fulfillment, but to intentionally ag-
gravate and harass other players. They kill other players, steal weapons and coins,
and even form virtual mafia, all in the pursuit of their own enjoyment and free will
version of “agency.”
The example of griefers echoes Ahearn’s warning to us. “The main weakness in
treating agency as a synonym for free will,” she argues, “is that such an approach
ignores or only gives lip service to the social nature of agency and the pervasive
influence of culture on human intentions, beliefs, and actions.” When adopted in the
domain of interactive narrative, this pitfall often transforms into the over amplification
of users’ freedom to act however they want, while overlooking the importance of
meaningful constraints and conditions in the context of the story.
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5.2.3 Agency as Resistance
“Agency as resistance” characterizes many works in feminist theory and subaltern
studies, in which traditions of social resistance of the past and present are called
into attention. Many feminist theorists agree that, in order to demonstrate agency, a
person must resist the hegemonic patriarchal status quo [1]. This form of oppositional
agency has gradually been adopted by some users/artists/hackers of digital worlds.
In 1999 Sonya Roberts released her Female Skin Pack Excerpts, a series of female
texture map for the original Quake avatars, because the game designers neglected to
provide a female protagonist. The eerie composition of a female skin on a muscular
male figure embodied a form of resistance to power.
Oppositional agency also finds its way through the voices of “protesters” in virtual
environment. Second Life users have successfully pressed their developer Linden Labs
to alter the regulations in the Internet-based 3D virtual world in various cases, most
prominently two events in 2003: a virtual tax revolt and agitation to allow people to
retain IP rights. It is useful to include such notions of agency because they relate
user action to broader social, political, and cultural contexts both within and outside
of the story worlds of particular interactive narrative (and related) systems.
5.2.4 Absence of Agency
Another approach to agency is well articulated by Michel Foucault’s work on power
[60, 61]. An extreme reading of Foucault is that omnipresent impersonal discourses so
thoroughly pervade society that no room is left for anything that might be regarded
as agency, oppositional or otherwise [4]. After playing some games produced by Ian
Bogost’s company Persuasive Games, such as Airport Insecurity and Disaffected!, it
is difficult not to question the existence of agency, both inside the games and out,
when a user is pushed to accomplish tasks either specified by game mechanics or more
pervasive commercial bureaucracy and protocol in real life.
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5.3 Agency Play as an Expressive Tool
In light of the above, our notion of agency needs to reconcile valuable insights pro-
vided by the various perspectives on agency. Any unilateral definition of agency
is inadequate. An actor’s agency is mediated through situated rules and resources.
Structuration theory addresses such negotiation between social structures and human
actions. Her actions are simultaneously constrained and enabled by the very social
structures that those actions serve to reinforce or reconfigure [70, 4]. As Ahearn
proposes, agency refers to the socio-culturally mediated capacity to act. In digital
environments, a user’s power to take meaningful actions is mediated through the
structure provided by the computational system as well as the socially situated in-
terpretation of actions rendered by the user. A system’s capacity to afford certain
actions, impose certain constraints, and reward certain behaviors clearly has great ef-
fect on user’s agency. Even though games such as Shenmue are often accompanied by
strong rhetoric that a player can do anything they like and their actions will impact
the gameplay, the system structure imposes a strong value system that shapes the
player’s agency, which, in turn, may reinforce or allow for critique of that structure.
User agency is thus situated materially in the system affordances and interpretively
in the context of use.
User agency also provides an aesthetic experience and needs to be appropriate
to its narrative context. A user’s capacity to act and make distinction does not
necessarily entail narrative consistency. Fortunately, the area of interactive narrative
is largely comprised of works that incorporate what Murray [154] calls the balance
between “dramatic structure” and “player freedom”[138, 78]. Aspects of agency that
have been commonly underexplored, however, include the ways that dynamically
changing the scope, nature, and degree of user agency during execution can serve the
expressive goals of an interactive narrative work. As a form of cultural production,
interactive narratives are created by human authors to convey meaning. What is
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significant sometimes is not what the story is, but rather how the story is told. The
use of agency is one of the channels for digital authors to express themselves.
An equally expressive use is to limit or even temporarily eliminate user agency
to convey a certain message, such as the sense of confinement or helplessness. Such
strategy nevertheless could be risky because historically the lack of agency, as freewill
in particular, has been associated with the computational simplicity of the system
or deficiency of the design. The use of cut-scenes in video games is a good example.
For decades the game industry has incorporated cut-scenes where user freedom is
temporarily suspended. Although scholars have pointed out the narrative utility
of non-interactive cut-scenes, e.g., to advance plot and introduce characters [108],
recent trends encourage designers to incorporate player interaction in these cut-scenes
regardless of its content, for example in the introduction scene of Half Life 2. It is
sometimes easy to forget that the power of narrative systems is to provide units
of meaningful work, not mechanical interaction [14]. As argued in the rest of the
chapter, computational techniques can be used to tune user agency according to the
story context.
5.3.1 Agency Play
Agency play engages multiple aspects of agency during runtime in expressive ways
that reinforce the authorially intended meanings of the narrative. Agency play is not
merely strategically limiting user control. It focuses on leveraging the relationship
between the user and system in order to create a story world that is meaningful
and engaging for users to participate in. Incorporation of a range of agency effects in
interactive narrative is similar to the step that film makers took last century when they
discovered that camera angle, framing, and take length were all effective storytelling
mechanisms, not just coincidental properties of the medium. This section defines






Figure 25: Dimensions of Agency (Arrows Indicate the Direction of Influence)
Accordingly, this section offers the following layers of agency play, each of which
can be used expressively to convey meaning:
• Agency Relationship: User actions and system actions operate in relation to one
another and can vary in relative magnitude and degree of dependency on one
another (e.g. an inverse relationship or independent operation).
• Agency Scope: Results of either user or system actions may have immediate
and local impact (e.g. turning a character left or right) or longer term and less
immediately apparent results (e.g. a series of actions may determine narrative
structure itself).
• Agency Dynamics : The relationship between possible user and system actions,
and their scopes, can vary dynamically during runtime.
• User Input Direction: The user may establish a pattern of input that directs
agency dynamics and/or agency scope.
Figure 25 illustrates how the dimensions of agency relate to each other and how
each dimension mediates the ones below it. The dimension of User Input Direction is
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separated graphically because it directs the deployment of effects of the levels below
it, but is not itself constituted by the layers below it. These layers below are meant
to provide a vocabulary for more precisely describing such varying types of agency,
and how they can be manipulated toward expressive effects.
5.3.2 Agency Relationship
Agency relationship is the fundamental dimension of agency play, and refers to a
function, always situated in a particular context, describing the relative magnitude
of and dependence relationship existing between:
• a set of actions allowed (by the system) to be executed by a user
• a set of actions allowed to be executed by the system.
• user desire or need to perform actions,
• user sense of meaningful possible actions, and
• a range of possible user interpretations of actions.
Focus is given to the first two aspects of the function above, with the understand-
ing that the latter three aspects determine the expressive qualities of the agency
relationship. Relative magnitude refers to the relative degree of possible user actions
to system imposed constraints, especially constraints upon actions that would usually
be enacted by the user in the story world.
Dependence between player and system control over actions operate vary greatly.
Primary models include cases where user and system agency are 1) independent,
2) inversely dependent, 3) interdependent. Of course, standard characters that are
transparently controllable by a human player and characters that are controlled solely
by the system operate independently. Independent user agency in interactive narra-
tive works usually refers to the ability of the player to take meaningful actions in a
story world. The ability to cause a character to move, acquire artifacts, and interact
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with other players or non-player characters (NPC) reflects this sense of player agency.
Yet, user agency can also operate along dimensions outside of the story world such
as in-game camera control. The “meaningfulness” of player actions most often arises
from the degree to which a player’s actions express intentionality, or aboutness, in
the story world, and the ability of player determined actions to affect the world and
progress in a narrative. Thus, control over character actions that do not have any
significant narrative effect are commonly described as providing the player with a
low degree of agency. Simultaneously, moving a camera in a proper way may reveal
to the player a necessary object in the game world for progressing the narrative, an
example in which a non-story world action provides a meaningful story world result.
As argued above, the notion of meaningful agency relies upon situated construal of
possible user actions.
Independent system agency can refer to narration of the system as being capable of
autonomously carrying out human-like actions. For example, Rafael Perez’s system
MEXICA has been described as an automatic storytelling system[168]. MEXICA
itself exhibits system agency by doing the “telling.”2
The IMPROV system by Ken Perlin and Athomas Goldberg, which was devel-
oped to allow for the scripting of semi-autonomous characters that expressed their
own behavior-driven goals and states, provides a good case with which to describe
inverse dependence [171]. For example, one could say that the more an Improv-based
character can take action in a story world without direction of a player, the more
system agency and less player agency is exhibited. The 2005 strategy game Civiliza-
tion IV, on the other hand, represents a different correlation. When the agency of
the player increases in the game as she or he gains more resources (money, weapon,
technology, etc), so does agency of the system because it controls more non-player
2Pérez y Pérez himself does not always deploy such intentional narratives in articulating
the system’s operation, describing it as a model for producing story frameworks in his website
www.rafaelperezyperez.com/MEXICA.
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characters (NPCs) with increased capability, and the system must coordinate a more
complicated set of game world events at large. This represents a type of interdepen-
dence. Likewise, a system could implement a subset of playable characters that are
semi-autonomous, requiring only high level direction from a player. In this case the
control of character action also displays an interdependent relationship. All three
types of dependency articulated above are meant only to sketch useful points along
a range of possibilities, rather than to exhaustively list every possible type of depen-
dence between user and system control of situated action.
5.3.3 Agency Scope
The concept of agency scope describes the impact and narrative focus of user and
system actions, ranging from immediate and local impact, such as spatial navigation
ability, to less immediately apparent but more global results, such as shaping the
narrative structure itself. Either side of the agency scope spectrum can be used
effectively to convey meanings in addition to the actual narrative.
We have already seen how Shadow of the Colossus deploys a high degree of local
player agency with a low degree of global player agency to render the sense of fate
and helplessness. An opposite practice can be found in the interactive narrative
documentary Terminal Time [136]. In this work, users only have very low local agency
through the one-dimensional control mechanism (volume of the clapping sound) with
very few multiple choice questions. However, the variability in the generated output
in terms of both media elements invoked and rhetorical model is great. The contrast,
in this case, between low local player agency and high global player agency can be
read as a commentary on pervasive power of ideologies.
5.3.4 Agency Dynamics
The nature of a given agency relationship and the scope of agency impact can vary
over time. In this case, we say that there is a play of agency dynamics. If these
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dynamics are orchestrated in order to express a theme such as the increasing emotional
maturity of a character, then agency play has become an expressive resource varying
according to runtime aesthetic dictates. Stories that contain fixed level of agency
relationship and agency scope throughout runtime, which could be a conscious and
expressive design decision in its own right, have static agency dynamics.
One space to explore the dynamics between player agency and system agency is
through semi-autonomous player characters (SPCs). In the domains of interactive
narrative and gaming, characters are often categorized as player characters (PCs) or
NPCs. PCs are often presented as avatars entirely controlled by players, whereas
NPCs embrace system autonomy and are not usually subject to player command.
Although most characters fall into one or the other category, some incorporate traits
of both. For instance, some PCs may convey their impatience by foot-tapping or
may smile when receiving power-ups. Our current work [221, 220] explores how to
algorithmically adjust agency dynamics in SPCs with a goal to express our view of
the relationship between human and machines(AI). In the Memory, Reverie Machine
project (formerly called the Daydreaming Machine)that is described in the next sec-
tion, both the relationship between player and system agency and their respective
scope level changes as required by the story and character development over time.
5.3.5 User Input Direction
All the above levels of agency can be directed by user input. For example, in Pac-Man
2: The New Adventures the player does not directly control the PC, but can direct
his attention toward certain objects or tasks (which the character sometimes refuses).
This is used expressively to provide a sense of personality to the player character, at
the same time as providing a necessary constraint on possible actions. In Terminal
Time, described above, the player interaction to determine the slant (e.g. feminist or
techno-centric) is minimal, the audience collectively answers a set of multiple choice
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questions. However, the user input is what offers players the strong sense of global
agency in the piece.
The model presented above is a preliminary effort to carefully present a model of
agency that includes often overlooked agency phenomena, towards the development of
theory for design of interactive narrative systems. The account of all four dimensions
above certainly is not comprehensive, and the examples do not cover the entire area
of expressive possibilities. Each is an area ripe for further exploration. Our modest
goal here is to present a new approach to considering the role of agency in interactive
narrative works and to provide vocabulary for the discussion.
In this chapter, we have introduced the general design concept of “scale of inten-
tionality” that explores the use of system intentionality to convey meaning. Special
attention was paid to one particular instantiation of this design concept, agency play,
in the domain of interactive narratives. First, critical attention has been called to
certain narrow understanding of agency in interactive narratives. After raising the
construct of system agency, this chapter has presented several socially situated defini-
tions of agency in contrast with a popular perception of concept as simply free will. In
opposition to a subsequent common assumption of “the more agency the better,” this
chapter argues that narrative agency is contextually situated, distributed between the
player and system, and mediated through user interpretation of system behavior and
system affordances for user actions. Next, a closer examination of agency allows us to
break it down into four dimensions, whose narrative effects are illustrated through ex-
amples. In addition to agency play, the scale of intentionality can also be manifested
through adjusting the ways in which a character’s disposition is narrated. Various
deployments of scale of intentionality will be further explained in the next chapter in
the context of our interactive narrative system Memory, Reverie Machine.
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CHAPTER VI
MEMORY, REVERIE MACHINE : A CASE STUDY
I wonder if a memory is something you have or something you’ve lost.
— Woody Allen, Another Woman [5], 1988
Intentionality and agency are crucial links that connect an individual’s mental
states to the material world and society around. Actions are certainly a major way
to manifest these constructs, as shown in prior discussions regarding both real life
scenarios and digital simulations in interactive narrative works. Insufficient attention
in the interactive narrative community, however, has been paid to one’s mental and
imaginative activities. Memories, reveries, and daydreams not only are another crucial
locus where one’s beliefs, desires negotiate with the world which they are directed at,
but also offer a rich, expressive domain for artists, writers, and designers to explore.
This chapter resumes the discussion of The Memory, Reverie Machine (formerly
named as Daydreaming Machine)(MRM ), a text-based interactive narrative work co-
developed with Fox Harrell, from the introduction chapter (Section 1.4). MRM was
built on Harrell’s theoretical framework for imaginative multimedia discourse [81, 82]
and technical framework for interactive and generative discourse instantiated in the
GRIOT system (Section 2.4.2). The author of this dissertation has contributed the
narrative content and several technical extensions to GRIOT, necessary for MRM.
Our major goal for the project is two-fold, one reinforcing another. First, as pri-
marily a conceptual project, MRM at the current stage is designed to illustrate the
design utility of scale of intentionality and agency play. Second, as an expressive
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project, MRM represents our attempt to explore new poetics of computational nar-
ratives that depict characters’ fluid and subjective internal worlds more than actions
[220, 221].
MRM instantiates the design constructs of scale of intentionality and agency play
in numerous ways. Ales starts as an avatar with very low levels of narrated inten-
tionality (e.g., agency, emotion, desires, etc.) completely under user’s control. As
the story progresses, the system dynamically retrieves memories triggered by Ales’s
encounter of different events, objects, and actors, and computes his belief-system and
emotional state. If the recollected memories converge to a coherent personality, Ales’s
system intentionality increases and he will act autonomously and ignore user’s com-
mands contradictory to his belief-system. These memories could also be fragmented,
triggering one another and leaving him in a state of confusion and hesitance. The
emotional state is used to generate affective descriptions of the world through the
computational-cognitive approach to conceptual blending [54, 81].
As we have seen, memory-building is the major means of character formation in
the stories generated by MRM. Ales’s rich mental activities and affective dispositions
contrast with his mundane actions. The loose plot structure and emphasis on char-
acters’ internal world echo traits of the Modernist stream of consciousness literature,
a major inspiration of MRM.
Furthermore, MRM is an initial step towards a critical commentary on an in-
dividual’s agency in society. The previous chapter has demonstrated that different
approaches lend themselves to distinctive social and political practices. Agency play
and the scale of intentionality, hence, seek to offer new means to commentate on a
wide range of negotiation and struggle between an individual and her socialization
practice, an important component of one’s lived experiences. In MRM, the power
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relation and proportion between user and system agency vary dynamically to high-
light a wide spectrum between the human-leader-computer-follower to computer-as-
an-autonomous-entity model. Between the two extremes, is what Lewis may call a
multi-dominance interaction model between human and computer [129]. Hence, the
project can be used as a platform to explore themes such as control, resistance, and
dis/empowerment.
MRM is built on a unique interdisciplinary framework that combines AI, cog-
nitive science, and stream-of-consciousness literature tradition. This chapter begins
with locating a nexuses of concerns we address. Section 6.1 traces the historical lin-
eage of intersections and divergences between AI, cognitive science, and literature
sketched above, highlighting a convergence of concerns that gives Memory, Reverie
Machine particular salience now. Antecedents to MRM in influential and experimen-
tal literature and electronic literature are also discussed. Section 6.2 illustrates the
ways in which the design principles of “scale of intentioanlity” and “agency play”
are embodied in MRM. Finally, Section 6.3 describes the major components of the
system, and how they contribute to the overall goal of the system. The following text
is based on our presentation “Narrating Artificial Daydreams, Memories, Reveries:
Toward Scalable Intentionality in Expressive Artificial Intelligence Practice” at the
2008 Electronic Literature Organization Conference [221] and a paper under the same
title which has been submitted for publication.
6.1 Motivation and Historical Context
“Stream of consciousness” is a psychological term that William James coined in his
1890 text The Principles of Psychology [107]. The term was later applied to works by
various modernist writers such as Dorothy Richardson, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf,
and William Faulkner, indicating both their literary techniques and the genre itself.
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Beyond various formal experiments, stream of consciousness literature reflects a con-
ceptual purpose — to use the internal thoughts as a primary way of depicting fictional
characters. As Humphrey puts it in his remarkable study in Stream of Consciousness
in the Modern Novel [103], the works under this genre replace the motivation and
action of the “external man” with the psychic existence and functioning of the “inter-
nal man.” A passage from Virginia Woolf’s 1925 novel Mrs. Dalloway well captures
some key characteristics of this literary tradition:
... so that should she be very old she would still remember and make it
jangle again among her memories how she had walked through Regent’s
Park on a fine summer’s morning fifty years ago. For she was only nineteen
and had got her way at last, to come to London; and now how queer it
was, this couple she had asked the way of, and the girl started and jerked
her hand...
Decades have passed since the heyday of stream of consciousness literature and
many works associated with this literary experiment have entered the canon of “high”
literature. Their approach to human subjectivity and focus on pre-speech conscious-
ness nevertheless are still relevant to many recent technologies (e.g., AI), theories
(e.g., cognitive linguistics), and forms (e.g., computational narrative). These younger
developments, in their own ways, have taken the modernist writers’ steps further in
ways described below. Our goal of narrating memory, reverie, and daydreaming com-
putationally in a new form of polymorphic fiction requires an in-depth understanding
of the synergy among these fields.
This section first discusses the motivation for choosing computationally generated
memories, reveries and daydreams, which will be referred to as the imaginative con-
tent, as one of the major themes of MRM. Our motivation is situated in the context
the synergistic connections between stream-of-consciousness literature, AI and cogni-
tive science research. Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 hence are devoted to such connections
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and their implications to MRM. We believe that the theory, content, and form we
present below have collided in this work in a way that is charged at this historical mo-
ment where scientists of the mind provide a new lens on modernist literary concerns
and where computation provides a new means for engaging both.
6.1.1 Machine Memories, Reveries and Daydreams
Scientific communities have had varying takes on human subjectivity and pre-speech
thoughts like memories and daydreaming. Positivist views of science holding sway
during much of the modernist period devalued such phenomena as unobservable and
therefore unscientific. Later, artificial intelligence researchers, reliant upon a “com-
puter as brain” metaphor, focused on internal thought, but only of the mathematically
grounded sort amenable to the language of computation. This perspective was car-
ried through to the early days of the interdisciplinary enterprise of cognitive science.
Under such a view, phenomena such as daydreaming must be construed as having a
rational utility amenable to modeling. Not surprisingly, the techniques chosen were
appropriate to rational, conscious thought processes such as planning [152].
It is no wonder then that speculative fiction on this subject matter has considered
human subjective mental phenomena to be the final frontier between AI-powered
machines and mankind. Indeed, speculative fiction characters such as the androids
David and Gigolo Joe in the film A.I. Artificial Intelligence [199], Lieutenant Com-
mander Data in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation [178], and Roy
Batty in Blade Runner [187] all were constructed to interrogate aspects of human
subjective emotion, aspirations, and dreams. This frontier is well depicted by the
following dialogue from Blade Runner :
Tyrell: Commerce is our goal here at Tyrell. “More human than human”
is our motto. Rachael is an experiment, nothing more. We began to recog-
nize in them strange obsession. After all they are emotional inexperienced
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with only a few years in which to store up the experiences which you and
I take for granted. If we gift them the past we create a cushion or pillow
for their emotions and consequently we can control them better.
Deckard: Memories. You’re talking about memories.
The potential of generating and narrating the imaginative content (e.g., memories
and daydreams) triggered by, and sometimes at odds with the world at hand has not
been fully explored by the electronic literature and interactive narrative communities,
both of which have been profoundly touched in recent years by advances in computer
gaming. Until recently, many gaming oriented works in the fields have focused on
advancing the plot through object acquisition, combat, or puzzle solving, leaving
behind a full range of psychological aspects of the characters.
Informed by the stream-of-consciousness literature, MRM engages such topics
through the narration of memories, daydreams, dispositions, and intentions, all of
which are used to signify system intentionality. It explores the tension between rigid
computational algorithms and fluid human cognitive processes by computationally
generating affective depictions of the story world as well as the character’s internal
world. In summary, MRM foregrounds a dance between user and system intentional-
ity through the stories about a robot character who, similar to Lewis’ Voyager, may
possess human-relatable intentionality and independence. The motivation is to bring
forth novel narrative experiences as well as critical reflections of social and political
conditions, a tradition that has been previously explored by the works of Yoko Ono,
Adrian Piper, and Sol LeWitt.
6.1.2 Stream of Consciousness Literature and AI
The stream of consciousness writing and AI may pose an unlikely match as a subject
of comparative analysis. The two fields not only sprouted in different historical pe-
riods, but also reside in two separate communities. One was populated in the early
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twentieth century and is now associated with academic literary analysis more often
than being seen as vibrant area for active creative production, whereas the other is
an on-going development in the techno-science sphere that underwent significant self-
reevaluation after the two “AI Winters” in the 1970s and 1980s [180]. Beneath the
obvious differences, however, are the similar overarching goals and historical contexts
shared by the two fields.
First, stream of consciousness literature and AI speak to each other through a
shared ambition. Humphrey observed that “[t]he attempt to create human con-
sciousness in fiction is a modern attempt to analyze human nature” [103]. If stream
of consciousness writers sought their answers by portraying humans directly, the AI
community pursued theirs by constructing the “other” — machines. AI practitioner
Michael Mateas recently echoed that “AI is a way of exploring what it means to be
human by building systems” [136]. These systems, built in attempt to resemble or
surpass their human creators, have become our mirrors to reflect upon our identities
as humans [203].
Second, both fields rejected behaviorism in their respective historic periods, and
turned their attentions to what happens internally in human mental activities as gate-
ways to understanding “human nature.” Prior to the turn of the twentieth century,
fictional characters were typically represented by their external behaviors. Writers
carefully crafted their actions, dialogues, and rational thoughts to create distinctive
personas for their stories. What stream of consciousness writers were able to achieve,
in comparison, was to create their characters mainly out of their psychological aspects,
including their buzzing random thoughts and associative trails.
The scientific community from which AI grew out of in the 1950s, in parallel,
was similarly dominated by behaviorism. The paradigm was based on the laws of
stimulus-response and declared itself as the only legitimate scientific inquiry. Mental
constructs such as knowledge, beliefs, goals and reasoning steps were dismissed as
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unscientific “folk psychology” [180]. Part of AI’s contribution was to bring these
scientific taboo back to the table by building powerful computational systems based
on them. For instance, the key AI research topics including reasoning, planning, and
learning, can mostly be seen as efforts to model the correspondent human cognitive
capabilities.
It is also worth pointing out some of the differences between the two areas that
are relevant to our project. Although both look at cognitive phenomena, stream
of consciousness writers and AI practitioners emphasize different stages of human
consciousness. The term “consciousness” from the vantage point of modernist writers
referred to “the whole area of mental processes, including especially the pre-speech
levels.” This was based on James’ original psychological theory, in which “memories,
thoughts, and feelings exist outside the primary consciousness” and, further, that
they appeared, not as a chain, but as a stream, a flow [107]. AI, and GOFAI in
particular, on the other hand, regarded human rationality as the key to problem
solving. Early AI practitioners relied upon the rational and stable operations of our
cognitive processes at the cost of the addressing the roles of the body, affect, and
the uncontrollable stream of thoughts unmediated by logic and rationality. Such
abandoned topics, of course, had been the constant themes under the pens of stream
of consciousness writers.
Another difference between AI and stream of consciousness literature is the conflict
between the former’s the emphasis on generalizability and the latter’s pursuit for
specificity. Modernist writers such as Virginia Woolf firmly believed that an artist’s
and writer’s mission was to express her private vision of reality, life and subjectivity.
Woolf’s characters in her various novels, such as Clarissa Dalloway, Mrs. Ramsay, and
Lily Briscoe, all embodied her belief in an individual’s unique search of meaning and
identification [103]. This individualistic approach contrasts strongly with AI’s focus
on generalizability, in which individual differences are often sacrificed for regularity
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and scalability.
The previous two differences impose challenges to the development of MRM. In
order to address the first difference, MRM attempts to complement both traditions
through deploying AI algorithmic works to narrate imaginative (instead of purely
logical) cognitive experiences such as of memory, reveries, and daydreams. As for the
second, we reconcile these two stances by distancing our work from an attempt to
reduce mental activities to uniform formal algorithmic processes. Instead, our project
utilizes scientific computational methods, including logical/mathematical formaliza-
tion, as a way to express our human search for meaning.
6.1.3 Stream of Consciousness Literature and Cognitive Linguistics
The pre-speech level of thought that was neglected by the AI community has been
scrutinized again recently in a new field closely built, in part, upon AI: cognitive sci-
ence. To contemporary cognitive linguists, such as Gilles Fauconnier, George Lakoff,
Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner, this neglected land of consciousness holds the ba-
sis for our basic conceptual, and even literary, thought [54, 51, 118]. “Language is
only the tip of a spectacular cognitive iceberg, and when we engage in any language
activity, be it mundane or artistically creative, we draw unconsciously on vast cogni-
tive resources, call up innumerable models and frames, set up multiple connections,
coordinate large arrays of information, and engage in creative mappings, transfers,
and elaborations,” we are reminded by Fauconnier and Turner [54].
Beneath the tip of this iceberg is what Fauconnier calls “backstage cognition”
[52], defined as “the intricate mental work of interpretation and inference that takes
place outside of consciousness” [54]. Thus, we could say that cognitive linguists
cite phenomena that are even below the unarticulated thought phenomena explored
by stream of consciousness authors. Fauconnier sites a range of results in cogni-
tive science to support his conjecture that many cognitive phenomena are rooted in
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backstage cognition: “viewpoints and reference points, figure-ground / profile-base
/ landmark-trajectory organization, metaphorical, analogical, and other mappings,
idealized models, framing, construal, mental spaces, counterpart connections, roles,
prototypes, metonymy, polysemy, conceptual blending, fictive motion, force dynam-
ics” [52].
It may be argued that one of the reasons that early AI largely confined itself to the
territory of rationality is the extreme difficulty that the field ran into in its attempt
to model common sense and contextual reasoning explicitly. These powerful, but for
the most part invisible, operations are seen within the field of cognitive linguistics
to be partially observable in the structure of our linguistic creations. The challenges
posed by the cognitive linguistics enterprise offer the opportunity to revisit some of
the compromises that AI made in its early stage.
6.1.4 Challenges of Engaging Legacy Forms
In forging this bond between stream of consciousness literature, AI, and cognitive
science, we are sensitive to a common trend in computing, that is, trying to prove
its triumphs by taking on tasks that seem to be humanly creative in ways that are
highly esteemed culturally. Examples include composing music like Mozart [28], play-
ing chess better than a grandmaster [102], or completing complex mathematical proofs
[126]. Likewise, we are aware the literature is often viewed in academic disciplines as
a succession of movements, tastes, trends, and techniques. Stream of consciousness
literature holds a special status in the canon of English literature and therefore im-
poses unique challenges when used as an inspiration for this computational narrative
project. When engaging legacy forms, authors are inevitably put in dialogue with the
original works’ historic contexts, social statuses, political agendas, etc. The following
clarifies our project’s position in relation to this set of modernist literature works.
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Our aim in referencing stream of consciousness writing is not to inherit its high-
brow status or to prove the effectiveness of the authors’ system by tackling the
“greats” of literature. Nor is it a sign of indifference to more recent modes of lit-
erary cultural production. The reason for paying homage to this particular literary
form is that it offers critical insights into the AI practice and expressive platform
to deploy cognitive science research results. Engaging a legacy form in a different
medium requires more than mere translation. The intent of our project is not to
generate texts similar to texts by stream of consciousness writers that can “fool”
the reader or pass a type of “stream of consciousness writing Turing test.” Instead,
we intend to establish a new aesthetic form that calls critical attention to the is-
sues of embodiment, affect, intentionality, and being through internal reflection and
imaginative processes.
6.1.5 Related Works
Before we turn fully to our new developments, we call attention to our antecedents.
MRM speaks to a variety of literary and technical approaches to narratives, such as
modernist and avant-garde literature (e.g., stream of consciousness literature, exper-
iments by members of the Oulipo group), algorithmically generated computational
narrative systems typically developed in the field of computer science (e.g., Meehan’s
Talespin [142], Scott Turner’s MINSTREL [207], and Bringsjord and Ferrucci’s BRU-
TUS [19]), and the broader domain of interactive narrative (e.g., interactive fiction
works, and video games).
The discussion at this section narrows down to several computational and interac-
tive narrative systems that are specifically related to MRM either at the content (e.g.,
daydreams and reveries) or the discourse level (e.g., system agency and intentional-
ity). Two computer science based systems are discussed first with their close focus
on daydreaming. Next, we will examine two interactive narrative works especially
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regarding their use of system agency.
6.1.5.1 DAYDREAMER
Erick T. Mueller’s program DAYDREAMER [152] bears a close resemblance to MRM
as both systems algorithmically generate narratives that can be read as daydreams
and reveries. DAYDREAMER takes as input the description of a situation, such
as an accidental encounter of a movie star, and produces daydreams “spontaneously
recalling or imagining personal or vicarious experiences in the past or future” [153].
Mueller and Dyer provided several daydreams which their theory of computational
daydream intends to model. Two sample daydreams based on empirical data are
included below with their initial situation:
Last night I went alone to the Nuart Theater to see a film. This actress
whom I’ve always had a crush on also came alone and happened to sit
down near me. I recognized her and started a conversation. At one point,
she mentioned the obviously well-known director of the film we were about
to see and I didn’t know the name. I was embarrassed. I finally asked
her if she’d like to go have a drink after the film. She said she had other
plans.
Daydream 1:
I feel embarrassed for not knowing who the director was. I should’ve
pretended to know who the director was. In the future I’ll read up on the
film before I go.
Daydream 2:
I’m disappointed that she didn’t want to go out with me. I imagine that
she accepted my offer and we soon become a pair. When she has to do a
film in France, I leave my job and travel there with her. As we continue
173
to travel, my career suffers. I become unhappy and feel unfulfilled. She
loses interest in me, because I have nothing to offer her. It’s good that
I didn’t get involved with her, because it would’ve led to disaster. I feel
less disappointed that she turned me down.
These samples underline daydreams’ cognitive and psychological utilities, namely,
rationalization, revenge, failure/success reversal, and preparation. DAYDREAMER
is essentially a planning system that generates plot units achieve a certain control
goal specified both by an emotion state and a personality model. For instance, a plan
for rationalization is employed in Daydream 2 in order to achieve the rationalization
control goal activated by the emotion of disappointment resulting from being rejected
by the actress.
The planning-based approach, on the other hand, is at odds with MRM ’s aes-
thetic and conceptual goals. Widely as it is adopted in computational narrative
research [177], the planning-based approach leaves a strong impact over the narra-
tives it produces. From the first computational narrative system implemented with
a planning algorithm, Tale-spin [142], stories generated along this line often have a
noticeably goal-driven and action-based flavor, echoing their underlying algorithmic
processes. This aesthetics imposes an antithesis to MRM ’s aim of generating fluid
and loosely structured narratives, preceded in stream-of-consciousness literature. In
MRM, daydreams, memories, and reveries are not goal oriented, but rather reflect
the protagonist’s subjective and floating internal thoughts.
Furthermore, the goal-driven behavior entailed by planning-based system is cul-
turally associated with the cold “machineness.” The AI cultural icons, such as DATA
from TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation, or HAL from Kubrick’s 2001: A
Space Odyssey, all unmistakably display traces of planning-based behavior (e.g., play-
ing chess [137]), which is used to indicate their differences from, if not inferiority to,
human. The concept of system intentionality, however, intends to complicate the
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simplistic distinction between human and machine. Avoiding the usage of planning
in MRM therefore is not only to explore new narrative styles, but also to limit the
cultural connotation associated with it.
6.1.5.2 Visual-Daydreamer
Pérez y Pérez et al’s recent program Visual-Daydreamer [170] provides an alternative
approach to daydreaming generation. Based on Pérez y Pérez’s engagement-reflection
model [167], daydreaming is implemented as the engagement or generation phase, that
is, the current state of the story is used as a cue to retrieve possible actions from the
library of pre-authored story snippets. In other words, the essence of daydreaming
here is not the narrative itself, but the open-ended process of generating it. MRM, in
comparison, focuses both the underlying generative mechanism and the presentation
of the daydream and memory components in the narrative.
Unlike the standard planning systems such as DAYDREAMER, which generate
a sequence actions that connect an initial state and a predefined desired end state,
Visual-Daydreamer only contains a start state and hence produces unpredictable and
loosely coherent stories that are reminiscent of daydreams. A daydream example
provided by the authors is below:
A attacks B




MRM shares Visual-Daydreamer ’s approach to construct daydreams based on simi-
larity. In the case of the latter, similarity is drawn at the story context level — which
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existing story in the library has similar context as the current state of the story. Cur-
rently, MRM retrieves memories and daydreams based on similarity of story content
(e.g., themes, topics, ideas, and objects) through annotated keywords. It is our plan
to further explore daydream and memory retrieval using analogy-based approaches.
6.1.5.3 Violet
Jeremy Freese’s Violet, the first place winner of the 14th annual Interactive Fiction
Competition, offers a good example of the use of system intentionality as the main
theme of narrative. Its plot line is that the protagonist, an easily distracted graduate
student, needs to complete 1,000 words in his dissertation in order to win back his
girlfriend, Violet, who is frustrated by his slow progress. Compared with other well-
acclaimed IF works such as Adam Cadre’s Photopia (1998) and Emily Short’s Galatea
(2001), the goal of Violet seems straightforward and clearly stated from the very
beginning. However, the way to achieve this goal is no less puzzling than the earlier IF-
based adventure games — every time the user issues the command “write,” obstacles
or distractions always occur and prevent the protagonist from doing so. The challenge
of the user is to figure out ways to resolve the obstacles and block distractions so that
the protagonist can move ahead in his writing, as shown from the below excerpt (the
story is narrated using the voice of Violet):
> write
You’re standing. You’ve been pacing most of the morning, stewing about
our fight last night.
I don’t myself see why one can’t type just as easily standing up as sitting
down, but you are adamant that you can only focus enough to write
seriously if you are seated.
> sit down
Okay. You are seated at your desk and ready to go. Just write!
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> write
Unfortunately, with all the pacing about and ruminating, you’ve been
here over two hours but haven’t actually opened your word processor yet.
> open word processor
As you move your hand to open the word processor, you look briefly at
the tattoo on the back of your hand.
Open. Chapter 3 of your dissertation awaits. You can do it!
> write
You start trying to focus on the screen and type, but you are very tired. I
realise that you hardly slept last night between being all worked up from
our fight and then being banished to the dodgy futon in our living room.
Still. I know you won’t let a little grogginess stop you. You are deter-
mined. For us! You look again at the tattoo on the back of your hand for
inspiration.
The battle between the system’s intentionality, manifested as the protagonist’s de-
sire to pursue his distractions, and the user’s intentionality to make him write the
dissertation, among other features of Violet, distinguishes it from similar IF works.
Far from simply a formal experiment of a semi-autonomous player character (Section
5.3.4), the split of control over the protagonist between the system and the user plays
a narrative role. It represents the two conflicting aspirations simultaneously present
in the protagonist’s character.
6.1.5.4 Lost One
The presence of both user and system intentionality is a step towards a scale of in-
tentionality. Next, a mechanism that can modulate system intentionality is needed.
Although not specifically geared towards modulating intentionality and agency, Nick
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Montfort’s work [149] on computationally manipulate narrative discourse is of par-
ticular relevance. Built upon Genette’s seminal work in narratology [68], his work
developed a formal theory of narrative variations in the context of IF, natural lan-
guage generation, and computational linguistics.
Montfort’s IF work Lost One [149, pp.125-29] is an interactive narrative piece
whose discourse can be adjusted to demonstrate a varying level of narrative distance,
that is, how immediate a story is narrated. It is of particular relevance to MRM be-
cause both works seek to gain finer grained control of narrative at the discourse level,
regardless whether the end goal is narrative distance or system intentionality/agency.
This scalability is very different from Violet, where the level of system intentionality
remains unchangeable.
In Lost One, the narrative distance is represented along a number of dimensions.
In order to increase the distance, for instance, the system may 1) insert distancing
phrases (e.g., “It appeared that,” and “It was as if”), 2) switch the time of nar-
rating from simultaneous with to subsequent to the events (i.e., from the present
to the past tense), 3) reorder the chronicle order of events to other less immediate
temporary order (e.g., retrograde, and random), and 4) switch from second person
(“you”) narration to third person (“the visitor”). Some of these methods are closely
related to MRM. As shown in Section 6.2.1, the perspective from which the story is
narrated plays an important role in suggesting the scale of intentionality in MRM
— a story narrated from the protagonist’s personal and affective perspective implies
higher system intentionality than one told from an objective narrator’s point of view.
The following two excerpts demonstrate the difference in their narrative distances,
achieved mainly through the use of random temporary order, and third person nar-
ration:
Example 1:
You look at the center of the plaza.
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Your senses are humming as you view the broad, circular, encircling Plaza
of the Americas. The morning has concluded. It is midday now.
From here, you see in the distance a statue and a flaneur to the north, a
fountain to the east, a trash collector to the southwest, a ball and a boy
to the northeast, an obelisk to the south, and some punk and a tree to
the west.
The flaneur goes to the northern area.
The punk kicks the tree.
The boy throws the ball.
The trash collector picks up something.
The ball falls to the ground.
Example 2 (increased narrative distance):
The flaneur went to the eastern area, perhaps.
Then, the punk conveyed herself to the southern area, if memory serves.
Then, the visitor looked at the center of the plaza.
Her senses were humming as the visitor viewed the broad, circular, encir-
cling Plaza of the Americas. No doubt, the morning had concluded. It
was midday then.
From there, the visitor saw in the distance the statue to the north, the
flaneur, the trash collector, and the fountain to the east, the trash collec-
tor to the southwest, the boy to the northeast, the obelisk and the punk
to the south, and the punk and the tree to the west.
Then, the trash collector took something.
Before that, the boy took the ball, or so it seemed.
Before that, the visitor walked to the center of the plaza.
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Lost One also engages expressive use of system agency (and hence system inten-
tionality). The overall story is that the protagonist is waiting for a friend in a plaza.
The user can choose to stay put, which will remain the narration at its low narrative
distance. If the user, on the other hand, directs the protagonist to move around in the
plaza, the narrative distance increases, indicated by the above mentioned methods.
At any point the user can stop to stay put, which will decrease the narrative distance
gradually. However, if the user keeps moving, the system will suddenly eliminate her
agency in the story and leave the protagonist wandering about at random under its
own control. Compared to MRM, the balance between system and user agency here is
reversed all at once. In terms of scale of intentionality, Lost One represents a binary
case where the agency either resides completely in the user or in the system, whereas
MRM intends to provide a finer-grained scale between these two extremes, paralleling
Lost One’s goal to modulate narrative distance.
6.2 Deployment of “Scale of Intentionality” and “Agency
Play”
MRM is designed specifically to explore the new narrative possibilities brought forth
by scale of intentionality and agency play, both of which were described in Chapter
5. In a nutshell, MRM intents to construct various levels of system intentionality
through independently adjusting the following aspects of its main character Ales: 1)
the amount of user’s control of Ales, 2) the amount of the imaginative content (e.g.,
memories, reveries and daydreams Ales retrieves), and 3) the perspective from which
the stories are narrated. This section discusses the specific ways in which these design
principles are incorporated in the system, and illustrates the particular uses through
three examples at the end of this section.
6.2.1 Main Indicators of System Intentionality
MRM currently deploys system intentionality at the following three levels:
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Action level The design principle of agency play is mainly implemented at this
level. The actions of Ales are overall jointly controlled by both the user and the
system. When emphasizing user’s agency, MRM directs Ales mainly following the
command input from the user. On the other hand, the system will make autonomous
decisions about the main character’s actions, should system agency needs to be high-
lighted. In the intermediate level, Ales may express his different opinions, compu-
tationally derived based his beliefs and desires, but still reluctantly follows user’s
command. Ales is an example of what is previously (Section 5.3.4) defined as the
semi-autonomous player characters (SPC), over which the user’s and the system’s
agency share an inversely dependent relationship. It is straightforward that the more
Ales’s actions are controlled by the system, the higher the system agency and hence
higher system intentionality.
Content Level At the content level, the scale of intentionality is externalized by
the ratio of the amount of main story content to the amount of memories, reveries and
daydreams. Compared to the main story in which the user may decide a substantial
portion of the main character’s actions, the imaginative content is beyond the direct
control of the user at all times. As Section 6.3 will explain in more depth, a piece of
memory or daydream is typically evoked automatically by certain events, objects, and
actors in the narrative, if the current system intentionality surpasses a certain level.
Although the user may impact the artifact or other characters that Ales interactive
with, which in turn triggers certain imaginative contents, she does not have direct
access to which memories and daydreams that the system will retrieve. In other
words, the process of how certain imaginative contents are generated remains to be
somewhat opaque to the user. As the system evokes more imaginative content, the
system intentionality of the main character therefore increases accordingly.
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Perspective Level As stated earlier, Montfort [149] illustrates the importance of
narrative discourse as a narrative dimension, independent from the narrative’s content
from the vantage point of interactive fiction works. MRM echoes Montfort’s observa-
tion by utilizing the narrative discourse, particularly the perspective from which the
story is narrated, as a third indicator of system intentionality. In MRM, the same
narrative content can be told either from a third person’s perspective with straight-
forward and descriptive tones, or be narrated from the Ales’s perspective signified
with more subjective descriptions and affective dispositions, generated dynamically
by Harrell’s Alloy conceptual blending algorithm (details in Section 2.3.3.2). The
extent to which the system narrates stories from the perspective of Ales, which sug-
gests the main character as an independent character with beliefs, desires and other
intentional mental states, determines the level of system intentional.
Table 10: Indicators of “Scale of Intentionality” in MRM
Level The ratio of
Action level Autonomous actions / user selected actions
Content level Imaginative content / the main narrative
Perspective level Ales’s perspective / third person perspective
6.2.2 Examples of Various Levels of System Intentionality
The above indicators of the scale of intentionality is summarized in Table 6.2.1. The
higher the ratio at each level, the more system intentionality MRM intends to achieve.
Ideally, these levels can be manipulated independently to achieve various effect; how-
ever, the current version of MRM adjust all three levels simultaneously. This means
when a higher level of system intentionality is needed, for example, MRM increases
the ratio at all three levels altogether. In order to discuss the engagement of scale
of intentionality concretely, the rest of this section provides three short examples of
a very similar scenario generated by MRM. Each example includes one iteration of
interaction between the user and the system, and represents a different level on the
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scale of intentionality. Notice a user’s commend is represented in capitalized words.
• Example One: high user intentionality
(ales approached the door. in his visual scan it was painted [red, yellow, blue,
grey, or brown?] ...)
RED
(.)
(he raised his mechanical arm to [knock, open, open gently, punch, or open
carelessly?] the door ...)
• Example Two: high system intentionality
(at the end of a long corridor a door loomed. ales looked up; he decided to see
it as (red, yellow, blue, grey, or brown?) ...)
(blue)
(. it was dusty wood , almost exactly like the one in his mother’s bedroom.)
(the room where he had his first encounter of tune-up and oil change had similar
doors.)
(the oil change left a sickly feeling in his gut)
(he would rust like the tin man before enduring another.)
(he raised his steel arm to [knock, open, open gently, punch, or open carelessly?]
the door...)
• Example Three: joint user and system intentionality
(ales stopped, computed, and moved again to (knock, open, open gently, punch,
or open carelessly?) the door ...)
PUNCH
(The door creaked into an entrance.)
(the funny noise reminds him of)
(the hospitals, the junkyards, he went to frequently)
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(, which was so unpleasant that he always avoided it ever since. ohhh, the same
noise.)
(he paused a bit before he walked in.)
(the bothersome light-colored room looked somewhat like the room he was
born.)
(his disturbingly familiar mother probably had left him quite early.)
(most of his knowledge about her came more from)
(the engineer pointing to the women in pictures)
(his memories of experiences.)
(the things she liked to wear, the way she smiled.)
6.2.2.1 Action Level
In short examples provided above, an immediately noticeable difference is that in
Example 1 and 3 the user is able to determine Ales’s action, whereas the system
acts autonomously in Example 2. As stated earlier, the system’s capacity to act
autonomously is one important indicator of a high level of system intentionality, and
particularly system agency. The rest of the discussion at the action level centers
around different layers of agency (Section 5.3) in MRM.
The scope of impact of user actions, besides their immediate consequences and
longer-range effects on the main story world, can also manifest itself through the
emotional tone of the blends and selection of particular memories episodes, both
determined by the emotional state of Ales. In Example 3, the user directs action to
“punch” the door open does not only allow the main character to enter the room (local
agency), but also inform later interactions related to Ales’s experience in the room
(global) via a history of actions. Furthermore, it also moves Ales’s emotional state into
“anger” (currently implemented using a simple finite state machine, described in 6.3),
which will influence the emotional tone of blends and memories in both immediately
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and in the longer term future. A major distinction between Example 2 and 3 is that
in high level of system intentionality (Example 2), system action is selected based
on Ales’s existing emotional state. In Example 2, Ales happens to be in a “gloomy”
mode, which leads to the choice of “blue” due to the latter’s similar emotional tone.
Once the system reaches very high level of intentionality, MRM will autonomously
choose actions that fits Ales’s emotional state. In a moderate high level, Ales could
refuse to carry on a command issued by the user that is contradiction his emotional
state, or obey the command “reluctantly.”
Although the system is capable of generating highly variable output, certain mo-
ments in the stories are designed to have low global agency in order to achieve ex-
pressive goals. For instance, in another short narrative sequence of the output, the
protagonist SPC is a cleaning robot working in a kitchen. The beginning of the
story offers a great variety of tasks to Ales, and user choice of action results in de-
tailed description of the consequence. As the story continues, and the character gains
more domestic work experience, both the number of options and the level of de-
tails decrease. In one particular moment, the user has to repeatedly choose between
“wiping” a dish and “rubbing” a dish, two closely related actions, yet the outcome re-
mains unchangeable. The aesthetic choice of emphasizing (limited) local agency over
(even more) limited global agency in this particular moment of the narrative is set to
contrast with previously encountered narrative sequences that incorporated a higher
magnitude of user agency relative to system agency. This design decision therefore
conveys the emotional state of the character: boredom with a repetitive daily job, in
addition to a sense of confinement and powerlessness. The sundry moment is meant
to evoke a sense of pathos and meaninglessness while completing a never ending list
of sundry chores.
Different dimensions of agency play are guided by user input direction, i.e. they
are mediated by patterns of user input. A repeated series of user choices reinforces the
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main character’s emotional state and patterns of behavior thus impact the system’s
style of narration, the character’s action performed, the short and long term impact
of actions, and dynamic changes in the degree of user control versus system control.
6.2.2.2 Content Level
As described earlier in this section, the imaginative content including Ales’s memo-
ries, reveries and daydreams is determined by the system, triggered by objects that
appear in the narrative, and is not directly controllable to the user. MRM gen-
erates such imaginative content indirectly based on user’s interaction, such as the
artifacts/characters that she chooses to interact with, and/or dispositions with which
actions are performed (e.g., “punch” vs. “open gently”). At a low level of system
intentionality as in Example 1, the amount of imaginative content is very limited. At
a high level, on the other extreme, cascades of memories and daydreams may trigger
one another and completely take over the main story line.
6.2.2.3 Perspective Level
Examples 1 and 2 also differentiate themselves in terms of the narrative perspec-
tive. It is true that at the first glance both texts were written from the third person
perspective using the pronoun “he” to refer to Ales. However, a closer examination
shows the difference. The narrative in Example 1 is told from an “objective” third
person point of view that emphasizes actions, facts, and consequences, whereas Ex-
ample 2 is comprised of “subjective” memories and “affective” description based on
the “perception” of Ales. In fact, the decision not to use direct first person pronoun
of “I” is to maintain a stylish connection to Woolf’s stream of consciousness works,
which characteristically combines third person voice with highly affective first person
experiences. Readers who are familiar with interactive fiction convention may notice
that the typical second person (“you”) is also avoided, a decision made for the above
reason.
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The goal of narrating the story from a first person perspective (different from first
person voice) at a relatively high level of intentionality is mainly achieved through
blends. In MRM, blended descriptions are created from mixing properties of “objec-
tive” elements (e.g., events, objects, and actors [205, 78]) and affective dispositions
(e.g., Ales’s current emotional state) algorithmically determined by the system. For
instance in Example 3, logical axioms selected from an ontology describing the con-
cept “mother” are blended with axioms describing affective concept “anger,” into a
“disturbingly familiar” mother. It is used to highlight that the story world is what
Ales “perceives” it as, influenced by his mental states, emotions, etc. It is important
to be clear that blending here is not the mere concatenation of words to form com-
pound phrases. It refers to the conceptual integration of multiple concepts according
to a set of cognitively-inspired optimality principles (details refer to Section 2.3.3.2).
In this case, modifier-noun phrases, some of the simplest indicators of conceptual
blends, are the final result of an underlying process that is semantic, not lexical.
Individually speaking, Example 3 offers the most interesting effects, for it pro-
vides a scenario where the user and system’s intentionality and agency are conflated.
However, the combination of all three examples provides an over-arching theme of the
story, that is, the (re)gain of identity of the main character. The contrast between
Ales’s low intentionality in the beginning of the story and his high intentionality at
the end suggests the transformation of the character. From the user’s perspective,
the unconventional experience of slowly losing control of a character is intended to
evoke critical reflections of the theme of control and hierarchy at various levels.
6.3 Major Components
So far, this chapter has situated the work in a historical web where stream of con-
sciousness literature, artificial intelligence discourse, and cognitive science research




As a future step, we shall perform more robust 
evaluation or interpretation of imaginative narrative 
works such as the ones presented in this paper. We 
have been analyzing stream-of-consciousness 
literature to inform the dynamic generation analogy-
based narrative discourse structures. We also intend 
to expand work on daydream retrieval and 
generation. For instance, daydreams can be 
cascaded to evoke further daydreaming. Finally, we 
plan to improve our grammar morphisms to achieve 
more effective natural language output. 
Conceptual Blending Theory
The Alloy Algorithm
Algorithmic concept generation is accomplished using the Alloy computer 
program for conceptual blending. It uses Joseph Goguen's algebraic semiotic 
approach to formalize conceptual spaces from conceptual blending theory as 
algebraic theories with additional structure, morphisms between these structures 
as structure preserving mappings of the constituents of these conceptual spaces, 
and the executing of a conceptual blending algorithm upon such structures 
(Goguen 1998; Harrell 2007). The blending algorithm accepts an "input 
diagram" consisting of a generic space G, two input spaces I1 and I2, and 
morphisms G I1 and G I2. The algorithm outputs a blended space B, and two 
morphisms I1 B and I2 B, integrating conceptual spaces based upon structural 
principles such as degrees of commutativity, typecasting, and preservation of 
sorts (types) and constructors from the input spaces in the blended space.
Critique of AI
This research has been conducted as a "critical technical practice," based on 
Agre's critical approach to AI engineering practice and critique (Agre 1997). 
Under this framework, the narration of system intentionality by engineering 






Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's 
conceptual blending theory describes the 
means by which concepts are integrated 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002), guided by 
"uniform structural and dynamic principles." 
Figure 1 depicts the integration of two input 
spaces I1 and I2 as guided by the shared 
structure indicated by the generic space G, to 
form a blended conceptual space B. An 
expanded account of the foundational role 
cognitive linguistics plays for GRIOT can be 
found in (Goguen and Harrell 2006, Harrell 
2005B).
II. Theoretical Framework
GRIOT is a system for implementing interactive and generative multimedia 
computational narratives, poetry, and other discourse forms. (Harrell 2007) It  
consists of: theme domains (ontologies), phrase templates (sets of clauses organized 
by narrative discourse), "event structure machine" (controller of the set and order of 
the phrase templates to instantiated). User input is used to select the conceptual 
space network from the set of domains.
 
This project has extended GRIOT in the following aspects:
1. Select Input Diagram: a finite state machine selects domains from which the input 
diagram is constructed from, in order to represent character states such as emotions.
2. Phrase Templates: annotated 
sets of phrase templates that can 
dynamically extend the discourse 
structure, in order to incorporate 
varying degrees of daydreaming 
at run-time.
3. Phase Templates: dynamically 
vary whether a phrase accepts 
user input.


























Authored Components User Interface
This project attempts to design authorial narration and user interpretation of system 
intention, and hence creativity. The following are the dimensions along which scales of 
intentionality can be embodied:
      1) User action / System action: 
        e.g.: direct response to user input commands / system choosing actions. 
      2) User input for content generation  / System generated daydreams: 
        e.g.: textual output to user-controlled actions / generative daydreams to user-input.
      3) Human author determines style of narration / System structures style of narration: 
        e.g.: pre-scripted authorial voice, person, narrative clauses /  generated authorial 
             voice, person, steam of consciousness style exposition.
Currently, the system intention is formalized by: 
      1) the proportion of daydreams output / the main narrative,
      2) the proportion of algorithmically selected character actions / user selected actions,      
      3) the proportion of generated subjective description output (mapped from blends  
          generated by Alloy) / pre-scripted phrases objectively describing the results of 
          character actions. These phrases are also organized into subsets of varying levels of 
          descriptive exposition (refer to the Sample Outputs section).
        
IV. Scale of Intentionality
V. Results and Sample Output
As a first application of the concepts above, we designed the micro-narrative (a small work focused on causal and temporal coherence, but not larger grained narrative structures such as 
plot) of a robot named Ales opening a door and entering a room.  (Color coding: ->USER INPUT, conceptual blending, daydream, and systematic outputs)
(at the end of a long corridor a door loomed. ales looked up; 
he decided to see it as [red/yellow/blue/grey/brown] ...)
BLUE
(. it was dusty wood , almost exactly like the one in his 
mother's bedroom.)
(the room where he had his first encounter of tune-up and oil 
change had similar doors.) (the oil change left a sickly feeling 
in his gut) (he would rust like the tin man before enduring 
another.)
(he raised his steel arm to [knock/open/open_gently/ 
punch/open_carelessly] the door...)
OPEN_GENTLY
(the door responded as doors do.) (the funny noise reminds 
him of) (the hospitals, the junkyards, he went to frequently)
(, which was so unpleasant that he always avoided it ever 
since, ohhh, the same noise.) (he paused a bit before he 
walked in.)
(the gloomy white room looked somewhat like the room he 
was born.)  (his unforgettably familiar mother probably had 
left him quite early.) (he got to know her mainly through) 
(reading about her in the books) (than his own memories.) 
(the things she liked to wear, the way she smiled.)
(ales couldn't help [examining/glancing/looking] around ...)
EXAMINING
(. no one was inside; no things either except) (a large 
window.) 
END 
("a door!" ales processed, his optics sensed the color as 
[red/yellow/blue/grey/brown] ...)
-> RED
(. distasteful wood-colored , he thought, just like the one 
in mother's bedroom.) (The room where he had his first 
encounter of tune-up and oil change had similar doors.) 
(the oil change left a sickly feeling in his gut) (he would 
rust like the tin man before enduring another.) (ales 
stopped, computed, and moved again to [knock/open/ 
open_gently/punch/open_carelessly] the door ...)
-> PUNCH
(The door creaked into an entrance.) (the funny noise 
reminds him of) (the hospitals, the junkyards, he went to 
frequently) (, which was so unpleasant that he always 
avoided it ever since, ohhh, the same noise.) (he paused 
a bit before he walked in.) (the bothersome light room 
looked somewhat like the room he was born.) (his 
disturbingly familiar mother probably had left him quite 
early.) (most of his knowledge about her came more 
from) (the engineer pointing to the women in pictures)
(his memories of experiences.) (the things she liked to 
wear, the way she smiled.) (ales couldn't help 
[examining/glancing/looking] around ...)
-> GLANCING
(. there was no one inside; nor was there much 
furniture, except) (a couple pieces of furniture.)
END
(ales approached the door. in his visual scan it was 
painted [red/yellow/blue/grey/brown] ...)
-> RED
(.) (he raised his mechanical arm to [knock/open/ 
open_gently/punch/open_carelessly] the door ...)
-> PUNCH
(it opened. ) (ales entered.)




Example 1: low intentionality Example 2: medium intentionality Example 3: high intentionality 
Our project addresses both cultural and technical aspects of deploying artificial 
intelligence for creative purposes:
1. To explore conceptual blending-based creative imagining through the 
narration of daydreaming. 
2. To highlight variable perception of system intentionality as a creative and 
expressive narrative tool.
I. Goal
Jichen Zhu, D. Fox Harrell, Ph.D  | Digital Media Program | Georgia Institute of Technology
AAAI 2008 Spring Symposium on Creative Intelligent Systems, 03.26.08 - 03.28.08
Daydreaming with Intention: Scalable Blending-Based Imagining and Agency in Generative Interactive Narrative
Figure 26: Architecture Diagram of GRIOT [77]
and calls for a new form of computational narrative, on the subject of daydreams,
memories, and reveries. We have also discussed the various ways in which the novel
design concepts of scale of intentionality and agency play are embodied in MRM. This
section provide a high level overview of the major components that are essential to
the deployment of scale of intentionality. The explanation is illustrated with Example
3 from the previous section, where different elements in the output are annotated in
Figure 27.
The GRIOT system [77] (Section 2.4.2) is the foundation of Memory, Reverie
Machine both in terms of technical implementation and our approach to computa-
tional narrative [80]. A more detailed technical description can be found in Harrell’s
dissertation work [81], where the detail of Figure 26 is explained.
Before we start, it is important to distinguish between the project’s various levels
of technological and expressive investigation and production: (1) the system as an
abstract model for how computational narratives ca be made generative, exten i-
ble, and reconfigurable, (2) the system that generates the story, (3) the narration
techniques developed, (4) the story content, and (5) each instance of output.
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Figure 27: An Annotated Example of MRM ’s Output
The emphases in this section are upon (1) and (2), which comprise our techno-
logical framework as inspired by the historical context and theoretical and creative
frameworks above, and secondarily on (3), the narrative techniques to depict inner
thoughts, and (4) the self-reflexive subject matter. (3) is heavily influenced by Vir-
ginia Woolf’s stream of consciousness novel Mrs. Dalloway [218]. Below we highlight
particular aspects of the system relevant to the technical and expressive goals involv-
ing the narration of system intentionality.
6.3.1 Dynamic Narration of Affect Using the Alloy Conceptual Blending
Algorithm
Computationally, our system builds upon the GRIOT framework, which identifies,
formalizes, and implements an algorithm for structural aspects of conceptual blend-
ing with applications to computational narrative. Alloy is the primary generative
component of the GRIOT system. The Alloy algorithm, when modestly applied in
MRM, generates blends involving connecting current experiences of events, objects,
and actors [205, 78] to affective concepts determined by current state, in this case
emotional state, of the protagonist (discussed below). In the example in Figure 27,
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logical axioms selected from an ontology (semantically structured database) describ-
ing the concept “door” are blended with axioms describing affective concept “anger.”
The Alloy algorithm uses a set of formal optimality criteria to determine the
most common-sense manner in which the concepts should be integrated [81]. The
result is a blended axiom or set of axioms that is then mapped to natural language
output. For example, the description of the door ranges from “distasteful wood-
colored” to “irritatingly sturdy” or more depending on the concepts being blended.
Since blending refers to the conceptual integration of multiple concepts, it is important
to be clear that blending is not the mere concatenation of words to form compound
phrases. In this case, compound phrases, some of the simplest indicators of conceptual
blends, are the final result of an underlying process that is semantic, not lexical. It
is not difficult to imagine that the phrase “inviting gateway” from the sample output
in introduction comes from blending concepts of “door” and “happiness” and trying
to articulate the outcome in the English language.
Constructing blends between objective and affective concepts allows us to achieve
a balance between author determined plot and variable theme or emotional tenor. An
artifact required by the plot can be depicted in various ways based on the character
Ales internal emotional state. The highly subjective description, in turn, portrays
personality traits of the character, a recurrent technique in Mrs. Dalloway.
6.3.2 The Emotional State Machine
Actions taken by a character in a computational narrative, which are usually (but not
exclusively) selected by a user, can guide building up of a profile that describes user’s
preferences, history of actions, and analysis of trends in those actions. A simple, but
effective, step in this direction is tracking the emotional state of a character based
upon actions that the character has taken. Memory, Reverie Machine allows user
to directly influence the emotional state of Ales, and hence the selection of affective
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concepts for blends. She may choose among an array of pre-defined actions, such as
seeing objects as “red,” “yellow,” “blue,” or another color in the robot character’s op-
tic sensors, each connecting to a particular emotion. A keyword “red,” for instance,
may trigger an affective concept “anger.” These emotional mappings are designed
aesthetically by the authors to achieve narrative effects, not as an attempt at cog-
nitively modeling emotion using a computer as has been the stated goal in multiple
traditional AI projects.
A successful interactive narrative requires a careful balance between the user’s
agency and author’s intention. In our system, user’s impact on the character’s emo-
tion is moderated by the emotional state machine component for the sake of narrative
consistency. The state machine records Ales’s current emotion based on the entire
history of user input, instead of the most immediate one. It guarantees that changes
of Ales’s emotions will be gradual, even if user input oscillates between opposite
emotions.
6.3.3 Memory Structuring and Retrieval
In MRM, we seek to make output coherently extensible at runtime. For this project
we allow the narrative to be punctuated with episodic remembered events and longer
reveries of remembered experience. Again, this is not meant as an experiment in cog-
nitive modeling or advanced algorithmic design, our goal is to demonstrate discourse
that is meaningfully reconfigurable to serve an author’s expressive goals in dialogue
with a user’s selected actions. In this case, each memory is annotated based on its
subject matter and is retrieved when at least one subject item appears in the story
line. In the example in Figure 27, Ales’s unpleasant memory of hospitals and junk-
yards is triggered by the opening of a door through the mutual subject of a certain
sound. The system also keeps track of the emotional tone of each memory and selects
a memory only if it does not clash with the current emotional state. The example at
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the start of the Introduction also illustrates this feature.
We have described the major components of Memory, Reverie Machine that align
with our tale of inner-thought and AI in historical concern through illustrative exam-
ples. To result in a longer form interactive and generative story, of course, requires
expanding each component. In the next section we reflect upon our accomplishments
and challenges and indicate both near and long term future directions for the project.
In summary, Memory, Reverie Machine is an interactive narrative system de-
signed explicitly to reflect the design principles of scale of intentionality and agency
play. It highlights a dance between user and system intentionality through the narra-
tion of memories, intentions and dispositions. This chapter has described the authors’
motivation of algorithmically evoking memories and daydreams, and how this goal
is consistent with an interdisciplinary framework that combines stream of conscious-
ness literature, AI, and cognitive linguistic research. Detailed account of how system
intentionality and agency are instantiated and adjusted for narrative purposes com-
poses a major part of our discussion. Particularly, we have examined the narrative at
the action, content, and perspective level. Finally, major components of MRM was
described.
Conceived as a critical technical practice [3], and acknowledging cognitive linguis-
tics critiques of computational approaches to cognitive modeling [49], this work is
not an attempt to reduce mental activities to a formal algorithmic process. We are
inspired by the fact that algorithmic and knowledge engineering approaches them-
selves can be expressive as in the practice of “expressive AI” [135] and its recent
generalization into “expressive processing” [209].
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A “program” which could produce music as [Chopin or Bach] did would
have to wander around the world on its own, fighting its way through
the maze of life and feeling every moment of it. It would have to un-
derstand the joy and loneliness of a chilly night wind, the longing for a
cherished hand, the inaccessibility of a distant town, the heartbreak and
regeneration after a human death. It would have to know resignation and
world-weariness, grief and despair, determination and victory, piety and
awe... Therein, and therein only, lie the sources of meaning in music.
— Hofstadter, D. Gödel, Escher, Bach [93], 1979
Can computers have intentionality? This is an underlying question central to
this dissertation. On the one hand, our knowledge about the fundamental differences
between humans and computers, as well as our lived experiences, all points to a
negative answer. As Hofstadter articulated beautifully above, the depth of human
emotions and our socialization into the everyday practices of our culture, the basis
of intentionality, is not replicable by computer in the foreseeable future, if ever. This
is the position many theorists take, including Searle. On the other hand, we have
witnessed an increasing cultural importance of computer systems that are designed to
appear intentional, to perform tasks, and to exhibit complex behaviors usually seen
as the territory of intentional human phenomena. These systems vary from household
appliances (e.g., Roomba vacuum robot) and virtual characters (e.g., Sims characters)
to expressive artifacts such as Voyager and EMI. Compared to programs such as Adobe
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Photoshop, these intentional systems seem to produce output “about” something in
the world rather than the merely execute algorithmic rules. Even Hofstadter admits,
upon playing on the piano a mazurka composed by EMI, “I was impressed, for the
piece seemed to ‘express’ something. If I had been told it had been written by a
human, I would have had no doubts about its expressiveness. It sounded slightly
nostalgic, had a bit of Polish feeling in it, and it did not seem in any way plagiarized”
[96].
The contradiction between the ontological contemplation and our actual interac-
tion with certain computer systems is the driving force behind the theoretical inquiry
and design space exploration of intentional systems. This chapter revisits the major
arguments made in the previous chapters. After discussing the major contributions
of the study, it concludes the dissertation with future research directions.
7.1 Revisiting the Major Arguments
In the discourse of AI, system intentionality is typically seen as a technical and on-
tological property of the program and is a result of its underlying algorithms and
knowledge engineering. Drawing from the areas of hermeneutics, actor-network the-
ory, cognitive semantics theory and philosophy of mind, this dissertation proposes
a humanistic view of system intentionality and AI. Specifically, this dissertation ex-
plores two central research questions: 1) How is system intentionality formed? and 2)
What are the design implications for building systems that utilize such intentionality
as an expressive resource?
7.1.1 The Formation of System Intentionality
The primary subject of the study is intentional systems, defined with four criteria: 1)
operational opacity, 2) system autonomy, 3) human-relatable behaviors, and 4) autho-
rial intention. The term “intentionality,” following a prototype model, encompasses
not only AI systems but also AI-like systems that exist either outside of computer
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science communities or that are not described by their authors as AI systems for ide-
ological or other reasons. The social and cultural dimensions of the four criteria call
for not only a new perspective on system intentionality that does not merely consider
the underlying machine operation, but also a novel framework that puts computer
systems back into the social contexts where they are created and used.
This dissertation proposes that system intentionality arises from a complex meaning-
making network that incorporates system authors’ discursive narration and users’
hermeneutic interpretation of system intentionality in a broad social context — the
AI hermeneutic network. In other words, intentional systems are seen as texts because
they facilitate the exchange of meaning between their authors and users. Informed by
Agre’s [3] observation of the importance of intentional vocabulary in AI practice and
Hayles’ [87] critical work on Alife, this dissertation focuses on the system authors’
discursive strategies in narrating system intentionality both at the source code (func-
tions, algorithms, and system architecture) and at the representation level. Different
from many AI practitioners such as Agre and Mcdermott, this dissertation argues
that intentional narration is not an epidemic that needs to be avoided, but is rather
a constitutive component of the practice of AI. Finally, this framework stresses that
system intentionality needs to be understood within social contexts along with other
actants (e.g., other relevant systems, funding agencies, and mass media).
The application and value of the AI hermeneutic network construct is illustrated
through a close reading of an intentional system, Copycat. The analysis of the system’s
source code and a substantial corpus of technical literature published by the system’s
authors illustrate their various discursive strategies to narrate the system’s technical
operation as intentional. Based on empirical data, this dissertation demonstrates
the ways in which intentional vocabulary serves as a connection point that links the
authors’ technical and intentional narrations, both of which are necessary for AI.
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7.1.2 Design Implications
Since system intentionality is discursively narrated and interpreted in its social set-
tings, instead of being merely understood as an intrinsic and static property of the
algorithmic complexity, it may be manipulated for expressive purposes. In this re-
gard, this dissertation proposes a new design principle called a scale of intentionality.
It allows system intentionality to be dynamically adjusted along a scale. Similar to
the use of a camera, which can be one effective way of storytelling in films, this design
approach turns system intentionality into an expressive mechanism that can be used
in different forms of digital artifacts.
One aspect of a scale of intentionality (and vice versa), agency play [84], is dis-
cussed in depth. Informed by the various approaches to a human individual’s agency
in social theories, this dissertation critiques the conventional view of “agency as free
will” in digital media, often followed by the motto of “the more agency the better.”
By breaking down agency into its various dimensions (agency relationship, scope, dy-
namics, and user input direction), this new model of agency play offers specific ways
to manipulate each dimension of agency as a mechanism to convey meaning and ex-
press ideas. In the domain of digital media, it allows a more nuanced understanding
of agency that is in dialogue with social theories of this concept.
The new design principles of scale of intentionality and agency play are illus-
trated in my joint interactive narrative project Memory, Reverie Machine (MRM ),
co-developed with Fox Harrell. Different from many other works in the same genre,
the main character in MRM varies dynamically along a continuous scale between a
user-controlled avatar with low intentionality and an autonomous non-player charac-
ter with high intentionality. Using GRIOT ’s facility for algorithmically controlling
the semantic hooks for interpreting system behavior as intentional in the narrative
discourse, the authors of the system turn system intentionality into a scalable expres-
sive dimension in interactive storytelling. Expressively, the content and aesthetics
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of MRM are inspired by the fluid depiction of human subjectivity in stream of con-
sciousness literature. Technically, this work extends Harrell’s GRIOT system [81].
Overall, this dissertation represents my approach to combining critical theory and
expressive cultural productions, and to blurring the boundary between what are of-
ten perceived as an objective, clean scientific practice and subjective, messy human
activities. The theoretical framework with the case study of Copycat is intended to
highlight the “humanness” in the scientific/engineering practice of AI by foreground-
ing the authors’ discursive role as the spokespersons of their systems. The expressive
exploration of MRM, in the meantime, can be seen as an attempt to depict the hu-
man subjective and affective experience of memories and daydreams with formal and
algorithmic machine operations. Similar to my approach to system intentionality,
my objective here is not to argue about the fundamental differences between human
and computer, or to suggest that one should take over the other. The shift of social
discourse from order and homogeneity to multi-dominance and diversity has rendered
these discussions less relevant to our contemporary culture. What drives my work is
the new possibilities of emergent meaning and reflection on our human condition as
a result of the tension and synergy between human and computer.
7.2 Contributions
This section discusses the major contributions represented in this dissertation. It is
presented in an order parallel to the structure of the dissertation.
AI Hermeneutic Network This construct provides a new framework with which
to study the intentionality of computer systems, a phenomenon that has been studied
mainly with computers in isolation from their creators, users, and contexts. The AI
hermeneutic network is a unique contribution in the following ways:
• A New Perspective on System Intentionality
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The topic of intentionality in the context of computers has been discussed since
the early days of AI. Most of the debates between philosophers and AI prac-
titioners have occurred at the philosophical and ontological level, based purely
on the technical operations of computers. Certain philosophers [35] theorized
system intentionality as a derived phenomenon, perceived by humans. Accord-
ing to this theory, our tendency to read intentionality was seen mainly as a
survival instinct. However, this approach leaves almost all artifacts subject to
similar intentional reading without addressing why certain artifacts seam more
intentional than others. This dissertation proposes a new perspective on system
intentionality, one that emphasizes its narration and interpretation by human
authors and users, who communicate meanings through intentional systems in
their social and cultural context. In other words, the argument presented in
this dissertation is not a philosophical one, but a social and cultural one.
• An Analysis of Discursive Strategies of AI Practitioners
Within the traditional value system of AI, the contributions of its practitioners
are often measured in terms of the technical properties of their systems (e.g.,
algorithmic complexity, knowledge representation, and performance). In reality,
the reception of their systems is also affected by how “intentional” and “intel-
ligent” they seem. Different from the AI practitioners who argue that the use
of intentional vocabulary needs to be minimized, this dissertation argues and
demonstrates with examples that narrating the system intentionality of machine
operations is a necessary component of AI practitioners’ practice. Their vari-
ous discursive strategies need to be acknowledged and recognized, rather than
downplayed by the community.
• An Interdisciplinary Theoretical Framework
This dissertation has presented an interdisciplinary theoretical framework, drawn
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from a broad range of theories including hermeneutics, philosophy of mind,
actor-network theory, and cognitive semantics theory. These different approaches
are synthesized in a unique way that bridges the divide between humanistic
interpretations and algorithmic operations. Applying hermeneutical interpreta-
tion to AI code and literature illustrates an especially new use of hermeneutics
and a new method for understanding computational systems.
A Close Reading of a Notable AI system In order to illustrate the utility of
the AI hermeneutic network for analysis and interpretation of intentional systems,
an empirical analysis with a clear method of a full-fledged AI system, Copycat is
performed. Different from many existing humanistic readings of computational sys-
tems, the analysis addresses both the rhetoric around, and operation of, the system.
In other words, the method combines both a computer science analysis and a hu-
man interpretation of meanings. Compared with related works in software studies,
the system under study is substantial in terms of its complexity and impact in the
community. Furthermore, technical literature has been a relatively unexplored area
for studying computer systems. However, as this dissertation has shown, the tech-
nical literature provides a rich resource for analysis. Finally, this approach can be
generalized for other forms of code, not just AI systems.
Design Implications for Expressive Domains A new design strategy of agency
play has been proposed for expressive domains. Drawn from social theories of agency,
agency play intends to transform agency from a holy-grail in digital media design to
an expressive resource that can convey meanings and express ideas. Agency play is
also important from a social perspective because it encourages reflection of our human
condition by allowing multiple understandings of agency in addition to “agency as
free will.”
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Memory, Reverie Machine MRM is designed to explore new design possibilities
fostered by the new design theories of agency play and scale of intentionality. It
offers a concrete example of the new design possibilities in an expressive domain by
creating a character that oscillates between low levels of intentionality (an avatar)
and high levels (a non-player character). Inspired by the aesthetics in Woolf’s Mrs.
Dalloway [218], MRM ’s emphasis on the associative connections between events and
memories and its loose story structure offers a unique narrative experience that is
different from many planning-based interactive narrative works.
7.3 Future Directions
There are several aspects in this work that are subject to future exploration. This
section provides a brief discussion of some of the promising future directions in both
theoretical inquiries and technical/expressive production.
Empirical Study of User Interpretation This document has focused primarily
on system authors’ narration of system intentionality. Although some discussion has
been devoted to users’ interpretations an empirical user study is needed to support
and expand this aspect of the AI hermeneutic network.
Software Hermeneutics The phenomenon of system intentionality is shared by
a large range of digital and other technical artifacts. It is a broad area that will
only grow in social significance and open up a number of possible research direc-
tions and applications in the domains of interactive narrative, gaming, interactive art
installation, robotics, and human computer interaction (HCI).
Multicultural Perspectives of System Intentionality The history of comput-
ing has been narrated and studied mainly from a Euro-American vantage point. How-
ever, computing and software is not as culturally-neutral as many computer scientists
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believe it to be. As Harrell puts forth in his article [79], there are other culturally
grounded systems to pursue and even European/American grounded cultural foun-
dations could be made explicit. The issue of the cultural roots of computing is of
particular relevance to the framework of intentional systems, as the latter empha-
sizes the interpretive process of users, who inevitably bring their own cultural values
and heritage. An important question is how would a different cultural point of view
influence the narration and interpretation of system intentionality?
Extending MRM MRM is designed, in part, for inquiry into what is seen as
especially promising avenues for research into agency play and scale of intentionality.
Algorithmically, MRM can be extended to be more generative. For instance, the
plot development is currently hard-coded and does not vary according to the user
interaction. To enhance the manifestation of system intentionality and agency, I
plan to explore various story generation techniques. A particularly interesting line of
future research is the use of analogy to structure and modify the course of the story.
For instance, events in the recalled memories can be transferred to the main story
world through analogical mapping.
For literary artists and digital media arts practitioners, rich prose, genre experi-
mentation, and interaction design will perhaps be seen as the ripest areas for future
exploration. The current interface that requires the user to input keywords can be eas-
ily bolstered into, for instance, a graphical user interface. A user could also perform
meaningful actions such as opening doors, washing dishes, setting visual scanners,
and more through a visual gesture interface mechanism. Alternately, in a text-based
system, user input could certainly be more complex than interactive fiction styled
simple keywords, using for instance a natural language-based interface.
This dissertation celebrates the ever-changing technology and the new expressions
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that it brings along. At heart, it is about humans. The proposed theory and design
is meant to underscore the warmth of the human touch even in what seems to be the
coldest machine piece or the most objective science/engineering practice. At its best,
it is also about dreams and memories. We create these lifeless artifacts, digital or
analog, and choose to believe that they share similar connection to the world as us as
a way to pursue our dreams and embody our memories. At the centre of all above,
is the intentionality, both of human and of machine.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE DATA FROM THE TECHNICAL LITERATURE
ON COPYCAT
Table 11: Use of Intentional Vocabulary from paper
“The Copycat Project: A Model of Mental Fluidity and
Analogy-making” [98].
Term Context Source
- An earthquake takes place when subterranean
structures are under sufficient pressure that some-
thing suddenly slips. Without the pressure, ob-
viously, there would be no slippage. Analogous
statement holds for pressures bringing about con-
ceptual slippage: only under specific pressures will
concepts slip into related ones.
[98, pp.207]
- That is, the Copycat project is not about simulat-
ing analogy-making per se, but about simulating
the very crux of human cognition: fluid concepts
[98, pp.208]
know Just as the program knows the immediate neigh-
bors of every letter in the alphabet, it also knows
the successors and predecessors of small integers.
[98, pp.210]
203
know Just as the program knows the immediate neigh-
bors of every letter in the alphabet, it also knows
the successors and predecessors of small integers.
[98, pp.210]
treat Copycat can even treat small integers as it does
letters - it can notice relationship between num-
bers, can group numbers together, map them onto
each other, and so on.
[98, pp.210]
notice Copycat can even treat small integers as it does
letters - it can notice relationship between num-
bers, can group numbers together, map them onto
each other, and so on.
[98, pp.210]
group Copycat can even treat small integers as it does
letters - it can notice relationship between num-
bers, can group numbers together, map them onto
each other, and so on.
[98, pp.210]
map Copycat can even treat small integers as it does
letters - it can notice relationship between num-
bers, can group numbers together, map them onto
each other, and so on.
[98, pp.210]
recognize Thus, copycat is capable of recognizing not only
that the structure
[98, pp.210]
resist Copycat tends to resist bringing numbers into the
picture, unless there seems to be some compelling
reason to do so
[98, pp.210]
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- Finally, while humans tend to scan strings of ro-
man letters from left to right, are much better
at recognizing forwards alphabetical order than
backwards alphabetical order, and have somewhat
greater familiarity with the beginning of the alpha-
bet than its middle or end, the Copycat program
is completely free of these biases. This should
not be regarded as a defect of the program, but a
strength, because it keeps the project’s focus away
from the domain-specific and nongeneralizable de-
tails.
[98, pp.210]
- In fact, the inspiration for the architecture comes
in part from a computer model of low-level and
high-level auditory perception: the Hearsay II
speech-understanding project.
[98, pp.210]
- Creative human thinkers manifest an exquisite se-
lectivity of this sort - when they are faced with
a novel situation, what bubbles up from their un-
conscious and pops to mind is typically a small
set of concepts that “fit like a glove”, without a
host of extraneous and irrelevant concepts being




It (the Slipnet) can thought of, roughly, as Copy-
cat’s long-term memory
[98, pp.211]
- The Workplace is the locus of perceptual activity [98, pp.211]
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- The basic image for the Slipnet is that of a network
of interrelated concepts.
[98, pp.212]
- Nodes acquire varying levels of activation (which
can be thought of as a measure of relevance to the
situation at hand)
[98, pp.212]
- The further away a given aspect of a situation is
from direct perception, the more likely it is to be
involved in what people consider to be the essence
of the situation
[98, pp.212]
drive We therefore built into the architecture a strong
drive, if a deep aspect of a situation is perceived,
to use it and to try to let it influence further per-
ception of the situation
[98, pp.213]
propensity there is a built-in propensity in the program to
prefer slipping shallow concepts rather than deep
concepts, when slippages have to be made
[98, pp.214]
prefer there is a built-in propensity in the program to
prefer slipping shallow concepts rather than deep
concepts, when slippages have to be made
[98, pp.214]
mold Slipnet is constantly altering its “shape” in at-
tempting to mold itself increasingly accurately to
fit the situation at hand
[98, pp.214]
- It (copycat) aims at modeling cognitive-level be-




- The basic image for the Workspace is that of a
busy construction site in which structures of many
sizes and at many locations are being worked on
simultaneously by independent crews, some occa-
sionally being torn down to make way for new,
hopefully better ones.
[98, pp.216]
- this image comes essentially from the biological
cell; the Workspace corresponds roughly to the cy-
toplasm of a cell, in which enzymes carrying out
diverse tasks all throughout the cell’s cytoplasm
are the construction crews, and the structures
built up are all sorts of hierarchically-structured
biomolecules.
[98, pp.216]
unhappiness is determined by the object’s salience, which is a
function of both the object’s importance and un-
happiness
[98, pp.217]
unhappy An unhappy object is one that has few or no
connections to the rest of the object in the
Worldspace, and that thus seems to cry out for
more attention
[98, pp.217]
cry out An unhappy object is one that has few or no
connections to the rest of the object in the




- the architecture honors the old motto “The
squeaky wheel gets the oil”, even if only proba-
bilistically so.
[98, pp.217]
- In particular, people are clearly quicker to recog-
nize two neighboring objects as identical than as
being related in some abstract way. Thus the ar-
chitecture has an intrinsic speed-bias in favor of
sameness bonds: it tends to spot them and to con-
struct them more quickly than it spots and con-
structs bonds representing other kinds of relation-
ships.
[98, pp.217]
- The fact that a and k are unrelated letters of the
alphabet is simply ignored by most people. Copy-
cat is constructed to behave similarly.
[98, pp.219]
- all the aforementioned types of perceptual actions
- scanning, bond-making, group-making, bridge-
building, and so forth - take place in parallel.
[98, pp.219]
- A useful image is that of highly coherent macro-
scopic structures (e.g. physical bridges) built by
a colony of thousands of myopic ants or termites
working semi-independently but nonetheless co-
operatively. (The “ants” of Copycat - namely,
codelets - will be described in the next subsection.)
-
- the system is thus far more like a swarm of ants
than like a rigid military hierarchy.
[98, pp.220]
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- We now turn to the description of Copycat’s “ants”
[of codelets] and how they are biased.
[98, pp.220]
- There are two types of codelets: scout codelets and
effector codelets
[98, pp.221]
notice For example, one scout codelet might notice that
the adjacent r’s in mrrjjj are instances of the same
letter
[98, pp.221]
desire Top-down codelets represent specific pressures
evoked by the specific situation at hand (e.g. the
desire, in Problem 1 and 2, to look for more suc-
cessor relations, once some have already been dis-
covered).
[98, pp.222]
- The mission of such a codelet is to scan the
Workspace in search of instances of its spawning
concept.
[98, pp.222]
- The shifting population of codelets on the Coder-
ack bears a close resemblance to the shifting en-
zyme population of a cell, which evolves in a sen-
sitive way in response to the ever-changing makeup
of the cell’s ectoplasm.
[98, pp.223]
feel Whenever a codelet is given the chance to run,
the various pressures for which it is a proxy make
themselves slightly felt
[98, pp.224]




- Much the same could be said for the Copycat:
an outside observer is free, after a run is over,
to “parse” the run in terms of specific, discrete
processes, and to attempt to imposes such a vo-
cabulary on the system’s behavior; however, that
parsing and labeling is not intrinsic to the system,
and such interpretations are in no way unique or
absolute, any more than in the basketball game.
In other words, a long sequence of codelet actions
can add up to what could be perceived, a posteri-
ori and by an outsider; as a single coherent drive






The basic image is that of many “fingers of explo-
ration” simultaneously feeling out various poten-
tial pathways at different speeds.
[98, pp.226]
fight This entails a “fight” between the incumbent
structure and the upstart
[98, pp.226]
- This is how the system’s actual viewpoint develops
with time
[98, pp.226]
- Incidentally, this aspect of Copycat reflects the
psychologically important fact that conscious ex-
perience is essentially unitary, although it is of




- A metaphor for the parallel terraced scan is pro-
vided by the image of a vast column of ants march-




the system loses this naive, open-minded quality;





the system loses this naive, open-minded quality;





At the start of a run, the system is open-minded,
and for good reasons: it knows nothing about the
situation it is facing
[98, pp.228]
knows At the start of a run, the system is open-minded,
and for good reasons: it knows nothing about the
situation it is facing
[98, pp.228]
facing At the start of a run, the system is open-minded,
and for good reasons: it knows nothing about the
situation it is facing
[98, pp.228]
- Reflecting the system’s uncertain advances and re-
treats as it builds and destroys structures in its
attempts to home in on the best way to look at a
situation
[98, pp.228]
- The codelet will thus tend to be more attracted to
A than to B
[98, pp.229]
willing Thus, the system itself controls the degree to which
it is willing to take risks
[98, pp.229]
211
personality and those data provided some of the most impor-
tant insights into the program’s “personality”
[98, pp.230]
- The earilier image of the swiftly-changing
panorama of a basketball game may help to make
this necessary necction between asynchronous par-
allelism and randomness more intuitive
[98, pp.232]
- except in the absurd sense of millions of monkeys
plunking away on piano keyboards for trillions of
years and coming up with “Blue Moon” once in a
blue moon
[98, pp.232]
- when there is a lot of fog ahead, and their purpose
is precisely to get an evenly-distributed sense of
what lies out there in the fog rather than simply
plunging ahead blindly, at random
[98, pp.233]
- The foggier things are, the more unbiased should
be the scouting mission.
[98, pp.233]
deal demonstrates how [the program] deals with these
issues, how it responds to variations in pressues,
and how it is able, starting from exactly the same
state on each new problem, to fluidly adapt to a
range of different situations.
[98, pp.234]
responds demonstrates how [the program] deals with these
issues, how it responds to variations in pressues,
and how it is able, starting from exactly the same
state on each new problem, to fluidly adapt to a
range of different situations.
[98, pp.234]
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adapt demonstrates how [the program] deals with these
issues, how it responds to variations in pressues,
and how it is able, starting from exactly the same
state on each new problem, to fluidly adapt to a
range of different situations.
[98, pp.234]





that it had, in some sense, a reasonable “under-
standing” of what was going on in the problem.
[98, pp.236]
- An alternative many people prefer is ljk.. [98, pp.238]
- Time and cognitive resources being limited, it is
vital to resist nonstandard ways of looking at situ-
ations without strong pressure to do so. You don’t
check the street sign at the corner, every time you
go outdoors, to reassure yourself that your street’s
name hasn’t been changed.
[98, pp.240]
- In a sense, answer wyz to Problem 6 seems like
a miniature “conceptual revolution” or “paradigm
shift”.
[98, pp.244]
like The answer xyz, whose very high temperature of
74 indicates that the program did not “like” it at
all,
[98, pp.246]
desperation It takes the “desperation” caused by the z-snag to
allow such strange ideas any chance at all
[98, pp.246]
- the persistent high temperature - make the nor-
mally unappealing r-z bridge a bit more tempting
[98, pp.247]
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- the program tends to see sameness groups quite
fast
[98, pp.249]
- It would be disastrous if Copycat were willing to
bring in unlikely notions.
[98, pp.249]
- coupled with the system’s unhappiness as it failure
to.
[98, pp.249]
- the successor relations among them might be spot-
ted by bottom-up codelets.
[98, pp.249]
- a small renegade codelet, totally unaware of the




Copycat opts for a middle way, in which it quite
literally takes calculated risks all the time
[98, pp.256]
- both source and target strings come quite quickly
to be perceived as successor groups.
[98, pp.257]
- encouraging a broader and more open-minded
search
[98, pp.258]
- the system’s attachment to a viewpoint already
established
[98, pp.258]
sniffed out unusual avenues are more likely to at least be




One such neighbor-concept is alphabetic-first,
which is now briefly given the chance to show its
relevance
[98, pp.259]
- they almost cry out to be mapped onto each other
- not because the system can anticipate the great
insight that such a mapping will bring
[98, pp.259]
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- they almost cry out to be mapped onto each other
- not because the system can anticipate the great
insight that such a mapping will bring
[98, pp.259]
- Once the system tries it out [98, pp.259]
- which means that the emerging new view will tend
to get supported
[98, pp.260]
- building a completely new view of the situation [98, pp.261]
- the process of arriving at answer wyz to be
very similar, on an abstract level, to the process
whereby a full-scale conceptual revolution takes
place in science
[98, pp.261]
- Copycat was forced to look for solutions [98, pp.261]
- Copycat was lucky enough to come across the dou-
ble reversal.
[98, pp.262]
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